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Occupational Hazards
I. THE NEED FOR ACTION
It is not popular to say that Canadian society is divided into two classes
-capitalists and workers, or ruling class and the oppressed. Acknowledge-
ment that such division exists would require accepting that a deep conflict
exists between classes of people, conflict which is continuous. Accordingly,
much is made of the apparent merging of the "haves" and "have-nots" as
evidence of the lack of class differentiation. Usually such reasoning is ac-
companied by assertions that political and social aims can be satisfied through
the electoral process.1 Conflicts that do exist are explained as inevitable re-
sults of clashes in a pluralistic society where a variety of values and interests
interact. The prevailing ideology is that such conflicts are not serious because,
at bottom, all members of society share the same overall respect for pluralism
and understand that it is legitimate for everyone to use all "responsible"
means to achieve their personal and group interests. Such battles are quite
different from those which would take place if there were but two rival classes
in society with irreconcilible objectives. If that were the case, a war of exter-
mination would be fought. The pluralists apparently see no evidence of such a
war around them, not even an analogue of it.
When nations fall out it is sometimes difficult to perceive whether or not
they are at war. One supposes that an exchange of angry diplomatic notes, or
a recall of ambassadorial personnel, or the calling for a vote of condemnation
at the United Nations are clearly not acts of war. The parties are still using
dispute mechanisms which they believe can solve the difference between them
by means acceptable to both. If one of the countries involved sets up a naval
blockade preventing the other from obtaining necessary supplies, some con-
troversy might arise as to whether or not a state of war exists. There will
be no doubt about the matter if one country issues a written declaration that
a state of war exists. Similarly, there will be no doubt at all if the two nations
assemble all their people and weapons and begin destroying each other. The
injuring, killing and destruction that will ensue will be indisputable evidence of
war. Now, in our kind of industrial society, if members of one clearly iden-
tifiable class of society are injured, killed and destroyed on a massive scale
on a routine basis while members of the other class are relatively immune
from such disaster, why is this not seen as evidence of war?
What follows is a series of tables and figures which, while not conclu-
sively establishing the incidents and distribution of industrial injuries and dis-
abling occupation-related diseases, go a long way to show the nature and
scope of industrial disaster which faces workers engaged in manufacturing
1 For instance, in the standard labour law casebook in Canada, the authors (when
providing a rationale for the exclusive bargaining agency rule in the United States and
Canada) argue that unions were not seen as vehicles for political social expression,
suggesting such needs were satisfied by other institutions. This was so because by the time
that trade unionism had developed "basic political rights had been obtained by their mem-
bers" and "[tihe widely shared feeling that working class unity was not essential to the
satisfaction of fundamental political and material needs", which existed diminished people's
need to use trade unions as agents for "long-range social and political change". Industrial
Relations Centre, Queens University, Labour Relations Law (2d ed., Kingston: Labour
Relations Law Casebook Group, 1974) at 227.
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enterprises, as compared to the dangers facing people working in other situa-
tions and in much different capacities. We begin with a table that indicates the
difference that the nature of work makes to one's life expectancy and to the
likelihood of dying as a result of a disease associated with one's occupation.
Death from Lung
Occupations all causes Tuberculosis Cancer Bronchitis
Workers
Coal face miners 180 294 140 293
Construction riggers 142 138 152 149
Engineering labourers 139 169 151 217
Furnacemen 108 106 168 151
Fishermen 144 171 188 148
Textile process workers 133 111 116 161
Dockers 136 180 171 220
Kitchen hands 130 410 88 165
Professional Classes
Mine managers 66 18 56 33
Contracting managers 50 33 66 21
Engineering managers 70 17 68 25
Personnel managers 67 40 44 64
Ministers, MPs 75 29 59 ?
Judges, solicitors 76 33 40 24
Clergymen 62 9 17 17
Teachers 60 23 34 23
The table is explained as follows:
"The report calculates its statistics by establishing the total number of deaths
in all occupations and then applying the national average to each of the 340
occupational groups that it studies. This average is called a 100. Where less
than the average number of deaths for all workers is found, the figure is below
a 100 and where more, above. On this scientific basis, which takes years to
compile, averages are found for deaths from all causes and certain diseases
and illnesses. Some examples from the report are shown, [above]."'2
There cannot be much doubt that the likelihood of contracting certain
types of diseases is much higher among people of one class than it is among
persons who belong to another class.3
2 Kinnersly, The Hazards of Work: How to Fight Them (London: Pluto Press, 1973)
at 8-9.
3 We also note that we have used the word "class" in a rather loose fashion in this
context. But, for our purposes, it suffices to show that certain kinds of productive workers
die much more often from the effects of specific diseases than do members of working
groups which belong to quite different income groups in our society. For a table giving
a similar indication note Table D9 in Ont. Report of the Royal Commission on the Health
and Safety of Workers in Mines (the Ham Commission) (Toronto, 1976). The increased
hazards for the population in one part of the province when compared to the whole of
the province may be explained, in part, by the fact that in Northern Ontario people work
in far more dangerous conditions than elsewhere in the province. In particular, this is due
to the prevalence of mining industries.
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This paper wishes to concentrate particularly on combatting the effect
of occupation health hazards that cause disabling disease. There are no satis-
factory figures that indicate how much disease in our society is due to occupa-
tional circumstances. Thus, it is impossible to say how serious the problem is
in statistical terms. Professor Ison has indicated that the problem is certainly
many times larger than statistical compilation from figures such as Workmen's
Compensation Boards' records indicate. He bases this on the fact that of all
reported deaths from all causes, 75.6 percent are attributed to disease, and
that of all disability pensions paid under the Canada Pension Plan, 95.2 per-
cent relate to disabilities resulting from disease. By comparison the Alberta,
British Columbia and Manitoba Workmen's Compensation Boards attribute
compensation payable for disability due to disease at somewhere between a
mere 3 percent to 17 percent of all claims they process. This suggests that
most disease in Canada is not work-related. Professor Ison is not convinced:
Thus while the bulk of permanent disabilities and premature deaths result from
disease, the bulk of workers' compensation claims for death and permanent disable-
ment result from trauma. There is no obvious explanation for the contrast. A logical
possibility, of course, is that only a small proportion of disabilities from disease
result from employment. But that explanation could not be accepted with any
confidence because the lists of disabling and fatal diseases include some larger-
volume categories in respect of which the etiology is unknown or uncertain, either
with regard to the category as a whole or with regard to a significant proportion
of cases in the category. With regard to some of these large-volume categories,
such as cancer, it is known that some proportion of the total result from employment,
but it is not known exactly, or even roughly, what proportion of the total result from
employment.
It is possible that the actual incidents of disablement from industrial disease
could be several times that which would be indicated by the statistics of compensa-
tion claims.4
Professor Ison's cautious approach is meritorious and we, for our part, are
discouraged from speculation. But there are figures which indicate the nature
of the industrial hazard faced by workers even if it does not prove the precise
extent and scope of it.
Boden and Wegman write as follows:
Every year roughly 14,000 American workers are killed in on-the-job accidents;
more than 2 million are injured. Fatalities from job related illnesses are estimated
(accurate data is scarce) to run as high as 200,000 a year.5
A more conservative estimate is found in the American President's Report on
Occupational Safety and Health, 1972, which stated that as many as 100,000
fatalities per year are due to occupation-caused diseases. 6 Dr. Irving Selikoff,
a pioneer in occupational disease research, documents that in the United States
4,000 miners will die every year and that their deaths will be attributed to
4 Ison, The Dimensions of Industrial Disease, Research and Current Issues Series,
No. 35 (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1978) at 2.
5 From Working Papers for a New Society (May-June 1978, at 43). These statistics
are derived from National Safety Council, Accident Facts 18 (1972).
6 United States, Executive Office of the President, President's Report on Occupational
Safety and Health, (1972), at 111.
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black lung disease. Further, he shows the coal mining industry has produced,
to date, roughly 210,000 totally disabled miners. In the asbestos industry,
which has been Dr. Selikoff's main area of research, he has come up with
some staggering figures. He took a group of pipe coverers who belonged to a
New York City union local named the International Association of Heat and
Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers, a group whose members could all be
accounted for for the period 1943-1963. There were 632 men in the unit. By
statistically determining how many people in an "average" group of a similar
size in society should have died, or should have died of particular causes, such
as lung cancer, and then comparing these "average" figures to what actually
had happened to the members in the pipe coverers' group, Professor Selikoff
found the following facts. There should have been six or seven deaths attri-
butable to lung cancer in an "average" group; in the pipe coverers' group there
were forty-two. There should have been no deaths of mesothelioma in an
"average" group; in the pipe coverers' group there were three. There should
have been nine deaths of cancer of the stomach, colon, oesophagus or rectum
in an "average" group; in the pipe coverers' group there were twenty-nine.
The increased incidence of disability due to working with asbestos was thus
clearly established. Dr. Selikoff then followed through by determining what
had happened to the members of the pipe coverers' group by 1975. For an
"average" group of the same number of people, similar in age and other vital
statistics, there should have been, by 1975, 305 deaths. There were in fact
451 deaths among the pipe coverers' group. There should have been fifty-two
deaths from cancer in the "average" group; there were 200 in the pipe coverers'
group.7
These examples are but the tip of the iceberg. Much-documented cases
where processing substances are linked to disease include situations in which
vinyl chloride, benzyprine, and betalneftylamine and benzodine have been
used in manufacturing. Further, the fact that silicosis is related to sandblasting
activities is well-known, as are the effects of lead smelting and of fluorspar
mining. In addition, it is pertinent to note that some 25,000 toxic substances
are presently used in manufacturing industries and that new ones are intro-
duced at the rate of 500 to 600 a year.8 The possible consequences of the use
of some of these substances by themselves, let alone in the many possible com-
binations which might be employed, are incalculable and, as research in-
creasingly shows, the implications are frightening.
7 From the text of a speech given to the Ontario N.D.P. Convention, June 12, 1976.
Dr. Selikoff also mentioned the following: "Let me give you some official credentialled
reports of what the result has been [at Elliot Lake-from a Department of Health Table
which Dr. Selikoff produced] at least until 1974. It was found that, on the whole, 3 to 10
times as many deaths were occurring of lung cancer as expected among the miners there
who had died. Altogether from 1965 to 1972 (and this is interesting, because the number
there is totally incomplete and there are many migrant miners who worked there who
were never found, and who will not be found under present circumstances) 368 men
died. Of these, 58 (15%) died of work accidents. Of the 260 men who died a "natural
death", 41 (20%) of all deaths were of lung cancer at Elliot Lake".
8 For a general discussion of this, see Page and O'Brian, Bitter Wages (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1973).
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Although it is possible to argue-and no doubt it will be argued-that
many of the diseases which disable workers would have been suffered by them
in any event, it is hard to question the flavour of the sampling of figures offered.
Quite simply, working is "dangerous to your health."9 To understand this, note
the known incidence of traumatic injury. For instance, the Workmen's Com-
pensation Board of Ontario regularly handles about 430,000 traumatic injury
claims a year. Compare this to the 85,000 car accident victims per year in
Ontario about which much public lamenting is heard, while the hazards at
work are hardly ever the subject of public debate.' 0
It seems self-evident to us that the horrific prospects for workers in in-
dustry require a dramatic call for preventive action.
II. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
In this section we will merely set out the various mechanisms which are
or could be used to lessen the materialization of risk at the work place. This
will be followed by a cursory discussion of how effective these mechanisms
could ever be.
1. As all employment situations create some inherent risk, to eliminate all risk
of injury, logically, one ought to eliminate all enterprise. This is obviously an
unacceptable means of approaching the problem. But it is put forward be-
cause it characterizes what is at issue: it is the fact of enterprise which creates
the risk. The focus of any scheme which hopes to better conditions for workers
has to be the nature of and control over the enterprise.
2. Many of the occupational hazards are created when the enterprise is set up.
In particular, the choice as to the product to be made, the materials to be used
in that process, the design and structure of the buildings and selection of
equipment, are all matters which are decided by the entrepreneur without any
necessary reference to the desire and needs of any other interested parties and,
in particular, those of the workers. These decisions are left to management
because there is an unquestioned precept that the investor of capital should
have the prerogative of making decisions as to how that capital is to be ex-
pended. While it is true that in respect of safety conditions in a new plant
there are usually some legislative and zoning requirements which have to be
met by the entrepreneur, they are of a minimal kind. They certainly never go
to the nature of the product to be made and the materials to be used." Yet, a
recommendation that no enterprise should be commenced without being
granted a licence by a body interested in the safety of the workers who are
going to be employed in the enterprise is not completely out of step with
9 Stellman and Daum, Work is Dangerous to your Health (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1973).
10 Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board, Annual Report 1975 (Toronto: Work-
men's Compensation Board, 1975) at 1. For the motor vehicle accident rate see Report
on Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1973),
at 11.
11 The new Ontario statute, The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1978, S.O. 1978,
c. 83, s. 21, does provide for governmental approval over new substances to be used in
manufacturing.
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social mores. We do not let medical practitioners, lawyers or dentists practice
without permits establishing their qualifications; we do not let builders build
the kind of premises that they wish to build anywhere they choose: we have
zoning laws and permits systems governing such activities; we do not permit
anyone with the requisite amount of capital to set up a banking business, and
so forth. The point is, the notion that a permit must be obtained before cer-
tain businesses can even be commenced is not novel; it has been accepted
whenever it is clear that large segments of the public will be adversely affected
by uncontrolled behaviour of entrepreneurs. The same urge to protect people
who are at work, except at a minimal level, has not yet been felt. The relation-
ship between entrepreneur and the public at large is clearly viewed quite differ-
ently from that between the entrepreneur and his employees. 12
3. A mechanism which is much advocated and indeed often relied on is to
leave the matter of safety at work to the bargaining of the parties affected,
employers and employees. The notion is that our labour laws are flexible
enough to permit anything to, be bargained about, including safety matters.
That is, employees can ask that the employers diminish their profitability to
ensure greater safety at work or, alternatively, employees have the flexibility
to demand less by way of remuneration for their efforts in exchange for in-
creased safety measures by the employer. This device permits employees to
decide for themselves how much safety they ought to insist on and has, there-
fore, the attraction of a self-determination scheme.
4. Another potential tool is the creation of joint management-employee safety
committees. These can of course be erected by bargaining between employers
and employees but they can, in addition, be provided for by mandatory legis-
lative order. Such joint committees could be given the power to inspect the
premises at any time they chose, to make recommendations as to how to im-
prove conditions they felt to be dangerous, to inquire into complaints made
by workers and, if necessary, to close down the operation of a plant until
conditions had improved sufficiently to meet the requirements set out by the
committees.
5. An even more direct interference than the statutory mandating of joint
management-employee committees would be the creation of effective statutory
bodies which had the task of regulating health and safety conditions in work
places. These could provide for standards of safety and health regulation,
complemented by an inspectorate which would have the right to impose penal-
1 2 For the argument that these initial decisions are vital to occupational well-being,
see Ison, supra note 4, at 5. For an unusual public admission of the importance of good
engineering design to ensure safety at work, see the statement by the Legal Director of the
Order of Engineers of Quebec, Mr. Claude Lajeunesse, as reported in The Gazette, of
August 12, 1975. Mr. Lajeunesse was reported as saying that "too many engineers don't
recognize their first duty, in law, is to serve the public rather than the companies that
hired them. Often an engineer will merely throw up his hands in defeat if a company
rejects his built-in safety designs as too expensive. But the fact is, companies are obliged
to abide by the engineer's safety recommendations, if he stands firm. It is time engineers
stopped acting like company clerks and shouldered a social responsibility." Mr. Lajeunesse
was further reported as saying that Quebec's industrial accident rate could be halved if the
province's 17,000 engineers designed their projects with safety in mind.
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ties and the right to stop operations until standards which have been set by
the agencies are met.
6. Another device which has been suggested is the imposition of an injury tax
on employers, the idea being that every time a worker's injury or disease is
deemed to be attributable to work conditions, the employer is to be made to
pay an appropriate penalty into a fund. The employer would then be forced
to focus on the financial wisdom of not improving working conditions. The
tax could be collected by having the employer either declare the injuries and
disabilities incurred by his workers to a safety and health agency, in much
the same way as the employer would normally disclose his income to the
revenue authorities. Alternatively, the employer could have the workmen's
compensation claims made in respect of injuries and diseases that led to dis-
ablement at his work place scrutinized by an appropiate agency. From this
scrutiny, an appropiate injury tax to be levied on the employer could be
calculated.
7. Implicit in all of the suggested devices now in use or which could be put
in use, is a tool which should always be employed: education of all concerned
people (including workers, employers, unions, designers, engineers, archi-
tects, and doctors) in respect of the real, hazardous nature of working.
III. INHERENT DEFICIENCIES OF THESE MECHANISMS
It has already been pointed out that the focus of any scheme for im-
provement in safety conditions in the work place has to be the excercise of
control over enterprise. Let us make it clear at the outset that there is no
expectation by us that this society will set out to control enterprise completely.
It is not beyond the bounds of possibilty, however, that our society would
adopt various permit schemes, that is, schemes requiring that certain criteria
be met before an investment could be made in a particular kind of enterprise.
Were this to happen on a systematic basis it would be a most useful device
with which to improve work conditions. But our hopes of this occuring with-
out a dramatically new understanding of the problems are slight. We are a
so-called free enterprise society wedded to the notion that investors must be
encouraged and that state interference is a disincentive to such investment.
There will always be well orchestrated opposition and political resistance to any
notion that investment should not be left as free as possible. This makes the
possibility of using a permit system on an organized basis a very tendentious
one. At most, it can be seen as a useful supplementary device.
The argument that the opponents of a systematic permit system will make
is that the best way to achieve better work conditions for workers is to rely on
the bargaining between employers and employees. Indeed, this is the argument
which will be made just as strenuously when interference is sought to be im-
posed after the entrepreneur has set up his undertaking, even though, at that
point, such interference has been much more common and seems to be more
readily accepted now than previously. The argument that such matters ought
to be settled by a free bargaining system never does fall on deaf ears in a
society in which labour law principles are based on the view that anything re-
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lating to work conditions that employees do not wrest away by bargaining re-
mains a prerogative right of the employer.13
The question to be faced, therefore, is whether bargaining by employees
can ever achieve those kinds of normative work conditions in respect of safety
which a society might deem acceptable. Note that the raising of the question
in this form assumes that there are certain minimum conditions which a society
is entitled to insist upon-regardless of which economic doctrine prevails.
Whether or not this assumption is theoretically defensible, we point out that
such societal consensus has led to the stipulation for minimum wages, equal
pay, anti-discrimination in employment regulations, maximum hours, and
control over employment of children. As a society we have acknowledged that
there are some needs which have to be met and, if people cannot satisfy them
through their own efforts, we as a society are willing to provide them. We
have not been generous in this regard, but the notion is clearly an acceptable
one. We therefore feel entitled to say that bargaining will have failed if it does
not provide minimum satisfaction of this kind. What follows is an attempt to
show that bargaining will always fail to provide such satisfaction in respect of
safety in the work environment and that, therefore, remedial state interference
should be permitted.
The first thing to note is that collective bargaining in our labour relations
system will take place only after an enterprise has been started and a work
force gathered. The hazards caused by the very setting-up of the enterprise by
the selection of the products to be made, the materials to be used, the pro-
cesses to be employed, the equipment and plant design will all exist before
bargaining takes place. Arguably, if employees are in a strong enough bar-
gaining position when they come to such an enterprise and if they recognize
the hazards, they can effect changes to the kind of product which it is sought
to be produced, to the processes utilized, to the materials employed and to
the design of the plant.
But unfortunately, this hoped-for strength in employees is unlikely to be
found frequently. There are some real problems inhibiting the organization of
employees, which no amount of theorizing about free enterprise economic
models can spirit away. Note that more than sixty percent of all workers in
this country are not unionized. 14 Even more significant may be the fact that
of the less than forty percent of the work force which is unionized, a good
13 It has sometimes been argued by collective bargaining theorists that where people
are in a collective bargaining situation the employer does not begin with any prerogative
of management rights. But note that whether an individual contract of employment or a
collective agreement is the contract in question, there is no doubt that the employer may
exercise unrestricted rights unless they have been specifically given away; e.g., the right
to close down the business, to advertise new products, to make new products, to stop
making a certain kind of line, to automate, to subcontract, to discipline, to rearrange shifts,
and so forth, are all prerogative of management rights which have been recognized by
courts and boards and which can only be restricted if the employees have managed to
obtain concessions written into their agreement with the employer to that effect.
14 Corporations and Labour Unions Return Act Report for 1976, Part IT-Labour
Unions. In 1976, 32.2 percent of an estimated 8,631,000 wage and salary workers in the
major industry groups reporting under CALURA were members of labour organizations.
The group of workers in respect of which this calculation was made included persons
ineligible for union membership.
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third or more are in public service industry where the issues of safety and the
work environment are, in general, unlikely to be as pressing. Theoretically it
is true that nothing stops people from organizing in greater numbers and that
the fact that so few people have decided to enhance their bargaining position
by forming trade unions indicates that they have freely chosen to remain un-
organized. Consequently, if they are not in a position to bargain more ef-
fectively than they have in respect of safety and health at work, this is due to
a free economic choice. But this is an oversimplification of the organizational
ability of workers in this country. There are serious constraints imposed on
organization by law, especially for those workers who find themselves in cer-
tain industrial sectors or in smaller groups in which established unions are not
very interested. Such workers, if they are minded to bind together, must be-
long to an appropriate bargaining unit; they must first form a voluntary asso-
ciation, then get a certain number of people in the bargaining unit signed up
as members; the voluntary association must have at that point, in place, an
acceptable constitution which must be ratified, and so on. All this may have
to be arranged in the face of vigorous employer opposition which is restrained
only by a fragile set of rules. Even more important, perhaps, is the inhibition
on organization created by the fact that so many people within the work force
are not permitted to belong to trade unions. There are also real limitations on
organization because of the existing trade union practices. Unions of a particu-
lar kind have developed in North America i5 and they have entered into
agreements not to raid each other. As was noted before, because it is so diffi-
cult for a spontaneous union movement to succeed, the established unions
have little need to worry about ensuring their viability by finding more mem-
bers. The result has been that, when unions have calculated the cost of or-
ganizing a small plant against the cost of obtaining and administering agree-
ments, they have tended to opt for non-organization. Thus, it is hard to be-
lieve that the failure by many people to organize into unions which, notionally,
could enhance the health and safety conditions of workers by increasing bar-
gaining strength, is due to a free choice by workers.
In any event, to leave it to the bargaining ability of trade unions to pro-
tect workers in their work environment has additional difficulties. It requires
a great knowledge of occupational health problems by trade unions. That
knowledge does not yet exist and will take a long time to acquire. More im-
portant, trade unions have come to accept the fact that the ownership of the
means of production is vested in employers and that, fundamentally, it is not
the trade unions' role to wrest it away from them. This means that trade
unions believe that their role is to improve the workers' share of the productive
enterprise rather than to change the power relationship in respect of invest-
ment and ownership. It is much easier to quantify improvements in terms of
dollars than it is in terms of quality of working conditions. To do the latter,
trade unions must understand not only the nature of occupational health
hazards but must also educate their membership to the same level of compre-
hension before they can sensibly make arguments that it is more important to
obtain greater safety at work than it is to get an extra amount of money in the
pay cheque. This argument assumes that trade unions will see improvement in
15 Basically international unions, with a very special view of their role, of which more
will be said below.
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working conditions as being something they must trade off against increases
in remuneration. There is no logical necessity for trade unions to make that
assumption. But one of the corollaries of not questioning the employers' right
to ownership of assets and return on investment of those assets is that trade
unions have come to accept that the easiest way to increase workers' income
is to take the same share of the produced cake as it increases in size, rather
than to make an attempt at cutting into the profit of the employer. To attempt
the latter, after all, would be a step in the direction of questioning the right of
ownership.10 The ingrained belief that, in the long run, the share of both
workers and employers is predestined by market principles-that workers can
make no inroads into the share of income attributable to investors and income
earners-leads to the belief in trade unions that improvement in working con-
ditions at the immediate expense of the employers will be an eventual expense
to the worker.
Further, in making the argument that bargaining is unlikely to lead to
acceptable safety and health conditions at work, we refer to the already stated
proposition that bargaining does not come into play in our society until the
plant, with all its inherent hazards, has been set up. Combining this with the
fact that, as has been asserted, unions are not interested in imposing too great
a cost on employers in respect of health and safety conditions because this
will minimize their chances of appearing as good and useful agents to their
membership, all that unions are left with when bargaining about health and
safety is the goal of installing relatively cheap safeguards. Thus, they will seek
to obtain some institutionalized methods whereby they will be allowed to in-
hibit unsafe productive processes. In order to be able to do this they must
have available to them information about the actual conditions prevailing in the
plant and they must also have the power to do something about unacceptable
conditions. Schemes to attain those objectives have sprung up as a result of
collective bargaining. The most common of these are joint employer-employee
safety committees with- equal representation. The nature of these committees
varies in sophistication. Some are merely allowed to inspect the plant and
report to the employer and to the employees about prevailing conditions;
others are actually given all the information availablo and may have power to
make recommendations about how to combat health hazards; others have even
been given the power to halt production until conditions are remedied to their
satisfaction. 1 So far these bargained-for joint committees have not resulted
16 This is of course not universally true. There are occasions when trade unions make
incursions into the profit rate of employers and do so consciously and with zeal. But, on
this continent, as a generality, the unions have deliberately opted for what they term to
be business unionism, a phrase made famous by Samuel Gompers. For a detailed analysis
see Hoxie, Trade Unionism in the United States (2d ed., New York: Russell and Russell,
1966).
17 This is a very short summary of findings made by P. Walden in an unpublished
paper, Occupational Health and Safety in Ontario, written at Osgoode Hall Law School
in April of 1977. Ms. Walden examined the contents of collective agreements in respect
of health and safety. She discovered and discussed provisions for joint committees in the
United Auto Workers and General Motors agreement of 1976, in the agreement between
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers and Polysar, Domtar and Dow Chemical, in the agree-
ment between the United Steelworkers, Local 6500 (Sudbury) and International Nickel,
in the agreement between Lumber and Sawmill Worker's Union, Local 2693 and employers
in the logging industry, in an agreement between Canadian Union of Base Metal Workers
and Canadian General Electric.
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in much improvement because, at best, they come into effective play when
conditions are egregious in relation to already established standards. Further,
the committees are seldom in a position to question the original manner of
setting up the plant, and, as Walden concluded,
without exception the joint committees are advisory bodies only. They can discuss,
recommend, review, suggest and persuade but in every case the final authority for
making changes rests solely with management. And management's interest in a safe
and healthy working environment is by no means the same as that of workers: when
the crunch comes, such considerations will usually take second place to the over-
riding goal of private industry of making a profit.' 8
In summation, inasmuch as bargaining is to be relied upon to provide
better working conditions, it is a plausible safeguard only in those unusual
bargaining situations that favour workers. It is thus left to the theorists who
wish to rely on the precept of self-determination in a free market to argue
that the principle of voluntariness in economic terms is so fundamental and
worthy of support that, if people do not bargain for better conditions than they
have, it must be assumed that the unsafe conditions which result are the best
the market can afford, and, therefore, the best such people deserve. In our
view, this is an unacceptable "principle" when the physical well-being, indeed,
the very existence of people, is involved. That our view is by no means idiosyn-
cratic is reflected by the fact that, despite the apparent popularity of the tenets
of economic self-determination in a market economy, many legislative schemes
exist to ensure that there will be employer-employee joint committees to moni-
tor and report on safety conditions in the workplace. Such interference by the
state with the free enterprise model may have been necessitated to help per-
petuate the overall dominance of employers over employees, inasmuch as nat-
ural compassion could lead to instability if human lives were seen to be
treated as insignificant in the drive for profits.
Various provinces have set up such legislative schemes.' 9 Where joint
committees are created by dint of legislation it becomes clear that their func-
tioning will be subject to the vagaries of the political process. For example, in
Manitoba an extensive scheme of employer-employee joint committees, backed
by a governmental inspectorate and standard-setting agency was set up. How-
ever, as soon as the government changed from the New Democratic Party to
the Progressive Conservative Party, the inspectorate was diminished in num-
ber to such an extent that the scheme has been rendered impotent.2 0
18 Inasmuch as it was stated that some joint committees may have the power to halt
production, the only one of this kind found was the U.A.W.-G.M. agreement in which
there is such power where both the company and the union representatives agree (after
a joint investigation of the situation), that there is a "reasonable basis for concluding that
a condition involving imminent danger exists." Where there is a dispute, the agreement
provides a special health and safety complaint procedure which proceeds via the normal
grievance channels to arbitration. But the production processes cannot be halted as of
right because of a joint committee finding.
19 See The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 83; The Occupa-
tional Health Act, S.S. 1972, c. 86; The Workplace Safety and Health Act, S.M. 1976, c. 63.
See also Canadian Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1.
20 Smith, Manitoba Discovers the Price of Norma (November 1978), 7 Last Post 14.
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Typically, the legislation, in addition to providing for joint employer-
employee committees, will provide for the creation of an administrative agency
which sets what it determines to be appropriate safety and occupational health
standards and then, by a system of inspection, provides for the enforcement of
the standards. Perhaps the most famous of all these models is the one which
has been in existence in the United States.21
It will be immediately apparent that such schemes will run into diffi-
culties. Take the initial setting of an appropriate regulatory standard. Because
diseases may have more than one cause, it is difficult to state with accuracy
whether certain environments and substances will produce particular unaccept-
able health consequences. For instance, despite an abundance of evidence
there are still people who argue that there is no conclusive link between cancer
and the use of asbestos.22 Even if it is accepted that there is an identifiable
link between a substance used in a manufacturing process and a disease, it
remains open to dispute how much exposure to the particular product is
actually unsafe. In part, the difficulty in measurement arises because there is
frequently a time lag between the actual exposure to a substance and the
ensuing occupational disease. Thus, when the statutory body does its research,
it will have before it a great deal of respectable scientific opinion which varies
tremendously in its appraisal. This leads to the second part of the difficulty: re-
searchers can, not to put too fine a point on it, be bought and sold in very
much the same way as most commodities in the marketplace are.23
In addition, because there are often grounds for genuine disputation, it
will take a great deal of time and research before a pronouncement can be
made. In the United States, there has been a division of labour created by the
statute, as a result of which the Occupational Health and Safety Agency
(OSHA) actually promulgates the standards after the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) researches into what the standard
ought to be. When first created, OSHA was asked to set immediate Threshold
Limit Values (TLV) for those substances in existence which were already
considered dangerous. It set 400 such standards immediately. They were to
be reviewed later by NIOSH. OSHA also has power to set up six months tem-
porary standards while it awaits NIOSH reports. This power is to be used
when it has a belief that the substances used in a particular process are inimical
to health. As for the rest, NIOSH investigation is awaited. It has already been
shown how many toxic substances are estimated to be in use in the manufac-
turing process, and, of these, at least 1,000-2,000 are considered to be highly
dangerous to workers.
21 The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C., 651 (1970). It created two
bodies, a standard-setting body, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), and an agency which is to determine whether the standards ought to be applied,
to what extent, and then to enforce them, the Occupational Safety and Health Agency(OSHA).
22 See Alexander, "Osha's Ill-Conceived Crusade Against Cancer," Fortune, 3 July
1978, at 86.
23 This cannot be documented with precision, but for a general indication, which can
leave no impartial observer in doubt, see Scott, Muscle and Blood (New York: Dutton,
1974).
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The American General Accounting Office report24 indicates how NIOSH
proceeds when it sets out to investigate the nature of toxic substances and the
optimum extent of control over them. First, NIOSH people do a literature
search of all existing data on the toxic substance. It is estimated that such
research takes six to twelve months. Then it must set up its own research pro-
cess to fill in the blanks in the data so unearthed. This work is done by NIOSH
staff or contracted out to people in the field. Three to five years will elapse
before this research is completed. With all the information then available the
NIOSH staff sets up a criteria document which is examined thoroughly by
NIOSH technicians, outside consultants, professional societies, other federal
agencies, and so forth. This process takes twelve to fourteen months. Before
approval by the Director of NIOSH is actually given to a criteria document in
respect of a particular substance, roughly six years will elapse. Between the
commencement of the operation of the Act in 1970 and September 1, 1974,
NIOSH had produced only eighteen criteria documents.25 Thus there is a
serious problem, but that is not the end of the difficulty.
Having set up what ought to be the ideal standard, the feasibility of im-
plementing it must be assessed. Usually the statute will say that the agency
that sets the appropriate standards for exposure to particular substances at
work places has to take into account the practicabilities of demanding com-
pliance with a particular standard. Even in the absence of such statements,
there can be no doubt that the agency would take such factors into account.
After all, these agencies are created as a result of political decision making
and they cannot be insensitive to the politics that underly the legislation. This
is reflected somewhat crassly at times. 26 In addition to bowing to crude politi-
cal imperatives, the agency, given the context in which it has been created, will
inevitably take into account the effect its promulgation of standards may have
on the profitability of a particular employer or of the industry in which the
employer functions. Indeed, under the American scheme this has been given
somewhat imprecise sanction by the federal courts when reviewing OSHA
decisions. It has been held that OSHA is entitled to balance the costs of a
standard against the viability of enterprise. 27
24 United States, General Accounting Office, Report to the Senate Committee on
Labour and Public Welfare: Slow Progress Likely in Development of Standards for Toxic
Substances and Harmful Physical Agents found in Workplaces (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Gov't Printing Office, 1973) at 7.
25 See Page & Munsing, Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The
Wages are Still Bitter (1973), 38 L. & Contem. Prob. 651, at 655 et seq.
26 A most spectacular instance is recorded in Randall, "Worker Safety and Politics,"
Washington Star, July 15, 1974. A letter by a Nixon aide to the Occupational Health and
Safety Agency was reported as saying that "no highly controversial standards (that is
cotton dust, etc.) ... be proposed by OSHA or NIOSH 'because of' the great potential
of OSHA as a sales point for fund raising and general support by employers." And in
the hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Watergate, the then Undersecretary
for Labour said that "it would have been perfectly legitimate to say that OSHA would
more nearly balance the relative interests of workers and employers under a Republican
than under a Democratic administration." See Page, Toward Meaningful Protection of
Worker Health and Safety (1975), 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1345 at 1354-55.
27 See Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F. 2d 467, 477-78
(D.C.C.A., 1974); Florida Peach Growers Association v. United States Department of
Labor, 489 F. 2d 120, 130 (5th Circ. 1974). See also Page, supra note 26.
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Compounding these factors which inhibit the effectiveness of regulatory
agencies in achieving better standards in respect of exposure to toxic sub-
stances is the fact that they rely on an inspectorate to enforce the standard
they have erected. With the best of intentions in the world this may prove
inefficient. Take, for example, the Target Health Hazard Project initiated by
OSHA. Between the months of May, 1973 and February, 1974, as a result of
this particularly intensive inspection program, 160 inspections for asbestos
were made; this covered fewer than 3,600 of the 200,000 employees estimated
to be exposed to asbestos; 275 lead inspections were made, covering 3,000
of the 1.6 million exposed workers; 400 silica inspections were made, covering
fewer than 4,000 of the 1.1 million workers exposed to silicosis; 45 cotton
dust inspections were made, covering 944 of the estimated 800,000 workers
exposed; 897 carbon monoxide inspections were made, covering about 27,000
workers. 28 Further, the system of fines and the right to close down operations
where there has been flagrant violation of prescribed standards will be sanc-
tions whose use may well depend on the political attitude of the agency.
More significant, perhaps, is the fact that the government in power can,
as already noted in respect of the Manitoba legislative scheme, cut back on
enforcement simply by not adequately financing the agency. But, superim-
posed on all these difficulties is the additional problem that inspectors under
these kinds of schemes will usually try to get violators of standards to cooper-
ate and will seldom recommend the imposition of penalties in the first in-
stance. When they do finally impose penalties they tend to be rather light and
will seldom lead to follow-ups. 29 Apart from the political reasons against, and
sheer physical impossibility of adequate inspection, there are also inbuilt con-
straints on enforcement by an inspectorate system. Empirical studies by so-
ciologists point to the fact that inspectors are loath to use what they see as
criminal stigmatization of employers in these kinds of circumstances. Even
when the statutes promulgating the standards are formulated in ways which
leave the inspectors no apparent discretion they will seldom impose penalties
upon the finding of a violation. They tend to do so only after there has been
a history of repeated violations, suggesting that they prefer to withold the
imposition of sanctions until they are convinced of the moral blameworthiness
of the employer.20 Thus the efficacy of an inspectorate must be doubted.
Finally, the potential of an injury tax scheme may also be questioned.
Because the causal connection between the disease and the environment is not
always easy to establish, it will be hard to know when to impose such an in-
jury tax. Moreover, the amount of the injury tax will be hard to fix. If the size
of the penalties now imposed under regulations proscribing certain kinds of
conduct are any indication, the likelihood of serious amounts being levied by
2 8 See supra note 25, at 666.
29 Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (Dem.-N.J.) Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, wrote in the Sept.-Oct. 1975 issue of Trial Magazine, that
in OSHA's first three years, 95 percent of all covered employers were not inspected at all
and that in the fiscal year 1973, 98 percent of the violations cited by inspectors were
classified as non-serious and carried an average penalty of $18.00.
80 See Carson, Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability and the Enforcement
of Factory Legislation (1970), 33 Mod. L. Rev. 396; also Carson, White Collar Crime
and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation (1970), 10 Br. J. Crim. 383.
[VOL. 17, No. 3
Occupational Hazards
way of injury tax is not very great. An injury tax scheme might also have a
backlash effect because people might be dismissed if they are considered injury
or disease prone. There may be discrimination in hiring. Also, as various work-
men's compensation schemes have done from time to time, injury tax schemes
could provide an incentive to employers to hide the nature of hazard-creating
enterprise. This would happen under any kind of regulatory scheme aimed at
improving safety and health conditions but there would be a greater incentive
to do so under a scheme that set out specifically to tie financial assessment to
particular debilitation.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AS A MEANS OF SPOTLIGHTING
THE PROBLEM
This sketch of the difficulties with the many existing and potential
schemes that might be used to regulate safety and health conditions in the work
place shows that it is the notion that profit-making is a sacrosanct principle
that leads to the apparent reluctance to provide stringent and effective mea-
sures. This inarticulate premise makes it very difficult for a scheme to be de-
vised ensuring the health and safety of workers if the scheme is to attain this
objective at the expense of investors. Starting from the premise that the change
of ownership of the modes of production is not on the agenda and that the
best that can be hoped for is amelioration of workers' conditions through
regulation, we are looking for a mechanism that will enable us to convince
people that it is proper to attack profitability.
Let us commence this attempt by noting that it may not even be good
economics to argue that the inestor should not bear more of the cost of the
materialization of risks created by the investment. The economic cost of in-
jury and debilitation at work is enormous. Addressing the Richelieu Club in
Montreal, the then Minister of Health and Welfare, the Honourable Marc
Lalonde, said that time lost through industrial accidents was twenty-three
percent higher than time lost due to industrial disputes.3 ' The Minister further
pointed out that, in addition, injured workers occupied 14,000 hospital beds
every day at a cost of approximately 500 million dollars per year. To this
cost had to be added, he noted, 250 million dollars spent in medical treat-
ment.22 It would be interesting to compare this external cost of enterprise to
the cost that entrepreneurs would have to bear if they had to install safeguards
to diminish this huge cost borne by people other than profit-makers. It is of
course arguable that, in a planned society, it might be economically unjusti-
fiable to maim and hurt people, given this kind of comparative costing. In a
capitalist economy of the kind that we enjoy, an argument which relies on
comparison of the global costs of industrial health and accidents with the cost
of safeguards to individual enterprise would need refining. It would have to
31 He noted that there were 11.5 million man days lost due to industrial accidents in
1974 compared to 9.3 million man days lost due to work stoppages. It hardly needs to be
pointed out that time lost due to industrial accidents may not be as harmful to particular
productive enterprises as is time lost due to industrial stoppages. The former occurs in
single instances and the work process may not be affected at all; the second is designed
to have the opposite effect.
32 Speech quoted by Julian Major, Executive Vice-President, C.L.C., in an address
to the Ninth C.L.C. Health and Safety Conference (September 22, 1975).
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be shown that a particular social cost could be attributed to a particular entre-
preneur's activity before action could legitimately be taken to internalize that
cost to the enterprise concerned. This would raise causal problems of a very
difficult nature but, if they could be overcome, even a capitalist society would
have to acknowledge that precautions should be imposed on that basis.
Next, we wish to make a polemical argument. Even on the basis that,
economically, the imposition of precautions and safeguards would cut into the
profits of enterprises, it does not automatically follow that such costs ought
not to be imposed. After all, there is nothing sacred about a particular rate of
profit. If one abandons classical economics for a moment and recognizes that
the world is not as competitive as the Samuelson-type theorists would have
it be, it may well be that profits are made which could not be expected to be
made in a true market economy. This will be the result of monopolies, oligo-
polies, the effect of tariff barriers in a particular market, tax subsidies, and
other such interferences with real free enterprise. That is, there already has
been serious interference with the market model;83 therefore, interference
might be warranted on a general basis where it is clear that profits are not
necessarily related to productivity.84
But if this crude form of economic argument is rejected, as it is likely to
be given the almost unanimous public adherence to free enterprise principles,
what we need to do is to show that profitability may be attacked when the
making of profit is associated not with laudable market practices but with
heinous conduct.
If the physical onslaught which takes place in the work place occurred
outside the employer-employee environment there is no doubt that society
would use the most formidable tool it has to stop such attacks: it would use
33 At this point note again that there is also interference in respect of minimum wages,
minimum hours, equal pay, discrimination in hiring and firing, etc.
34 It is not easy for us to prove that there are in fact profits which are not the result
of head to head competition but, looking at a few entrepreneurs who would appear to
mere 'laypersons' to be in oligopolistic situations, we may be able to give an indication
as to how it might not be such an economic disaster if the costs of avoiding harm were
internalized. Thus: would it matter very seriously if the profitability of Johns-Manville
Corporation, a giant in the asbestos industry which had a year-ending income of
$102,527,000 in December 13, 1977, were cut down a little? The total assets of the com-
pany were $1,333,800,000 (Financial Post Survey of Industrials, 1978). And again, Rio
Algom Limited, a processor of uranium and other hazardous products, had net earnings,
according to its Annual Report of 1976, of $31,629,000. (This was earned on sales of
$401,611,000. The excess of assets over liability at that time being $321,748,000.) Would
a reduction in its rate of returns be unwarranted interference in the market leading to
calamity? Could a similar point not be made about Asbestos Corporation Ltd., which
showed, at the end of December 31, 1977, a net profit of $21,021,000 earned on sales of
$145,344,000? (From Moody's Industrial Manual, 1978). Asbestos Corporation Limited
is controlled by General Dynamics Corporation and operates the famous Thetford Mines
in Quebec. And Inco had a net income at the end of December 1977, of $99,859,000
(Financial Post Survey of Industrials 1978). The total assets of Inco are $4,075,764,000.
Inco, of course, operates in the mining industry where many hazardous situations exist.
Can it be argued strenuously that to cut into the profitability of these companies would
be a mortal blow to their enterprises or enterprise in general? Can this argument be made
strenuously in view of the fact that these operators are not-to say the least-in very
competitive situations and unquestionably have caused serious harm to the people who
work for them?
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the criminal process and treat offenders as social pariahs. Prosecution under
the criminal law of employers for the harm they do to workers rather than
reliance on existing safety and health regulatory schemes would characterize
the conduct of such employers as an unjustifiable preference for unregulated
profit over the well-being of human beings who are, after all, very important
in the garnering of such profits. Prosecution of entrepreneurial behaviour
which can inflict grievous bodily harm or even death would thus identify the
kind of conduct that warrants interference and regulation by government.
Expectations that such interference would be more vigorous than it is now
would not be misplaced. Indeed, it may become possible to talk openly about
what is a "reasonable" profit in view of the need to reduce injury and disease
to an "acceptable" rate. It is hard to imagine that there will be many people
who will publicly advocate the principle that the earning of profit, even if it
requires criminal conduct to be made, is more important than the health and
safety of human beings. Better regulation might result because of the need to
defuse the argument that there may be class distinctions in our society. Yet
the controversy about the need for such regulation might well heighten aware-
ness of the nature of the social organization which created the problem sought
to be solved.
The use of the criminal process has another attraction. Because of the
assumptions of the liberal state, the ideology of law requires it to claim that it
punishes behaviour which has been judged unacceptable by society no matter
who the perpetrator of the offensive behaviour is. It will be interesting to see
how the administrators of the legal justice system respond when it is argued
that entrepreneurs are offenders against the criminal process in much the
same way as robbers of private property and people. It will provide some-
thing of an insight if the officers of justice resist the use of criminal prosecu-
tions in this context. This may in itself serve the purpose of spotlighting the
nature of the health and safety problem in particular and the assumptions
about our social organization generally.
V. POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE CRIMINAL LAW PROVISIONS
What follows is a selection of criminal offences that might be used to
serve the purpose of dramatizing the need for less inhibited state interference
with the nature of enterprise to upgrade the safety and health of workers. As
these offences were not devised for this purpose, it will be necessary to dem-
onstrate that they can be so utilized. This will cause us to make arguments
which,at first blush, might be perceived to be somewhat far-fetched. It is our
position that this appearance of unreality is due to the reluctance we are all
taught to have to use the criminal law to interfere with otherwise socially
commendable activity, namely, productive enterprise. Therefore we will at-
tempt to establish the essence of the offences we have selected to show that
they are inherently capable of being utilized in the manner we advocate. In
doing so, we will cover ground which will be trite to schooled criminal lawyers.
Indeed, we do not claim that the exposition which follows is in any way ex-
haustive or novel. We are at pains, however, to show that technically the argu-
ments we make about the applicability of the Criminal Code provisions we
have chosen are, at the very least, plausible. If they are, then those interested
in aiding the cause of greater safety and health for workers will have an addi-
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tional and practical weapon at their disposal. In this light, note that the of-
fence of criminal negligence has been dealt with at great length as its potential
utility seems to be immense.
A. Criminal negligence: section 202
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code"5 are as follows:
202. (1) Every one is criminally negligent who
(a) in doing anything, or
(b) in omitting to do anything that it is his duty to do, shows wanton or
reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.
(2) For the purposes of this section, "duty" means a duty imposed by law.
203. Every one who by criminal negligence causes death to another person
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.
204. Every one who by criminal negligence causes bodily harm to another
person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment
for ten years.
The very name of the offence and the phrasing of its requirements seem
to demand comparisons with tort liability in negligence. In tort the basis for
recovery is that where A can or ought to reasonably foresee that his or her
conduct is likely to affect B and then behaves in a way not consonant with the
standard of care that is said to be reasonable for a persons in A's circum-
stances, B is entitled to be compensated for any injury that he or she may
have suffered as a result of A's conduct. A will be judged to have been negli-
gent.
If this approach were adapted for use in prosecutions under sections
202-204 of the Criminal Code, these provisions would become a very power-
ful weapon in any arsenal built up with the intent to attack employers who
allegedly operate unsafely. Clearly, an employer can or ought to foresee that
the manner of operation of the workplace will affect the employees who work
there. Failure to observe the standard of care which is perceived as reasonable,
as a result of which injury to (or even death of) employees resulted, would
lead to a finding of criminal culpability.
There is, however, a built-in bias against the use of the civil, objective
test of culpability in criminal matters. Thus, Estey J. in R. v. Watts and Gaunt
stated:
It is a general rule that mens rea is an essential ingredient of criminal offences, Its
meaning varies in relation to different offences, but it is generally described by
Cave J. as "some blameworthy condition of the mind", Chisholm v. Doulton, (1889)
22 Q.B.D. 736, or by Chief Justice Robertson as "at least an intention to do a
wrong or to break the law", Rex v. Stewart, [1940] O.R. 178 at 181, Tremear, 5th
Ed., p. 18, Russell on Crime, 10th Ed., p. 25.80
There are very powerful theoretical reasons for requiring a guilty intent
as a prerequisite to the finding of criminal culpability. Inasmuch as the state
35 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
36 [1953] 1 S.C.R. 505 at 511, [1953] 3 D.L.R. 152 at 157, 105 C.C.C. 193 at 199,
16 C.R. 290 at 297. See also Beaver v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531, 118 C.C.C. 129,
26 C.R. 193; R. v. King, [1962] S.C.R. 746, 35 D.L.R. (2d) 386, 133 C.C.C. 1, 38 C.R. 52.
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of the law relating to criminal negligence runs counter to this theoretical ra-
tionale it will be argued strenuously-by those who support the theoretical
requirement of a guilty mind-that no use should be made of these provisions
of the Criminal Code against employers who had no intent, in the usual way
that this notion is understood in criminal law, to hurt their employees., 7 Ac-
cordingly, it would not necessarily be advantageous to the proposals advocated
in this article to find that an objective test has evolved in respect of the offence
of criminal negligence. It might make the political task of persuading the
forces of prosecution to exercise their discretion in favour of laying charges
against errant employers under sections 202-204 more difficult than if it were
believed that such employers will have to be shown to have had a guilty mind.
There are, however, signs that something akin to an objective test might
be applicable to the offence of criminal negligence. Indeed, in Chisholm v.
Doulton,38 one of the cases relied on by Estey J. in the passage cited above,
Cave J., wrote that:
It is a general principle of our criminal law that there must be as an essential
ingredient in a criminal offence some blameworthy condition of mind. Sometimes
it is negligence, sometimes malice, sometimes guilty knowledge-but as a general
rule there must be something of that kind which is designated by the expression
mens rea.A9
Thus, even one of the classic statements stipulating the incontrovertible need
for a finding of guilty intent referred to the possibility that the intent might be
established in an apparently non-subjective way, namely, by proving negligent
conduct. Given this kind of confusion in language, it is not surprising that case
law has evolved that has obscured the supposed rigid distinction between sub-
jective intent on the one hand and the allegedly forbidden assessment of guilt
on the basis of more objective criteria on the other hand. Although it would
be foolish to pretend that what follows is a comprehensive survey of the law
of criminal negligence in Canada, an attempt will be made to sort out these
intertwined strands. It will be shown that subjective intent needs to be proved
in order to succeed when laying a criminal negligence charge but that the way
in which intent has been defined in this area makes it plausible to prosecute
employers for wayward behaviour on bases similar to those on which one
would bring an action in civil negligence.
1. Cases in which a form of subjective intent is easy to find.
Where the accused knows that to do what he or she does is conduct likely
to cause bodily harm or death to another person and has no justification other
than self-gratification for engaging in such conduct, it is reasonable to say
that an appropriate guilty state of mind which satisfies the mens rea require-
ment has been established. A good illustration is provided by R. v. Petzolt .40
3 7 The arguments as to why mens rea must always be found before attributing
criminal responsibility are best put in Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should be Excluded from
Penal Liability (1963), 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632. Some of these arguments will be addressed
below.
38 (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 736, 16 Cox. 675 (C.A.).
39 Id. at 741 (Q.B.D.), 679 (Cox C.C.).
40 [1973] 2 O.R. 431, 11 C.C.C. (2d) 320 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
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In that case the accused took his chimpanzee, which he knew to be vicious
and to have a propensity to bite, out on to the street. The chimpanzee bit a
child and the accused was convicted of criminal negligence. The court ex-
plicitly stated that advertence is a necessary ingredient to be proved and that in
this case the Crown had discharged the burden in that respect.41
To a similar effect are a series of cases in which a person with a known
disability behaved as if he were not incapacitated and could meet the standard
of care expected from a non-disabled person. Then, having in fact failed to
meet this standard of care, the courts have had no difficulty in convicting such
people of criminal negligence. Two illustrative cases are R. v. Shaw42 and R.
v. Taylor.43 In the first, an epileptic, knowing of his disability, had a seizure
while driving a car. As a consequence there was an accident resulting in fatal-
ities; he was convicted of criminal negligence. In the second, a driver who had
taken prescribed drugs and then imbided alcoholic beverages, something
which his medical advisor had told him explicitly not to do, had an accident
after driving erratically as a result of this mix of medication and alcohol. He
was also convicted of criminal negligence. 44
In these cases it is clear that the accused voluntarily embarked on a
dangerous course of conduct and the apparently necessary subjective intent
was found to exist on that basis. It follows that, if the accused had not acted
voluntarily, it would be impossible to attribute guilty intent to him or her. The
courts have so held. In R. v. Minor,45 for instance, it was decided that, if be-
lieved, it would be a good defence to a motor manslaughter charge to estab-
lish that, at the time of the fatal collision, the driver was suffering from a tem-
porary blackout. If such circumstances could be proved, it could not be shown
that the accused was capable of forming the intent required for conviction.40
This line of decisions seems unequivocal in its requirement of proving
the accused's subjective intent.
2. Cases which raise the possibility that criminal negligence does not
require a subjective intent.
Automobile accidents are a recognized evil in our society-so much so
that legislatures will seek to educate the driving public, in an effort to improve
its behaviour and thereby to ameliorate the accident toll. To this end, they
enact provisions which, in their appearance, look very much like criminal sta-
tutes. Such provisions prescribe certain kinds of conduct and impose serious
41 See also R. v. Coleman, [1973] 5 W.W.R. 89 (Sask. Prov. Ct.), afl'd [1974] 3
W.W.R. 46 for a similar approach taken in respect of equivalent misconduct under a
federal statute.
42 [1938] O.R. 269, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 140, 70 C.C.C. 159 (C.A.).
43 (1968), 65 W.W.R. 628, [1969] 2 C.C.C. 356 (B.C.C.A.).
44 This driver's car was, in addition, in a serious state of disrepair, a fact also known
to the accused.
45 (1955), 15 W.W.R. 433, 21 C.R. 377, 112 C.C.C. 29 (Sask. C.A.).
46 See also Slattery v. Haley (1923), 52 O.L.R. 95, (1923] 3 D.L.R. 156 (C.A.);
Gootson v. The King, [1947] Ex. C.R. 514, [1947] 4 D.L.R. 568; R. v. Charlson, [1955]
1 W.L.R. 317, [1955] 1 All E.R. 859, 39 Cr. App. R. 37 (Q.B.D.); R. v. Balcerczyk (1956),
114 C.C.C. 391 (Ont. C.A.). aff'd [1957] S.C.R. 20, 117 C.C.C. 71.
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penalties for failure to comply. In this sense they share some of the aims of
criminal law. Their objectives include specific deterrence of the particular mis-
creant and general deterrence of all such behaviour by all road users. All pro-
vincial legislatures in Canada have enacted such provisions.
The question of whether these provincial enactments are, in fact, criminal
in nature came to be examined because of the nature of Canadian constitu-
tional law. By dint of the constitutional distribution of powers, the provinces
are not permitted to enact legislation which may be characterized as criminal
law; such power is reserved exclusively to the federal legislature.
In O'Grady v. Sparling,47 it was held that a Manitoba statute, which pro-
hibited driving without due care and attention and which provided for the im-
position of a penalty should there be a breach of this provision, was within the
legislative competence of the province. It was reasoned that even though an
offence under the provincial statute might also amount to an offence under
the Criminal Code,48 the Criminal Code always required proof by the prosecu-
tion that there be advertent negligence whereas this was clearly not required by
the provincial legislation. That is, the provincial statute was not legislation in
respect of criminal law because it created an offence which required no sub-
jective intent; criminal law properly so called always requires this element.
At this point, there seemed to be no confusion: criminal negligence was
defined as requiring advertence, making it essentially different to civil negli-
gence. Unfortunately, the picture did not remain clear. A series of decisions
was so equivocal that even Laskin C.J.C. became perplexed. Briefly, events un-
folded as follows.
In Mann v. The Queen,49 it was held by the trial judge that the provincial
statute that made careless driving an offence covered the same grounds as sec-
tion 221 (4) of the Criminal Code,50 which made it a criminal offence to drive
dangerously in a public place. Hence it was held that the federal legislation
occupied the field and the operation of the provincial careless driving section
was precluded by reason of the dangerous driving provision of the Criminal
Code. That is, the argument was not that the province could not enact such
legislation but rather that, inasmuch as the section enacted overlapped with
a section of the Criminal Code which did not require advertence, the federal
legislation had through a valid exercise of its criminal law power made the
provincial section inoperative. This reasoning suggests that the Criminal Code
had, at least in the case of automobile regulation, abandoned the requirement
of advertence.
When the case got to the Supreme Court of Canada this reasoning was
rejected, but not so clearly that its ghost was laid to rest. Some members of
the Supreme Court held that the history of section 221(4) showed that no
47 [1960] S.C.R. 804, 25 D.L.R. (2d) 145, 128 C.C.C. 1.
48 Section 202(1), (criminal negligence), or section 233 (1) (criminal negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle).
49 [1966] S.C.R. 238, 56 D.L.R. (2d) 1, [1966] 2 C.C.C. 273, 47 C.R. 400.
50 Now s. 233(4).
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crime of inadvertent negligence had been created.51 Others concentrated more
on the possibility that section 221 (4) of the Criminal Code and the provincial
section gave complementary areas of coverage. One of the arguments was that
section 221 (4) required dangerous driving, while the provincial section merely
required careless and inconsiderate driving. Thus it was possible to be penal-
ized for some conduct under the provincial statute, but not to be convicted by
reason of that behaviour under section 221 (4) of the Criminal Code. 2 There
was also an argument that, no matter how broadly one wished to construe the
criminal law power, it ought never to be interpreted so as to lead to the ex-
tinction of a provincial regulatory power. Here, the regulatory power of the
province had been used towards bona fide ends and ought not to be under-
mined. 53 On reflection, the overriding sense one got from the decision was
that criminal negligence (then section 191, now section 202), the offence of
criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle (then section 221 (1),
now section 233(1)), and the offerice of driving dangerously, (then section
221(4), now 233(4)) required advertence. It is not clear that in Mann this
holding was essential to the actual decision reached and the refinements in
the judgments left the door open for arguments on this point whenever a dis-
tinction would have to be made between criminal negligence on the one hand
and the Criminal Code offence of dangerous driving on the other. The occa-
sion to do this arose in the case of R. v. Binus 4
There the court was concerned with the distinction between criminal
negligence in driving, that is, the offence defined by the combined effect of sec-
tions 191(1) and 221(1) (now sections 202 and 233(1)), and the offence
of dangerous driving created by section 221 (4) (now section 233 (4)). In is-
sue was the question of whether the section 221 (4) requirements were met
by proving that the driving by the accused fell short of the standard of be-
haviour of the reasonable driver. Laskin J.A., leading the Court of Appeal of
Ontario, recognized that a section 221 (1) offence included a section 221 (4)
one and then went on to examine whether the lesser offence required the
Crown to prove the same state of mind as it must do in a criminal negligence
case. His answer was that it need not. To overcome the apparent obstacle of
Mann, Laskin J.A. argued that there, as in O'Grady v. Sparling, the Court had
been at pains to distinguish the Criminal Code provision from a provincial
one and had accordingly emphasized the fact that, for the purposes of the
Criminal Code, mere inadvertent negligence was not enough. But this did not
mean that the same amount of advertence was necessary to convict on a dan-
gerous driving charge as for a conviction under criminal negligence. Going
to the actual language of sections 191 (1) and 221 (1) on the one hand and
section 221(4) on the other, Laskin J.A. pointed out that in the former ex-
51 Cartwright and Spence JJ.
52 Martland, Judson, Ritchie JJ. appeared to rely in part on this argument. Spence J.
also seemed to support this line of thinking.
5 3 Fauteux, Abbott and Judson JJ. For a more detailed analysis of this very frag-
mented decision (and of other cases in this area of the law) see Burns, An Aspect of
Criminal Negligence or How the Minotaur Survived Theseus Who Became Lost in the
Labyrinth (1970), 48 Can. B. Rev. 47.
54 [1966] 2 O.R. 324, 48 C.R. 279, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 193 (C.A.), aff'd, [1967] S.C.R.
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press reliance was placed on a finding of recklessness or wantonness, whereas
this requirement was totally absent in the latter. This, the Court of Appeal
reasoned, demonstrated that the state of mind required for the purposes of
sections 191 (1) and 221 (1) was manifestly distinct from that which needed
to be proved when a charge was laid under section 221(4). Thus he con-
cluded that an objective test had to be applied when interpreting section
221(4). To now differentiate this Criminal Code offence from the provincial
one of driving carelessly-as the holdings in O'Grady v. Sparling and Mann
necessitated-Laskin J.A. argued that the distinction lay in the fact that under
the provincial enactment it was possible to be found in breach even though no
member of the public was endangered by the defendant's conduct; whereas
such actual danger was a necessary element of the Criminal Code offence. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the whole of this argument.
Cartwright J.r5 found the reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal most per-
suasive but held that, in view of the fact that five out of seven members in
Mann56 had determined that advertent negligence needed to be proved under
section 221 (4), it was not open to argue that an objective test should be ap-
plied when interpreting that section. Having said that, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision on the basis that the trial judge
had, in any event, sufficiently directed the jury's mind to the necessity of find-
ing something more than mere civil negligence. 57
The picture that must have been presented at this time was clear, even
if the reasoning creating it was not: a state of mind known as advertent negli-
gence had to be proved to convict under the Criminal Code provisions, sec-
tions 191(1), 221(1) and 221(4). That is, merely establishing a deviation
from an objective standard of care was not enough; the accused had to have
a "criminal" mind of some kind. But the Supreme Court did not help matters
by its decision in Peda v. The Queen. 8
In that case the accused had been charged with dangerous driving under
section 221(4) (now 233(4)) of the Criminal Code. In directing the jury,
the trial judge had merely read out section 221(4) to them, with some ex-
planation, but with no reference whatsoever to the need to find some adver-
tence in the accused's conduct. On appeal, 59 it was held by the majority in the
Court of Appeal that a proper direction had been given because the language
55 Ritchie and Spence JJ. concurred with Cartwright J.
GO From the discussion above, it is easy to see how lawyers might, in fact, differ about
the specific reasons given for the decision in Mann, supra note 49. In this context note
that in Binus, supra note 54, Taschereau C.J. and Judson J., classified the remarks in
Mann as to the requirements of a high degree of negligence, behaviour worthy of punish-
ment and moral blameworthiness as obiter dicta; [1967] S.C.R. 598. But note, without
requiring advertence, these two justices still upheld the findings of dangerous driving; see
note 61.
57 The Court of Appeal had dismissed the appeal from the conviction on the basis
that the trial judge's direction to the effect that some advertence was necessary could not
have seriously affected the jury's deliberations. There was sufficient evidence for a jury
to find that the accused had been guilty of dangerous driving, even on the basis of the less
demanding objective test set by the Court of Appeal.
58 [1969] S.C.R. 905, 6 D.L.R. (3d) 177, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 245, affg. [1969] 1 O.R.
90, [1969] 2 C.C.C. 228, 4 C.R.N.S. 161 (C.A.).
59 Id.
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of section 221 (4) was unambiguous and it described the nature of the con-
duct an accused must be guilty of before he or she could be convicted. The
finding that such conduct had taken place satisfied the Criminal Code require-
ments without more. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with this holding.
The majority of that bench argued that, inasmuch as mens rea had to be
proved, it did not require a special instruction to the jury because dangerous
driving was defined in such a way that, if it was found to have occurred, a find-
ing would also have been made that the appropriate mental element existed.
They then went on to say that Laskin J.A., who had dissented when Peda was
before the Ontario Court of Appeal, was wrong in his perception that Binus
was a binding decision requiring a jury to be told that advertent negligence
had to be proved. Their argument was that the Supreme Court in Binus, in
holding that Laskin J.A. had been wrong in Binus in the Ontario Court of
Appeal when he reasoned that a breach of an objectively set standard was
sufficient, had not decided that the jury must be directed to find advertent neg-
ligence when trying a section 221(4) case. Rather, since three members of
the Supreme Court of Canada had stated that this requirement had to be
satisfied, it was not necessary to the actual decision in Binus. In Peda it was
now said that in Binus the essence of the decision was that a section 221(4)
charge would not lead to conviction if only inadvertent negligence were found.
Further, inasmuch as it might be inferred from the judgments in the Supreme
Court in Binus that they were insisting that a direction in terms of advertent
negligence had to be given because this followed from the holding in Mann,
the majority in Peda pointed out that such statements in Mann itself were
obiter. Not surprisingly, Cartwright, C.J.C., with whom Spence and Hall JJ.
agreed, held that the principle that the jury must be told that advertent negli-
gence had to be proved was central to the decision in Mann. Cartwright C.J.C.
and Spence J., had, in fact, rested their decision in Mann on that very point. 0
They now held in Peda that a jury must always be directed expressly to find
advertence in a section 221(4) case.
The obscurity of reasoning in Mann and Binus was now reaping its re-
ward. But, despite the confusion surrounding section 221 (4), there had been
no abandonment of the position that the three sections-1 91 (1), 221 (1) and
221 (4), (now 202, 233 (1) and 233(4) )--required advertent negligence to
be proved. Certainly none of the arguments about advertence or inadvertence
had been raised in respect of sections 191(1) and 221(1) of the Criminal
Code,-the criminal negligence sections with which we are concerned in this
paper. It seemed clear, even after O'Grady, Mann, Binus and Peda, that the
criteria of wanton and reckless behaviour specified in those sections denoted
the need for finding advertence. But a small doubt about this proposition has
arisen. It stems from pronouncements by Laskin C.J.C. who has had every
reason to be bemused by the legal reasoning adopted in this area.
In Arthurs v. The Queen,"' the Supreme Court of Canada had to deal
with a case in which it was argued that the judge had failed to properly put
the accused's defence to the jury. A secondary issue raised was whether the
judge's directions had adequately countered any racial bias that might have
60 Although, it will be remembered, Spence J. used other reasons as well.
61 [1974] S.C.R. 287, 28 D.L.R. (3d) 565, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 438.
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existed because of the fact that both the accused and his counsel were black.
The accused had been convicted of causing bodily harm by criminal negli-
gence in the operation of an automobile. Six members of the Supreme Court
gave negative replies to the two questions put by the appellant; 2 Ritchie J.
noted that "[C]rown counsel treated the charge as one which necessarily in-
volved proof that the accused had deliberately run [the victim] down. In my
view, this was a wrong approach which placed an unnecessarily heavy burden
on the Crown."6 3 This, of course, does not suggest that subjective intent need
not be proved in this kind of charge, but merely that deliberate conduct need
not be established. Laskin J., dissented, noting that the charge was a rather
strange amalgam of homicide by criminal negligence in the use of a motor
vehicle. He thought that the charge had to be viewed as one of homicide by
criminal negligence, the particulars being homicide by the criminally negli-
gent driving of a motor vehicle. In that light he went on to say that the direc-
tion which had been given by the trial judge in Arthurs, and which had been
in common use in Ontario in criminal negligence cases, put too great an onus
on the Crown because it required that the accused had with deliberate intent
done something or omitted to do something which he or she knew or ought
to have known would endanger the lives of others.6 4 Having said that, Laskin
J. could have left the point alone, as had Ritchie J. in his judgment. It would
then have been open to reason that criminal negligence did not require proof
of deliberate intent by the accused, but some element of advertence still
needed to be proved. That is, the second branch of the Ontario direction-
disregard for the lives and safety of others-would be the subjective intent
which it is necessary to prove to establish that the offence of criminal negli-
gence has been committed. But Laskin J. did not leave the point alone.
Instead he stated:
Although the question of the type of mens rea involved in criminal negligence, as
defined in s. 191(1), was not directly in issue in the judgments of this Court in
O'Grady v. Sparling, Binus v. The Queen, and Peda v. The Queen, these cases sup-
port the conclusion that subjective intent is not a necessary ingredient of criminal
negligence. 5
As this was clearly, in the context, an unnecessary argument to the decision
and as Laskin J. was a dissentient, does this pronouncement have any
importance?
That issue arose in a peculiar manner in R. v. Leblanc.66 The accused
was the pilot of a light aircraft in which he was to transport the victim. The
victim was waiting on the ground when the pilot flew the aircraft very low
near to where he stood to frighten him. He miscalculated, and a part of the
62 Fauteux C.J.C., Ritchie, Abbott, Martland, Judson and Pigeon JJ.
03At 297 (S.C.R.), 572 (D.LR.), 446 (C.C.C.).
6 4 This was part of a direction which had two branches. The first was as stated in
the text; the second was that, in the alternative, the accused must have acted with such
disregard for the lives and safety of others as to indicate that he or she was heedless of
the consequences. This two-branched direction had been given the judicial stamp of
approval in R. v. Titchner, [1961] O.R. 606, 29 D.L.R. (2d) 1, 35 C.R. 111 (C.A.);
R. v. Torrie, [1967] 2 Q.R. 8, 50 C.R. 300, [1967] 3 C.C.C. (C.A.).
65 Supra note 61 at 306-07 (S.C.R.), 579 (D.L.R.), 453 (C.C.C.).
6 [1977] 1 S.C.R. 339, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 243, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 97.
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plane hit the victim, killing him. The accused was convicted of criminal
negligence. When the matter came to the Supreme Court of Canada, one of
the issues was whether the trial judge had improperly admitted evidence
to the effect that, on several previous occasions, the accused had made low
flying passes over people waiting on the ground. The argument was that
similar fact evidence can be admitted only where it proves a fact-in-issue
and does so by way of a chain of inferences other than that the accused has
a predisposition to behave in a particular way because of some unworthy
characteristics he or she may possess. In this case, as there was no need
to prove the actus reus, similar fact evidence could have been admitted only
because it proved the mens rea of the accused. The accused reasoned that
it was clear that he had not had any intention to kill the victim and that the
Crown had not sought to base its case on any such supposition. Thus, the
argument went, the similar fact evidence was totally unnecessary and its ad-
missibility may well have prejudiced the jury against the accused.
The majority of the Court, led by de Grandpr6 J.,67 found that the
similar fact evidence had been properly admitted because it tended to prove
one of the facts in issue: mens rea. De Grandpr6 J. cited Ritchie J. and
Laskin C.J.C. for the proposition that deliberate intent to cause harm was not
an element to be proved in criminal negligence. But he relied on O'Grady v.
Sparling for the proposition that advertence by the accused had to be estab-
lished. That is, some kind of intent had to be proved. His Lordship, citing
Peda, noted that often the very proving of the alleged conduct would estab-
lish the intent necessary to be proved in a criminal negligence case and that
it might have been enough for the Crown to rely on the conduct of the
accused, the nature of which was not disputed. However, he continued, this
did not preclude the Crown from proving this intent-this advertence-by
adducing more evidence than was necessary. Hence, the similar fact evidence
was properly admitted.
The minority in Leblanc took a radically different view. Dickson J.
argued that similar fact evidence, when the actus reus was not in question,
could only be adduced where it was relevant to prove identity or intent or
to negative accident or mistake or to rebut a defence otherwise open to an
accused. Here identity was not an issue, nor could the Crown introduce the
evidence to rebut a defence which had not been raised, was most unlikely
to be raised and was, in the event, not raised. As to intent, Dickson J. argued
that to prove the mental element of criminal negligence, it was sufficient
for the Crown to establish that the accused had shown wanton or reckless
disregard for the lives and safety of other persons. He cited the passage from
the dissenting judgment of Laskin J. in Arthurs, already extracted. Dickson J.
went on to make the following observation:
That is to say, the mens rea of criminal negligence is determined by an objective
standard. The majority of the Court in that case [Arthurs] did not disagree with the
statement by Laskin J. It is doubtful that similar fact evidence would be admissible
to prove subjective intent-proof of subjective intent not being a requisite of the
offence.68 (Emphasis added.)
67 Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence and Pigeon JJ. concurred.
68 Supra note 66 at 346 (S.C.R.), 249 (D.L.R.), 103 (C.C.C.).
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Beetz J. delivered a short concurring judgment; Laskin C.J.C. concurred with
Dickson J. but did not write a word.
To sum up the consequences of these decisions is not easy. At the very
least, a strong minority of appellate judges feels a need to opt for an objective
test in criminal negligence cases. Perhaps if it had not been for the peculiar
constitutional framework in which the questions were put to Canadian courts,
an objective test might have emerged. The various reasons advanced for up-
holding both criminal and provincial legislation had to have, or so it appeared
to the judiciary, a common thread. That thread was found to be the need
for advertence in the federal offences and the non-requirement of it in pro-
vincial ones. But for the need for such a demarcation point the issue may
have been resolved otherwise. At present, however, it may be stated-with a
good deal of diffidence-that the offence of criminal negligence requires some
measure of subjective intent to be proved by the Crown. What is the nature
of the intent which must be established?
3. The nature of the subjective intent required.
As has already been noted, there are some theoretical reasons why ob-
jective criteria ought not to be applied when determining criminality. Two
of the foremost theorists who argue that criminality requires a guilty state
of mind and that, therefore, an objective test is anathema to criminal law are
Hall and Turner.69 The thesis of these writers, and others like them, is that
an essential component of criminality is voluntary conduct. Inadvertent con-
duct is defined as not being voluntary and, therefore, not criminal. The
reasoning is that it is ethically wrong to stigmatize a person as having acted
immorally-which is what a criminal conviction entails-if the conduct of
the accused was, in fact, not voluntary. In addition, the punishment which
follows a criminal conviction is physically very harsh. It is seen as wrongful
to inflict such hardship on people who were not ethically to blame for their
conduct. An additional argument that these people use is that, inasmuch as
punishment of a convicted person is meant to act as both a specific and a
general deterrent, punishment imposed for involuntary acts cannot fulfill that
function. By definition, people who do not act voluntarily cannot be deterred
from the conduct in which they engage.
The writers who oppose the objective test on the foregoing bases equate
inadvertent conduct with negligent conduct. To them, it follows as day follows
night, that there ought to be no such thing as an offence of criminal negli-
gence. It must be noted at this point that this description of how the criminal
system ought to operate is consonant with some of the basic concepts relating
to defences. The defences of insanity, automatism and drunkenness operate
on the basis that the accused acted without necessary intent. The intent is,
generally speaking, lacking in such situations because the conduct might be
69 See Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947)
at 366-67; see also Hall, Negligent Behaviour Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability
(1963), 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632, and Turner, "The Mental Element in Crimes at Common
Law," in The Modern Approach to Criminal Law, ed. Davies (London: Macmillan, 1945),
and Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, ed. J. W. C. Turner (18th ed. Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1962), and Turner, Russell on Crime, (12th ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1964).
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classed as involuntary in the sense that that word has been used by the
opponents of objective standard-setting in criminal law. What follows in this
section will indicate that the courts are acutely aware of the need to find a
subjective intent and that they therefore will speak about the need to find
mens rea or voluntary conduct or both when attempting to determine criminal
liability. It will also be shown that it may not be as difficult as it might be
expected to demonstrate the requisite intent.
First, to demonstrate that it is true that the courts are not willing to find
that every departure from an apparently objectively-set norm for behaviour
is criminal, note the decision of R. v. Akerele. In that case a medical prac-
titioner had wrongfully and carelessly mixed a drug which he was prescribing
for sick children. As a result of his carelessness ten children died. The Privy
Council held that, although the practitioner may have erred in the way that
he approached his task, his carelessness did not amount to criminal behav-
iour. 0 It may well have been that if the practitioner had been sued in tort
he would have been found to have departed from the standard that a reason-
able man could be expected to meet. If one equates inadvertent conduct with
negligence, it seems to follow from this decision that inadvertent conduct
cannot amount to criminal negligence. It would then appear that a subjective
element of some kind needs to be found before criminal responsibility can
be attached to conduct. The only other possibility would be to discover some
intermediate state of mind between inadvertence and mens rea.
This leads to the second argument. Professor Hart has reasoned that
negligence and inadvertence are separate concepts. He defined inadvertence
as referring to those situations where the conduct of a person is the result
of a truly blank state of mind. He agreed that where this was the fact no
criminal responsibility ought to attach to the act of the accused. He differen-
tiated this blank state of mind from negligence by describing the latter as a
departure from what a reasonable man could and would do in the circum-
stances. Negligence was thus described as conduct which departed from a
standard of behaviour which was objectively derived. In this sense, negligence
was seen as the failure to think about how to meet the requirements which
are objectively set. Not thinking about undertaking precautions which a
reasonable person would take is the culpable state of mind known as negli-
gence. This is to be differentiated from the situation where there was no
intent to commit the act at all, or from the situation where the act was
committed without any notion about its consequences because of an excusable
failure to anticipate events.7'1
In the Hart test, an objective test will be utilized at some stage of deter-
mining criminal liability. This obviously does not preclude the use of another
test than the one used in civil cases being used in the inquiry. It is believed
that it is the failure to see this that has caused unnecessary confusion in
decision-making. As we have seen, because it has seemed important in Canada
70 [1943] A.C. 255, [1943] 1 All E.R. 367, [19431 3 W.W.R. 167 (P.C.). See also
R. v. Noakes (1866), 4 F. & F. 920, 176 E.R. 849.
71 Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility in Hart, Punishment and
Responsibility (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968) at 136.
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to differentiate between criminal and non-criminal matters for constitutional
purposes, the focus has instinctively been on the need to show intent in
criminal cases and the lack of necessity for doing this in other cases. It is
suggested that the need to find intent in criminal cases was, because of its
juxtaposition to civil cases, translated by some of the courts to mean that an
inquiry into subjective intent, which made no reference at all to the civil
means of determining the appropriate code of behaviour, was the only inquiry
which was permitted to occur in a criminal negligence case. In fact, there may
not be that much difference between the view of those members of the
Supreme Court of Canada who apparently insist that the essential criterion
in criminal negligence is subjective intent and the view of those of the other
members of the Court it rejects, namely those of Laskin C.J.C. in Arthurs and
Dickson J. in Leblanc. Inasmuch as this prestigious minority is arguing that
an objective test is all that needs be satisfied in criminal negligence cases, it
may be that, although its members use the language of civil liability, they are
merely pointing to the need to set a standard which only can be done by the
use of an objective test. Failure to meet such a standard will then perhaps
suffice as evidence of the state of mind which is a prerequisite to establishing
criminal responsibility. They are not necessarily arguing that the standard is
to be set at the same level as it would be for a civil case.
Since the proponents of the necessity of a subjective intent might be
using the Hart approach, while using the language of mens rea, they might
seldom reach results which differ from those reached by the "objective test"
proponents. Thus, they would be setting an objective standard first, and then
deciding whether the deviation from it was sufficient to merit the attachment
of criminal responsibility. If they set the objective standard as low as they
would in a civil case to establish criminal responsibility, the emphasis will
be on the nature of the deviation from the standard so set. A semblance of
subjective intent searching will thus appear. But, clearly, the "objective test"
proponents may set their standard so high that, in order to find a breach
of it, a court would have to find the same kind of conduct as that which
constituted a gross deviation from a lower "civil" standard. The difference
between the subjective intent proponents and their objective standard antago-
nists would, if this analysis of what they actually do is correct, be of minor
significance.
It is the thesis of this paper that decided cases show that the courts do
determine culpability in criminal negligence cases by setting an objective
standard and then assessing the nature of the deviation, if any, from that
standard. All that remains to be shown is the nature of the assessment of the
alleged deviation: does it in fact require a finding of such a huge departure
from a "civil-type norm" that it makes sense to speak of a criminal intent
which the word "subjective" denotes, or will it be sufficient to show that the
accused failed to take precautions a reasonable man could and would have
taken? If it is the latter of these approaches which is to be used, criminal
negligence would be well-suited for use by those, who like us, wish to make
employers criminally responsible for deficiencies in their operations. It is to be
argued that, on the whole, the cases provide support for the latter position.
Let us return to the cases.
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(i) Conduct can truly be characterized as not voluntary when the
accused was incapable, through no fault of his own, of thinking
about taking normal precautions. No criminal responsibility ought
to attach to such conduct. Nor will it. This is true inadvertence
and will not be treated as criminal behaviour. The case of Minor,
already discussed, is a good illustration.72
(ii) When the cases of Petzoldt, Shaw and Taylor78 were discussed it
was seen that there was no difficulty involved in holding the con-
duct in those cases to be criminally culpable. Using the analysis
offered above, it can be seen that criminal negligence was found in
those cases because the accused knew about what precautions they
ought to have taken as reasonable people and either deliberately
refused to take such precautions or foolishly and erroneously
thought that they simply did not have to meet the standard require-
ments. A similar case is R. v. Coleman.74 In that case, a pilot
decided to take off even though he was strongly advised that the
conditions of fog were such that flying was inadvisable. For the
purposes of the statute under which he was charged, wantonness or
recklessness had to be proved. He was found to have been culpa-
ble. To repeat: in all these cases an objective standard was as-
sumed to exist and a breach of that objective standard led to a
finding of criminal culpability. In all it was manifest that something
more than a mere or very slight breach of the objective standard
was involved. 75
(iii) This brings us to the more difficult kind of cases, those in which
it is not clear that the accused deliberately or simply foolishly
ignored the precautions that a reasonable man could and would
have taken. In particular, difficulties will exist where the accused
was drunk and drove negligently. In R. v. Savoie76 the accused
driver zigzagged all over the road and killed a boy who was walk-
ing alongside the road. The question facing the court was whether
the jury should have been instructed that the accused, to .be found
guilty, had to have had knowledge of the danger he was creating
by his conduct. As the accused was very drunk it was arguable
that he had no understanding of the risk he had created. It was
held that the accused was criminally negligent because it is possible
72 Supra note 45. See also, R. v. Balcerczyck, supra note 46.
73 Supra notes 40, 42, and 43.
74 Supra note 41.
75 See also R. v. Gagnon (1956), 115 C.C.C. 82 (Que. Sessions of the Peace), tho
accused threw a bottle from the back of the car; he did not mean to hit anyone but hit a
bystander; he was held to be criminally negligent; it was suggested that a criminal intent
was necessary: that intent was inferred from the nature of the conduct. See also R. v.
Dauphinge (1959), 31 C.R. 247 (N.B. Mag. Ct.) in which the accused's truck was sought
to be taken away by a person executing judgment; the accused threw a piece of heavy
wood; regardless of whether or not it was intended to hit anyone the conduct was held
to be criminally negligent; the conduct itself was sufficient to base a finding of the requisite
intent.
76 (1956), 117 C.C.C. 327 (N.B.C.A.).
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to be held wanton and reckless, as the provision requires, without
having had actual knowledge of the danger which had been created
by the accused's conduct. This decision is based on the notion that
the accused did not behave as a reasonable man could or would
have in the circumstances because a reasonable man would not
have put himself in a position of not being able to appreciate the
risk that he was creating for all people.77 A similar decision is R.
v. Galloway.78 In that case the accused had entered into a drag
race and therefore had deliberately set out to break the speed limit.
It was held that the accused was criminally negligent, presumably
on the basis that he had the requisite criminal intent because he
put himself in a position where he was willing to defy the normal
precautions that would be taken by a person driving a vehicle.
It is of interest to note that even as vigorous an opponent of the use of
an objective test as Professor Hall would permit a finding of criminal respon-
sibility in a case where a person about to drive an automobile "knows that
he is ill or very tired or if he drinks alcoholic beverages knowing this will
incapacitate him" or where "a railroad guard, who knows he has not read
recently issued regulations concerning his work, acts recklessly when he
controls the traffic despite his known ignorance." 79 It appears fairly clear
that what Hall (and Turner) may really be objecting to is the finding of
criminal liability in cases where there truly is a blank state of mind. The
courts have accepted this proposition.
It seems, then, that subjective intent will not mean that the accused must
have had some kind of deliberate intent to cause harm or to be completely
careless about whether or not he or she caused such harm. Both of these
states of mind will, of course, allow a finding of criminal responsibility but
something between that and a breach of an objective standard of care set at a
civil level may be adequate. The difficulty of enunciating such a test in the
form of a precise rule is manifest and it therefore has not been done. But
the analysis of the cases above gives some indications as to what the courts
may do in certain circumstances. In particular, they have adopted the tech-
nique of asserting that the necessary intent is present when the conduct is
either inherently anti-social or belongs to a category of behaviour which has,
over time, come to be unacceptable. Of particular interest in this context are
77 Reliance was placed on a passage from Middleton J.A. in R. v. Greisman (1926),
59 O.L.R. at 162, [1926] 4 D.L.R. 738 at 743, 46 C.C.C. 172 at 177-78:
I think the great weight of authority goes to show that there will be no criminal
liability unless there is gross negligence, or wanton misconduct. To constitute crime
there must be a certain moral quality carried into the act before it becomes culpable.
In each case it is a question of fact, and it is the duty of the court to ascertain if
there was such wanton and reckless negligence as in the eye of the law merits
punishment. This may be found where a general intention to disregard the law is
shown, or a reckless disregard of the rights of others.
This was approved by the Supreme Court of Canada in American Automobile Insurance
Company v. Dickson, [1943] S.C.R. 143, [1943] 2 D.L.R. 15.
78 [1957] O.W.N. 477, 26 C.R. 342 (Ont. C.A.).
7 9 Supra note 37 at 634.
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a series of New Brunswick cases of which the first is R. v. Fortin.80 In that
case a trial judge had suggested that before a person can be found guilty of
criminal negligence, intention or knowledge of the consequences of his behav-
iour has to be proved. On appeal it was held sufficient that a particularly
reckless act which clearly was in breach of an objective standard of care had
occurred. The conduct itself allows a court to hold that the accused had a
blameworthy state of mind, and such a state of mind can be found to exist
when there has been a failure to think about the consequences of behaviour
at all. Similarly, note the case of R. v. Coyne8 l in which the accused, a man
with good vision, shot at a shape he thought was a deer but turned out to be
a man. Ritchie J., relying on his own judgment in Fortin, held that an honest
belief was no defence and that a blameworthy state of mind could be inferred
from the conduct of the accused.8 2 The test used in Fortin, and in these other
cases cited, mirrors the analysis offered by Hart. It will be noted that, in
essence, it is what the Supreme Court was saying, at least in part in Binus,
and explicitly in Peda, where it was held that if, as a fact, dangerous driving
had been found to have occurred, criminal negligence could be attributed to
the accused because the conduct would be such as to show that the person
had the necessary criminal intent. That is, dangerous driving by definition was
such a departure from the objective standard which had been set in relation
to driving that the blameworthy state of mind could be attributed to the
accused (presumably unless it could be shown that the accused's driving was
a result of a blank state of mind, such as an unexpected blackout).
The poverty of analytical tools in this area is now clear. In a large
number of cases intent will be inferred from the nature of the accused's
conduct. To determine whether conduct was dangerous, unacceptable or un-
reasonable (regardless of the state of mind of the actor), an objective stan-
dard has to be set. Very often this is set by implication and, therefore, it looks
as if no objective test-setting is involved in the criminal negligence proceeding
at all. Where the behaviour is something as crude as zigzagging across the
road when driving a car, driving in contravention of other well known and
clearly set out statutory standards and regulations, throwing a piece of wood
when there are people standing about, taking a vicious chimpanzee out for a
walk regardless of the many people who will be met on that walk, and so
forth, it is easy to classify behaviour as criminally negligent without spelling
out how the objective standard of care was first determined and how the
moral blameworthiness of the accused was subsequently decided. Where the
behaviour is not obviously in defiance of what a reasonable man in those
circumstances could have and would have done, two possible approaches are
open to a court. It may decide that the objective standard was in fact not
breached or, alternatively, that it was not breached sufficiently to give rise to
a criminal charge. Both require the setting of an objective standard of care.
The latter approach is most likely to appeal to the judiciary when it is known
that, civilly, the behaviour might have been seen as unacceptable. Therefore,
in order to say that the conduct was nonetheless not criminally negligent, the
80 (1957), 42 M.P.R. 70, 29 C.R. 28, 121 C.C.C. 345 (N.B.C.A.).
81 (1958), 31 C.R. 335, 124 C.C.C. 176 (N.B.C.A.).
8 2 See also R. v. Manderville (1958), 31 C.R. 154, 124 C.C.C. 268 (N.B.C.A.); R.
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court will have to say things such as the conduct was not grossly negligent
or, what is even more unsatisfactory, that it was unintentional. These are
ill-defined notions. But it is clear what the court is in fact doing. In both
approaches-saying that the objective standard of care was not breached
or that it was not breached sufficiently-the court is making a political deci-
sion. It is deciding how people are expected to behave in particular circum-
stances. As the conduct of the accused, rather than his or her true subjective
intent, determines whether the behaviour was criminal, the issue is against
what background the conduct is measured. It can only be against such factors
as: (i) the nature of the risk it creates, (ii) any justification there may be
for creating such a risk, (iii) the likelihood of harm and the gravity of such
harm. There seem to be no other possible criteria by which to evaluate the
acceptability of behaviour, unless it can be shown somehow that, regardless
of the nature of the conduct, the accused had no criminal intent. This always
remains theoretically possible. But, in a large number of cases, indeed the
great majority, the court adjudging a criminal negligence charge is doing very
much what it explicitly undertakes to do in a tort case. As is well known,
what it does there is to measure the cost of eliminating the risk against the
likelihood and gravity of injury. As Lord Reid said in the Wagon Mound
(No. 2), the general principle is:
that a person must be regarded as negligent if he does not take steps to eliminate
the risk which he knows or ought to know is a real risk and not a mere possibility
which would never influence the mind of a reasonable man ... , [I]t is justifiable
not to take steps to eliminate the real risk if it is small and if the circumstances are
such that a reasonable man, careful of the safety of his neighbour would think it
right to neglect it.83
Arguably, because the result of a criminal conviction is so much more serious
than that of a finding of civil liability, it may be true that, in a criminal trial,
a court will find that it is very difficult to eliminate a particular cost which
creates a risk or that the risk of likely harm and the gravity thereof is not
very serious, whereas in a civil case the cost might be seen as manageable or
the risk as great. This would mean that the courts would find no breach of the
objective standard in a criminal case when the same behaviour might have
led to a finding of liability in a tort case. This may often be explained by
saying that the requisite intent was not established to attach criminal respon-
sibility. A good example may be the case of Akerele. A theoretical difficulty
in equating the criminal negligence process with that of the risk analysis ap-
posite to civil negligence law is that, in criminal matters, it is the behaviour
itself which is of significance, not the damage it causes. The nature of the
behaviour characterizes it as immoral and worthy of punishment. In a tort
case the behaviour itself may be egregious yet attract no sanctions because
it caused no recoverable damage. Indeed, in some of the cases, explicit state-
ments may be found to the effect that, in determining whether or not the
accused has been criminally negligent, the actual consequences of the conduct
v. Gylee (1909), 1 Cr. App. Rep. 242; R. v. Barek, [1947] O.W.N. 831, 90 C.C.C. 189
(C.A.); R. v. White, [1934] 2 W.W.R. 513, 62 C.C.C. 76 (B.C.C.A.).
83 Overseas Tank Ships (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co., [1967] 1 A.C. 617 at
642-43, [1966] 2 All E.R. 709 at 711, [1966] 3 W.L.R. 498 at 511 (P.C.).
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ought not to be taken into account. Thus, in Akerele the Privy Council said
that:
The act had already taken place, and its observed consequences, which only showed
themselves at a later date, could not add to its criminality. The negligence to beimputed depends upon the probable, not the actual, result.84
But, even so, while it may be theoretically possible to evaluate the blame-
worthiness of conduct without reference to the actual consequences, it seems
psychologically impossible to do so. In any event, it is to be noted that even
the Privy Council did not reason that the consequences of conduct must be
ignored but rather that the actual results, as opposed to the probable conse-
quences, were to be disregarded.
In sum, when determining whether the conduct of the accused was such
a deviation from the accepted norm as to warrant a criminal conviction (the
task usually performed by courts when adjudicating criminal negligence
cases), courts will balance the cost of eliminating the risk against the likeli-
hood and gravity of harm. The imprecision of this formula needs no under-
lining. Its value as an analytical tool is not great. But, it has great significance
in the context of this paper. The fact that the apparent requirement of sub-jective intent can often be satisfied by showing that the cost of eliminating
the risk was less than the likelihood and gravity of consequence makes it
theoretically and practically plausible to use the offence of criminal negligence
as a sword in the occupational health sphere. Some of the practical difficulties
are discussed in the next section.
4. The possibilities for Criminal negligence in occupational health cases.
It will have been noted that the definition of criminal negligence shows
that the crime may be committed by either the doing of an act or by the
omission of an act which the accused was required to do because the law
imposed a duty to do the act. It is thus possible that it would be advantageous
to show that a positive act led to the victim's injury because the prosecution
would be relieved from having to show that a breach of legal duty had taken
place. This distinction between commissions and omissions, although sug-
gested by the Criminal Code, is conceptually unattractive. Thus, an omission
to put in proper ventilation can logically be categorized as the positive act of
causing too much dust to remain in the room. There is no fact situation which
cannot be characterized as either an omission or commission merely by en-
gaging in minor sleight of hand. For instance, when the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court was asked the question of whether a trial judge had appropriately
characterized the negligent driving of a car as being a positive act, rather than
an omission to take care, Ilsley C.J. said:
The learned Judge in effect left both act and omissions to the jury, as indeed he
could not escape doing, because one or more of the omissions alleged to show
criminal negligence involved positive acts on the part of the accused. When a person
drives at excessive speed, he not only omits to do something which it is his duty to
do, namely, to drive at a reasonable speed or to take reasonable care in the circum-
stances, but he also does something.85
84 Supra note 70 at 264 (A.C.), 372 (All E.R.), 175 (W.W.R.).
85 R. v. Forgeron (1958), 42 M.P.R. 23, 29 C.R. 36, 121 C.C.C. 310 (N.S.C.A.), at
28 (M.P.R.), 39-40 (C.R.), 313 (C.C.C.).
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Whether the conduct is classified as a positive act or as an omission will not
matter; each time the prosecution will have to establish that the necessary
mental element and causative relationship existed. It is true that where a duty
imposed by law has been breached it will be easier to establish these prere-
quisites to the founding of criminal responsibility than it might be otherwise.
But, conceptually, nothing ought to turn on this.
Nonetheless, section 202 of the Criminal Code does create a distinction
between commissions and omissions and, in some cases, it might help a court
achieve one result rather than another by relying on this pedantic distinction
and thereby avoiding expressing a manifest preference for one result over
another. But, in the particular context of this paper-namely, the criminal
negligence of employers for having unsafe premises-it will seldom be diffi-
cult to show that a duty imposed by law has been breached. That is, the
notionally more difficult route of relying on an omission will, in fact, not be
more difficult than establishing that a positive act led to the harm. This is so
because most employer/employee situations will be governed by statutes
which impose a duty in respect of safety and health. For instance, section
81 (1) of the Canada Labour Codes8 states:
Every person operating or carrying on a federal work, undertaking or business shall
do so in a manner that will not endanger the safety or health of any person employed
thereupon or in connection therewith.8
In addition, there is a well established common law duty which is implied
in the contract of employment to the effect that the employer shall ensure that
the employee has safe working conditions. We will return to the nature of this
duty shortly. For the moment let us note another minor difficulty in respect
of the laying of a criminal negligence charge.
When the prosecution relies on an omission to do something which it
is the accused's legal duty to do, there is an argument to be met that a breach
of duty of the kind imposed by common law (which has just been referred
to) will not suffice. This argument arises out of a difference in wording in the
definition section of the Criminal Code's French version and its English one.
In the English version of the Code there is no definition of duty, except that
it must be one imposed by law, law being undefined. In the French version,
the word "law" is defined in section 2. That definition, on its face suggests
that "law" only includes the Criminal Code itself or an enactment of a legis-
lature.88 It is here argued that this apparent restriction of the concept of duty
80 R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1.
87 See also The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 83, ss. 13,
14, 15, 16; The Workplace Safety and Health Act, S.M. 1976, c. 63, s. 4; The Occupational
Health and Safety Act, S.A. 1976, c. 40, s. 2; The Occupational Health and Safety Act,
S.S. 1976-77, c. 53, s. 3.
88 "Loi" comprend
(a) une loi du Parlement du Canada,
(b) une loi de la ldgislature de l'ancienne province du Canada,
(c) une loi de la l6gislature d'une province, et
(d) une loi ou ordonnance de la 16gislature d'une province, d'un territoire ou d'un
endroit, en vigueur au moment o-t cette province, ce territoire ou cet endroit est
devenu une province du Canada.
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is not to be read into the Code. In support of that argument, note that in the
first place, we already have referred to a number of cases where no reference
was made to the breach of a duty imposed by either the Code or a statute of
any kind, yet a criminal negligence charge was held to be well-founded. Such
a case, for instance, was Petzoldt which was referred to earlier.89 There, it
will be remembered, the accused was found guilty of criminal negligence
when his vicious chimpanzee, which he took for a walk, bit a child. There
seems to be no apparent Criminal Code provision or other statutory enact-
ment prohibiting the walking of chimpanzees. Of course, this might lead one
back to the argument that the distinction between positive acts and omissions
is significant. That is, it could be argued by those who wish to restrict the
meaning of "duty imposed by law" to one which is apparently suggested by
the French version of the Code, that cases like Petzoldt are really cases where
a positive act was committed and where, therefore, no breach of duty im-
posed by law had to be found. For the purpose of this reasoning the positive
act must have been taking the chimpanzee out onto the streetY0
Another argument in support of the proposition that the duty may be im-
posed by Criminal Code, statutory provisions, or by common law is that, if it
were not so, presumably an omission to perform a contractual obligation in
Quebec might be classed as an omission to do a duty imposed by law because
the law of contract there rests on statutory enactment, whereas an omission
of the same kind in Ontario would not amount to omitting to do a duty
imposed by law because there the obligation arises under common law. That
kind of result could not have been intended by the draftsmen of the Code.
It is therefore suggested that the phrase "la loi comprend" in section 2 of
the French version of the Code means that "the law includes" not "the law
means."'
To recapitulate, inasmuch as there is a difference between a positive act
and an omission, nothing much will turn on the distinction in the occupational
health area in which we are interested in this paper because, if there is a
positive act, there would be no need to establish a duty imposed by law, and,
where there is a reliance on an omission (because, say, an adverse party
sought to characterize the conduct as such), it will be easy to show that there
is a duty imposed by law in most employer/employee relationships. This will
not be inhibited by the definition of the word "law" in the French version of
the Code. With that in mind we can now turn to some illustrative fact situa-
tions which demonstrate how the law of criminal negligence might be used
in the occupational health area.
The first such situation is taken from a case which was brought before a
coroner in Qu6bec. 92 Three workmen had been sent underground to do some
89 Supra note 40. See also the judgment of Ritchie J.A. in R. v. Coyne, supra note 81.
90 Or, adapting the reasoning of the court in Forgeron, supra note 85, it was a positive,
negligent act to omit to keep the chimpanzee at home.
91 Were it intended to mean "means" it is likely that the draftsman would have used
the word "signifie."
92 Quebec Coroner's Inquest into the Death of Daniel Tardif, Frangois Lamarre,
Robert Paquet, held on 13th November 1978, case number 1660-78.
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cable work in a part of Montreal where it was well known that there was a
danger of an escape of hydrogen sulphide from nearby refineries. It was
established that an inspector of Hydro Qu6bec (who had contracted with the
workers' employer) had reported that basic precautions such as an exposure
measuring instrument, scaffolding and hats and gloves for the workmen, were
not available. Other workers gave evidence that there was no gas detecting
machinery nor appropriate ventilation. Further, there was evidence that sev-
eral workmen complained of feeling ill after their first day's work and had
complained about the lack of ventilators and gas measuring instruments. Two
workmen had had to be replaced because they felt so ill. Despite these events,
no action was taken by the company. When three of the workers were over-
come by fumes and died, a coroner's inquest was instituted. The coroner,
Me Laniel, held that he would recommend the laying of charges of criminal
negligence because this was the kind of case which called for such a measure.
The second illustration is taken from a Workers' Compensation Board
decision rendered in British Columbia.93 In that case the issue was whether
the Board should impose severe penalties until the employer concerned had
met the safety requirements which the Board wished it to satisfy. In particular,
the Board had found that there were signs and symptoms of lead poisoning
in many of the workers, that there were many airborne contaminants in the
blast furnace area, in the drossing plant and in the lead refinery complex of
the company. It was pointed out that the company had had many warnings
over a time span of several years to redesign its plant to meet what the Board
deemed to be appropriate safety requirements. The failure of the company
to do so had put the Board in a position where it had no option but to impose
a fine of such severity that the company would be forced to choose to rede-
sign the plant rather than to continue to absorb the fines. The Board appar-
ently hoped that this would be more cost-efficient than to continue to operate
in a way that was inimical to the safety of the employees in the plant. We
advocate here that there should be no difficulty in this kind of situation to
initiate a prosecution for criminal negligence because the employer had clearly
been given (as in the Qu6bec hydrogen sulphide case) ample warning of the
fact that its plant was not safe. If it could be shown that workers had been
adversely affected by the condition of the plant then it ought to follow that
the employer had omitted to obey the duty imposed on it by law (be it a
lawful order of an agency such as the Workers' Compensation Board or the
common law duty to keep premises safe) and that it had done so knowingly
in a manner which could be appropriately described as wilful or reckless.
The third example offered arises from the facts of Cassiar Asbestos
Corporation and United Steelworkers of America, Local 6536 (B.C.). 94 This
case was an arbitration in which the issue was whether the employer had been
entitled to discipline some clerical employees who had walked off their jobs
because they felt that their colleagues in the associated manufacturing process
were endangered by the great number of fibres of asbestos in the air about
them. The discipline issue does not concern us here. What is of interest is that
93 Re Industrial Hygiene (1975), 2 B.C.W.C.B. 234, Decision No. 167.
04 (1976), 2 C.L.R.B.R. 476 (B.C.L.R.B., before Weiler).
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it became clear in the case that the mine inspectors of the Provincial Depart-
ment of Mines and Petroleum Resources had, prior to the incident, made
reports which indicated that the asbestos fibre count was in excess of the
accepted safety level. Further, by the time the arbitration came to the Board,
both sides acknowledged that there had been a dangerous situation at the
plant. The argument herein is that in that kind of case-where the company
had had warnings of some kind that a known safety margin has been ex-
ceeded-there is ample ground to initiate a prosecution for criminal negli-
gence. It could easily be shown that the employer knew that there was a
doubt about the safety of work conditions. If, in addition, it could be shown
that workers' health had been adversely affected, a case could be made out
that the employer did a positive act (by permitting too many contaminants to
pollute the air) or omitted to do an act which it had a legal duty to do,(namely, to provide ventilation, slow down the process, provide respirators,
and so forth), and had done so quite reckless of the effect such an omission
would have on the employees.
Another situation in which the employer might easily be imputed to have
knowledge of the unsafe conditions in the plant, is likely to arise where joint
employer/employee committees, set up under the terms of a collective agree-
ment or as a result of one of the many new occupational health statutes, have
warned the employer that unsafe conditions exist.
In all these cases it will be easy to make out a case that the employer
knew full well that the plant was unsafe, and that this employer was wanton
or reckless of the bodily well-being of employees as shown by his refusal to
heed actual warnings or acknowledging danger. This does not establish intent
in the subjective sense of wanting to harm the employees, but it certainly
establishes intent in the sense that it was used in cases like Petzoldt, Shaw,
Taylor, Coleman, Savoie, Galloway, and so on.95
What will be the situation where it is not so clear that the employer
knew that he was in breach of a safety statute which made the plant unsafe
or where there was no clear indication to him that something was amiss? To
prove criminal negligence in such cases will be extremely difficult if a subjec-
tive intent of the kind that is thought to be involved in most mens rea offences
has to be established. We therefore return to our analysis of what the mental
requirement in the offence of criminal negligence may be. It will be remem-
bered that the argument was that all that must be shown is that the accused
did not take the precautions which, given the cost of taking such precautions,
should have been taken in view of the likelihood and gravity of injury. It was
indicated that such a calculation would be difficult to handle even if the
courts faced it squarely. But it may be possible to make predictions in the
very particular context of the employer-employee relationship.
Assistance may be obtained from the nature and scope of the common
law duty that an employer has to provide a safe working environment for his
employees. The classic statement of the implied obligation in the employment
95 Petzoldt, supra note 40; Shaw, supra note 42; Taylor, supra note 43; Coleman,
supra note 41; Savoie, supra note 76; Galloway, supra note 78.
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contract in respect of safety comes from the well known case of Wilsons and
Clyde Coal Company Ltd. v. English.0 It was there held that mine owners
were liable for the failure of their manager to provide a safe system of work
in the mine. The duty to be imposed on the employer-and one which was
held to be non-delegable-was that the employer had to provide a competent
staff of men, safe plant and equipment and a safe system of work. Although
there are not all that many recent Canadian cases which have had to apply
this principle this does not mean it is not part of the law of employment in
Canada. The dearth of authorities here is attributable to the fact that, in
Canada, people can no longer sue their employers in tort but must rely on
workmen's compensation schemes. There is, however, Supreme Court of
Canada authority for the acceptance of the Wilsons and Clyde Coal v. English
principle. In Marshment v. Borgstron9 7 the Supreme Court of Canada, citing
the House of Lords decision with approval, went on to say that it stood for
the proposition that:
[t]he duties specified as the duties of the employer are 'fundamental obligations of a
contract of employment', and in the next place, that these obligations fall within
the same category as a statutory duty in respect of the characteristic that the em-
ployer cannot fulfill them by entrusting their fulfillment to competent employees.0 8
The duty owed by the employer to the employees is one which requires
the employer to behave with reasonable care in the circumstances. This is
manifestly vague. But nonetheless it was the test enunciated by the Privy
Council in Toronto Power Co. v. Paskwan,99 when it was asked to determine
an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Ontario.
It appears from the case law that, for the purposes of a civil cause of
action in respect of a breach of the common law duty to provide a safe work
environment, it is sufficient if it can be shown that the employer knew or
ought to have known of the unsafe conditions which prevailed and then failed
to take adequate precautions. Further, it is not always a defence to take only
those precautions which other similar employers are taking. In some cases
the employer has been required to force his employees to use safety equip-
ment; merely making it available was not sufficient. Thus, in Crookall v.
Vickers-Armstrong Ltd.100 the manufacturer's process caused the emission
of invisible particles into the atmosphere. When the process was first set up
it was not known that this process presented that kind of danger. Some time
90 [1938] A.C. 57, [1937] 3 All E.R. 628, 157 L.T.R. 406 (H.L.).
97 [1942] S.C.R. 374, 4 D.L.R. 1, rev'g [1941] 4 D.L.R. 804, which reversed [1941]
O.W.N. 197, [1941] 3 D.L.R. 428. -
98 Id. per Duff C.1.C. at 376 (S.C.R.), 3 (D.L.R.). For other cases in which this
proposition has been cited with approval, see Grant v. Acadia Coal Co. (1902), 32 S.C.R.
427, rev'g (1901), 34 N.S.R. 319; McKelvey v. Le Roi Mining Co. (1902), 32 S.C.R. 664,
rev'g (1900-03), 9 B.C.R. 62; Ainslie Mining and Ry. Co. v. McDougall (1910), 42 S.C.R.
420, 7 E.L.R. 429, aff'g 42 N.S.R. 226; Brooks v. Fakkema (1911), 44 S.C.R. 412, aflg
15 B.C.R. 461. Most of these cases concerned traumatic injuries to employees not covered
by workmen's compensation legislation. There is no reason why the same principles should
not extend to diseases arising out of a failure to comply with the duty of care implied in
the contract of employment.
90 [1915] A.C. 734, 22 D.L.R. 340 (P.C.).
100 [1955] 2 All E.R. 12, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 659 (Q.B.D.).
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later it became known that silicosis might be a disease associated with work
in foundries of the kind the employer was operating. It was understood by all
in the industry that workers should be provided with masks. When, in
Crookall, employees contracted silicosis, the employer answered that silicosis
could have been avoided by wearing the masks which were provided and that,
therefore, the employer had taken all the precautions which he could be
expected to take. But it was held that the employer had a duty of care-be-
cause of his knowledge of the danger-to enforce the wearing of masks by
employees, even if they opposed this.101
If this test in respect of civil causes of action could be made applicable
to criminal negligence prosecutions, it would be relatively easy to initiate suc-
cessful prosecutions of that kind. And, indeed, there is an argument, based
on one important case, which supports the idea that the equivalent of this
civil test might be employable in criminal negligence cases. The case is R. v.
Rogers.102 The accused was a former medical practitioner who had lost his
licence. He had become a naturopath. A young child with a skin disorder
was brought to him and he suggested a very low protein diet to help get rid
of the skin irritation. The child began to lose weight and became sick. Re-
peatedly the child was brought back and the aggravating symptoms were
explained to the accused and repeatedly the accused continued to prescribe
the same diet for the child. Eventually the child was taken to the hospital and
died. There was ample evidence to show that normal medical practice would
have suggested exactly the opposite treatment to that which the accused had
given. It was therefore alleged that the accused had been criminally negligent
in causing the death of the child. The accused argued that he clearly did not
intend to harm the child and that he was doing his very best. That is, in the
context of this paper, it is plain that the accused was saying that he had no
subjective intent and that he could only be said to have been objectively negli-
gent. Of course, failure to meet the objective standard of care would, argued
the accused, not suffice to convict him of criminal negligence. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal held to the contrary. In particular, it held, under
what was then section 187 and is now section 198 of the Criminal Code, that
everyone who undertakes to administer surgical or medical treatment to
another has a duty to have and to use reasonable knowledge, skill and care.
The accused could, therefore, not say that he merely had to abide by what he
thought was reasonable and appropriate skill. The standard had been set by
the Criminal Code as being one which had to be met by the reasonable
medical attendant in such circumstances and the person administering medi-
cal treatment was not allowed to escape the burden of that standard merely
by saying that he had obeyed his own best instincts and had applied his
knowledge carefully and diligently.
Could it not be argued then, that, since an employer has a duty imposed
by contract law to take responsible care and have reasonable knowledge of
101 Different circumstances will lead to differing findings in respect of the duty of care
imposed on employees to force their employees to take precautions. See Clifford v. Charles
H. Challen & Son, [19511 1 All E.R. 72, 1 K.B. 495 (C.A.); Cf. Woods v. Durable Suites,
Ltd., [1953] 2 All E.R. 391, 97 Sol. J. 454 (C.A.).
102 (1968), 65 W.W.R. 193, [1968] 4 C.C.C. 278, 4 C.R.N.S. 303 (B.C.C.A.).
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the necessary precautions which must be taken in respect of the safety of
workmen, the law has imposed a duty which cannot be escaped by merely
asserting that a particular employer did his best, just as in Rogers the accused
was incapable of arguing that he was doing his best? If this were a tenable
proposition, then, in light of what has been said about the nature of the
common law duty of care in respect of safety implied in every contract of
employment, it ought to be relatively easy to prosecute an employer for
criminal negligence. The argument is worth pursuing, but it may well be that
courts, if confronted with it, will seek to avoid it by noting that Rogers was
a peculiar case in that the objective standard of care imposed on doctors was
imposed by the Criminal Code and that this was an indication that the signifi-
cance of satisfying such a standard was a matter of serious concern to the
draftsmen of the Code. This emphasis would permit the argument that the
mere existence of a common law duty of care could not serve the same pur-
pose as the standard imposed on medical practitioners by section 198 of the
Criminal Code. To further bolster that reasoning it might be noted that medi-
cal practitioners already have a duty of care at common law to treat their
patients with appropriate reasonable care and skill and that obviously the
Code draftsmen thought that there was something peculiar about the medical
practitioner-patient relationship which required this standard to be written
into the Code and that it was this peculiarity which the Court of Appeal was
recognizing in Rogers."w
Because the duty implied in every contract of employment requiring an
employer to take reasonable care to ensure safe working conditions for his
employees is sought to be made the standard to be applied in criminal negli-
gence cases, an alternative to the argument based on Rogers may be used. It
relies on the precursor of the present section 202, namely, section 247 of the
Criminal Code. That section had a formula which resembled very much the
nature and spirit of the duty of care implied by common law as formulated
in Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. v. English. It stated:
Every one who has in his charge or under his control anything whatever, whether
animate or inanimate, or who erects, makes or maintains anything whatever which,
in the absence of precaution or care, may endanger human life, is under a legal
duty to take reasonable precautions against, and use reasonable care to avoid, such
danger, and is criminally responsible for the consequences of omitting, without
lawful excuse, to perform such duty. 0 4
1o3 But note that section 201 of the Criminal Code emphasizes the peculiar relation-
ship of employers/employees in much the same way as section 198 does that of medical
practitioners/patients. Stction 201 prescribes that every master has to take care not to
unlawfully endanger his servants or apprentices. This is also a duty of care which exists
at common law and, therefore, the embodiment of it in the Code may suggest that there
is something special about the employer/employee relationship in much the same way
as there is about the medical practitioner/patient relationship. Not too much emphasis
is sought to be placed on this because section 201 seems to imply that there has to be
nens rea before the Code becomes interested in the lack of care that a master might take
in respect of his servants' or apprentices' bodily condition. Perhaps this sufficiently dis-
tinguishes it from section 198, but this possibility underlines the fact that the argument
in the text is not to be given up without a fight.
104 R.S.C. 1927, c. 36.
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It seems as if the failure to take safety precautions when one knew or ought
to have known of danger-the formula used to describe the duty implied by
common law in the employment contract-would lead to criminal responsi-
bility. While it is true that the modem criminal negligence provision does not
use the same phraseology in that it specifically refers to a requirement of wan-
ton and reckless conduct, it is to be noted that, on several occasions, courts
have said that the present section 202's language did not alter the essence of
crime created by the old section 247.105 Therefore, it is not without interest
to note what the judicial understanding of section 247 had been. In McCarthy
v. The King, Duff 3. interpreted section 247 as follows:
Where the accused, having brought into operation a dangerous agency which he
has under his control, (that is to say dangerous in the sense that it is calculated to
endanger human life), fails to take those precautions which a man of ordinary
humanity and reasonably competent understanding would take in the given circum-
stances for the purpose of avoiding or neutralizing the risk, his conduct in itself
implies a degree of recklessness justifying the description "gross negligence." The
facts of course may disclose an explanation or excuse bringing the accused's conduct
within the category of "reasonable" conduct.' 0 6
On its face, it is hard to see how a breach of the Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co.
v. English formula could have been found and a breach of the formula offered
by Duff J., as the test for criminal negligence, not be found. Hence, inasmuch
as criminal negligence is a mirror image of what it once was, the common law
duty in respect of safety owed by an employer to an employee may, if breach-
ed, give rise to a successful prosecution.
It may be argued that (i), this is not very much help because one still
has to find a breach of the civil duty or (ii), a breach of the civil duty could
not possibly satisfy the criminal requirement of mens rea in our present sec-
tion 202 (in view of the change in wording from the former section 247). It
is worth noting, however, how closely the language in McCarthy v. The King
resembles the test which we suggested is used by the courts in criminal negli-
gence, whatever the theorists argue. We reasoned that what the prosecution
had to prove was that there had been a failure to take reasonable precau-
tions and that a lack of precautions would be unreasonable if the likelihood
and gravity of injury vastly outweighed the cost of taking such precautions.
This bolsters our confidence that we accurately postulated the test to be ap-
plied in criminal negligence prosecutions. Using that test as the one which
will be applied by the courts when prosecutions are brought against em-
ployers under section 202 (if not in all other cases), we now wish to show
how reliance on the implied duty to provide safe work conditions which arises
out of the contract of employment may be utilized to help found a charge of
criminal negligence, even if it is not accepted that the mere establishment of
a civil cause of action would suffice.
In both the McCarthy v. The King formula and our own analysis, it was
noted that, in many cases, the burden of proof on the prosecution will be dis-
105 See, for example, R. v. Savoie, supra note 76. See also R. v. Dauphinde, supra
note 75, in which the Royal Commission on the Revision of Criminal Code, 1952, which
gave rise to the present Criminal Code, was quoted as authority for this proposition.
106 (1921), 62 S.C.R. 40 at 44, 59 D.L.R. 206 at 208, 35 C.C.C. 213 at 215-16.
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charged by merely proving the conduct of the accused. This will be so be-
cause the conduct may be of such a kind that there can be no question that
it was the behaviour of a person who acted without taking precautions which
a reasonable person would have taken in view of the likelihood and gravity of
injury. Or, if this formulation is thought to be too close to the objective test
imposed by the law of torts, the conduct itself may be said to suffice because
it indicates that the failure to take precautions in a particular circumstance
was such an imbecility or gross delinquency that it amounts to wantonness
or recklessness and, therefore, satisfies the subjective element required by
section 202. It was noted that this was part of the reasoning in Binus, Peda
and LeBlanc.10 7 But, of course, to say that the conduct speaks for itself is
another way of obfuscating the question. When will the conduct speak for
itself? The common law contractual duty may help. An employer may be
met with the argument that he knows full well that he has to meet a certain
standard of care because the existing contract between him and his employees
requires him to provide safe working conditions. If he therefore does not take
precautions which he ought to have taken as a reasonable employer, he will
have deliberately put himself in a position where his conduct can be charac-
terized as speaking for itself, namely, being negligent to such an extent that it
may be considered criminally negligent. It is noted at once that this runs the
danger of saying that if there is a breach of the common law duty there is
also a criminal offence, and we know that this might offend the principle
which insists that civil and criminal negligence must be kept distinct. The
point being made here is simply that, at the very least, an employer should
not be permitted to say that he did not understand his obligation to take pre-
cautions. He should never be permitted to say that he was doing his best
under the circumstances. If he does so, he runs the risk of being faced with
the argument that, by ignoring the common law employer/employee duty, he
was putting himself in a position where he could not live up to the kind of
conduct with which the Criminal Code expected him to comply. This is the
sort of argument which is used when breaches of statute are sought to be
relied on to launch prosecutions. Thus a breach of statute which imposes a
duty does not necessarily make a person responsible in criminal negligence.
But such a breach may very well indicate that there has been conduct which
speaks for itself and which may be characterized as criminal negligence. It
is certainly proper to draw the jury's attention to the existence of the statute
and the failure of the accused to abide by it. The Supreme Court judgment
in LeBlanc108 stated this expressly. The breach of the statute is an indication
of potential criminal responsibility. It is this which is being argued in respect
10 7 Binus, supra note 54; Peda, supra note 58; and Leblanc, supra note 66. In Leblanc
it was held by the majority that mere proof of the conduct might be sufficient, but more
proof of subjective intent could be offered if the prosecution desired.
108 Supra note 66 at 360 (S.C.R.), 259 (D.L.R.), 113 (C.C.C.). Similarly, in a civil
action arising out of the contractual duty to provide safe working conditions, it is clear
that not every breach of a safety regulation or statute will lead to a finding that there was
a breach of the employer/employee duty of care. Indeed, there has been a tendency for
the courts to read such statutes very strictly because they are penal in nature. If the
employer does not fall within the four corners of the statute's intended purview, the
likelihood is that he may escape liability under the statute but can be found liable under
the contractual obligation.
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of the contractual duty of care: breach of it does not automatically make
conduct criminally negligent,10 9 but it assuredly helps characterize the con-
duct as being potentially of the kind which might be called grossly negligent
and it robs the employer of a defence that he was merely doing his subjective
best.
To focus the arguments advanced, consider the following illustrations:
(a) It is relatively well known that asbestos processing is dangerous to
people's health. It is therefore incumbent upon an employer, under
his common law duty to take care to ensure that appropriate pre-
cautions are taken to avoid harm to his employees. What is and
what is not reasonable under the circumstances will be a matter for
debate. But it certainly will not suffice for the employer to argue
that everyone operated in the same way as he did. Further, the
mere fact that he believed that he did not have to do anymore than
he was doing will not necessarily exculpate him. Failure to provide
safe working conditions by the standards of the common law con-
tract of employment would indicate the existence of conduct which
"spoke for itself."
(b) A similar example would arise where the noise level in a plant was
consistently above that which "reasonable" employers know full
well to be acceptable. That is, in a circumstance where there is a
well known health risk, such as going above well-established deci-
bel and intensity ranges, an employer must take precautions to
avoid the causing of harm or run the risk of being held criminally
responsible even though he did not intend to hurt anyone.
So much attention has been given to the intricacies and ramifications of
the potential of criminal negligence because, in our view, it is the most useful
of all the serious criminal charges which might be brought under the Code
as weapons in the fight to prevent and diminish the incidence of occupational
disease.""
B. Duties of Master to Servant: Section 201
201. Every master who
(a) unlawfully does, or causes to be done, bodily harm to his apprentice or
servant so that his life is endangered or his health is or is likely to be
permanently injured, or
(b) omits, without lawful excuse, to provide necessaries of life for an appren-
tice or servant in accordance with any contract that he has entered into
with respect to that apprentice or servant,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable for imprisonment for two years.
This provision is one of several resulting from a rationalization of a long
development of the common law. That development has been carefully de-
109 See R. v. Tichner, supra note 64.
310 Everything that is said in the text about occupational health problems also applies
to traumatic injuries.
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tailed by Glazebrook."'1 He wrote his article in the context of a debate as to
whether an omission could ever constitute a crime. His research demonstrates
that there was once a notion that criminal responsibility could attach without
the prosecution having to prove that a positive act had been committed by
the accused. In particular, he writes, responsibility attached when the prose-
cution could show that something might have been done by the accused per-
son to avoid harm and he or she deliberately did not undertake that preven-
tive course of action. It transpired that as the Industrial Revolution-and the
accompanying laissez-faire mentality that apparently took control of the col-
lective judicial mind-progressed, questions were raised as to whether a per-
son could be held criminally liable for merely not taking preventive action in
the absence of a positive legal duty to provide safeguards, liability for omis-
sions being seen as an interference with the freedom to be left alone. In re-
sponse, the common law courts, in upholding the notion that people could be
held responsible for omissions, sought to justify this by linking omissions to
duties which had existed in antiquity.112 They relied on old cases such as
Huggins," 3 Patmore,"4 and Squire."15 Additional support was found by anal-
logizing from the Poor Law.l i6 That legislation imposed positive duties on
people to maintain other people. Thus courts came to formulate a principle
that, in certain cases, where there were identifiable positive duties, criminal
responsibility would be attached where apparent omissions had led to death.
Glazebrook summarized the legal position as follows:
1. Neglect that resulted in injury to health, as well as neglect that resulted in death
was, if two further requirements were satisfied, indictable-as a misdemeanour.
2. It was necessary to show that the prisoner was, quite independently of the harm
he had caused, under a legal liability in respect of his neglect, either because he
was under a duty imposed by law or because he had undertaken it by contract.
3. Even if the prisoner was thus liable for his neglect, he was not indictable for it
on this principle unless the person who had suffered the neglect was so helpless
that he or she was unable to withdraw from the control of the prisoner and seek
a remedy in any other way. This was thus basically a causal requirement."i 7
There was thus a need to establish a legal duty and, as can be seen from
the foregoing, the kind of legal duties that came to be accepted by the courts
as leading to potential criminal liability were of the kind which suggested
that certain people were in a situation of obligation to others because of a
paternalistic relationship. That development is now subsumed in the Criminal
Code. We have already noted section 198 which requires any person under-
taking the administration of surgical or medical treatment to do so with rea-
111 Glazebrook, Criminal Omissions: The Duty Requirement in Offences against the
Person (1960), 76 L.Q. Rev. 386.
112 They had to rely on unsubstantiated claims by Coke who had defined murder as
including incidents of killing by famishing, and a jailer treating a prisoner more harshly
than he ought to, and on the writings of Fleta, Britton and the Mirror of Justices. See
Glazebrook, supra note 11, at 389.
113(1730) 2 Ld. Raym. 1574.
114 (1789) O.B. Sessions Papers 214.
110 (1799) MS.
116 An Act for the Relief of the Poor, (1601) 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2.
117 Supra note 111, at 391-92.
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sonable knowledge and care. Section 199 states that any person undertaking
an act is under legal duty to do it if an omission to do so would endanger
life. This may be useful for our purposes inasmuch as every master must
undertake to provide safe premises by reason of his legal obligation to his
servants and a breach thereof is potentially a breach of section 199. Section
197 imposes positive duties on people such as parents, foster parents, guard-
ians and heads of families to provide necessaries of life for children; on hus-
bands to provide necessaries of life for spouses; on other people to provide
necessaries of life to people under their charge where such people are unable
to look after themselves. Section 200 makes it an offence to unlawfully aban-
don or expose a child under the age of 10, endangering his or her life or
health. Section 201 is yet another provision in this part of the Criminal Code
with the same intent and purpose.
Section 201 (b) is a provision much like section 197 in that it enforces, by
criminal sanction, the provision of contracted-for necessaries of life. More
directly useful to us is section 201(a). It is the result of the development of
the rule which grew up that, if apprentices had to be taken on by a particular
master as a result of directives made under the Poor Law, a positive legal
duty existed on the master to provide for such an apprentice. The common
law courts came to regard this as a failure in respect of a legal duty which
could lead to criminal responsibility. The common law judges went on to hold
that it would make no sense to differentiate between this kind of apprentice
and common apprentices, that is, those who came to masters not as a result of
the compulsion of a Poor Law directive. Indeed, as Glazebrook argues, it be-
came clear to common law judges that it would be wrong to insist that the
duty (in respect of which a breach needed to be established) was created in
a particular way and, therefore, they felt that the principle underlying the
doctrine was wide enough to apply to master and servant situations where it
was clear that the practice was that the master should provide necessaries for
life. In our modem section 201 (a), unlike 201 (b), the duty to provide neces-
saries for life is not made explicit. But there is, we argue, a positive legal
duty that arises from the mere fact of the existence of a master/servant re-
lationship. If that is so, it is clear that the section may be of direct utility in
the context of this paper, namely, to prosecute masters who do not provide
their servants with adequate protection, thereby causing them bodily harm.
There are some hurdles which have to be cleared before the section can be
used in this way.
The first is that it must be shown that the master "does, or causes to be
done" something which causes bodily harm. On its face this seems to require
the doing of a positive act by the master leading to the harm. But, as has
already been argued in the criminal negligence section of this paper, the re-
quirement of a positive act may not be a difficult one to meet. An appropriate
formulation of the master's conduct may fairly be characterized as a positive
act, even though it entails something like omitting to provide ventilation. For
instance, why not say that the master has put too many contaminants in the
atmosphere? The argument does not bear repetition. In our view, this re-
quirement does not seem to be an insuperable problem to the use of section
201(a).
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The next hurdle arises because the master must "unlawfully" do or cause
to be done, bodily harm. Arguably, the word "unlawfully" in this context
might require no more than proof that harm was inflicted by unreasonable
behaviour of the master. That is, the reasoning would be that because a
master/servant relationship is of a kind in which there is a legal duty not to
inflict bodily harm, the very fact of it having been done would be sufficient to
satisfy the requirement that the act was done unlawfully. Such an argument
would be supported by the fact that the predecessor of section 201(a) was
section 249 of the 1927 Criminal Code"18 and that, in that section, the re-
quirement of an unlawful act was directly linked to the failure to obey the
duty imposed on a master or mistress to provide for the necessaries of life
for a servant or apprentice. As the modem Code draftsmen apparently have
not seen it important to require more than a master/servant relationship in
that they do not single out the duty to provide the necessaries of life as an
unlawful act, it might be argued that the word "unlawfully" is no longer
meant to have a connotation other than the doing of harm to the servant/
apprentice. But, even if this semantic argument is rejected, the requirement
that the master "unlawfully" does or causes to be done bodily harm is not a
serious problem in the context of this paper. Whenever a prosecution is
launched because some people are suffering from a disease which is the re-
sult of a poor health situation at work, it is more than likely that the prosecu-
tion vill be able to show that there has been some breach of a legislative
standard or, at the very least, there will have been a departure from the
common law standard of care that a master owes his servant to provide safe
and healthy work conditions. That is, there will have been conduct in breach
of a separate legal obligation.
The major obstacle to be overcome, as usual, is the fact that the accused
must be shown to have intended the harm which was caused. The general
presumption that subjective intent must be attributable to the accused will
govern the reading of this provision. There are very few decisions dealing
with section 201 and its Criminal Code predecessors. R. v. Brown" 9 was a
case dealing with a fact situation from which the issue arose as to whether
there was a failure to provide the necessaries of life for a servant. The servant
in question was a 15 year-old boy who, because he was wetting his bed, had
been removed by the master to a stable. This was at the height of a partic-
ularly cold winter. As a result of the freezing of the boy's ankles which had
rendered him completely immobile, the accused did attempt to provide some
help for the boy. He carried him back to the house after the boy had spent
14 days in intense cold in the stable. He bathed him and put him to bed. He
also asked a neighbour what kind of remedy for frostbite he ought to use and
asked a doctor what could be done about the boy's frozen feet. He did not
tell anyone how bad the freezing of the feet actually was or anything about
the condition of the servant in respect of other parts of his body which were
also seriously deteriorating. In the result, the servant died of gangrene. When
the accused was tried, the judge found that, although he was not in fact aware
of the seriousness of the condition of his servant, he ought to have known
118 R.S.C. 1927, c. 36.
119 (1893), 1 Terr. L.R. 475, (C.A.N.W.T.).
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that the servant was in serious trouble and that his failure to get better care
for the boy amounted to gross negligence. This attributed knowledge and
failure were held to be sufficient to convict the accused. It seems what needs
to be shown in order to convict is advertence to the risk and then a failure to
take precautions which a person knowing of the risk would take or could
be expected to take.120
It seems, then, that what needs to be shown is an "intentional" act by the
accused of the same kind as it was argued had to be found in criminal negli-
gence-type situations. It may be easier to prove intent in a section 201(a)
case than in a criminal negligence one because it may be that a person charged
under 201 (a) should never be permitted to say that he honestly did not be-
lieve that there was any risk at all created for his servant or apprentice by
his conduct. The accused's belief in the safety of his procedures should always
be, it would be argued, a reasonable one. His actual belief that there was no
risk should provide no defence. There are two lines of authority which would
support such an argument. The first stems from the recent Supreme Court
of Canada decision in R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie.12' In a judgment written
by Dickson J. on behalf of a unanimous bench, it was said that there are
three categories of offences to which mens rea applies, and that in each the
phrase had a different connotation. The first of these categories is constituted
by offences which could be called criminal in the true sense of the word.
Among such offences one would expect to find murder, theft and the like. A
positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, recklessness, has to be
proved by the prosecution. The third category of offences is constituted by
offences of absolute liabilty in which the accused will not be absolved of re-
sponsibility by showing that he or she had no intention to commit the act at
all, let alone with malicious intent. The second category of offences is consti-
tuted by public welfare offences. Under these, it was held, a defence would
be available to the accused to the effect that he or she reasonably believed
in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would have rendered his or her con-
duct innocent. Can it be argued that section 201 (a) of the Criminal Code is
a public welfare offence? In describing the public welfare offences, the Su-
preme Court noted that their presence in the law was due to attempts to reg-
ulate behaviour where there were conflicting values to be protected. In parti-
cular, they will be found where:
lit is essential for society to maintain, through effective enforcement, high standards
of public health and safety. Potential victims of those who carry on latently perni-
cious activities have a strong claim to consideration.' 22
Given the historical background of section 201 and like provisions and the
fact that we are seeking to utilize section 201 to protect health and safety,
12 0 For cases of a similar kind decided on the basis of precursors of the present
provisions, see R. v. Friend (1802), Russ. & Ry. 20, 168 E.R. 662 (K.B.D.); R. v. Ridley
(1811), 2 Camp. 650, 170 E.R. 1282 (K.B.D.); R. v. Smith (1826), 2 Car. & P. 449, 172
E.R. 203 (K.B.D.). In addition to Brown, suprd note 119, there seem to be few such cases
in Canadian jurisprudence. Citations are found in R. v. Bissonnette (1879), R.A.C. 190,
23 L.C.J. 249 (Qu6. Q.B.), a case which dealt with a procedural point relating to the form
of the indictment in such cases.
121 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161.
122 Id. at 1310 (S.C.R.), 170 (D.L.R.), per Dickson J.
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it might be successfully argued that section 201 (a) constitutes a public wel-
fare offence to which the mens rea as described for category two offences
by the Supreme Court is apposite.12
Inasmuch as section 201 (a) is treated as a true crime-in the sense that
this expression is used in the Sault Ste. Marie decision-it may still be argu-
able that the mens rea required is not the person's actual belief, which the
Supreme Court suggested it must always be in true criminal cases. The reason-
ing supporting this argument is to be gleaned from the recent House of Lords
decision in DPP v. Morgan. 24 Three members of the House of Lords125 held
that, where a crime is defined without reference to mens rea and the accused
wishes to rely on a defence of mistaken belief, it will be incumbent on the
accused to show that that belief was reasonably based. The Supreme Court
of Canada in Sault Ste. Marie did not have to address itself to crimes which
lacked this definition of mens rea in an explicit form and, therefore, it may be
reasoned that the Sault Ste. Marie decision may be read as not prescribing
any principle in respect of such cases.
Even if the arguments supporting a watered-down version of mens rea
in respect of section 201 (a) are rejected, it will be seen that it is plausible to
argue that, in a prosecution under that section, the conduct of the accused
may speak for itself very much as it does in criminal negligence, thus satis-
fying the intent requirement. The reasoning would be that where a master
has clearly not taken care for the safety and health of his servant or ap-
prentice, the circumstances may render it clear that no master could have
failed to advert to the risk in respect of which precautions had to be taken-
especially in view of the fact that the duty a master owes his servant is well
ingrained in the psyche of all employers by dint of a long history upholding
this precept. In this respect, the case of R. v. Blondin'2 6 is of some assistance.
It was there held that where it is necessary to establish recklessness, this re-
quirement may be established by showing that the accused wilfully turned a
blind eye to the risk. He or she will be deemed to have turned a blind eye
where he or she has suspected the existence of the risk. It should be quite
1W To classify an offence as either being truly criminal in nature, or as one constituting
an offence of absolute liability, or as one of a public welfare nature, requires an examina-
tion of "[Tihe overall regulatory pattern adopted by the Legislature, the subject matter
of the legislation, the importance of the penalty, and the precision of the language used,"
said the Supreme Court in Sault Ste. Marie, supra note 121 at 1326 (S.C.R.), 182
(D.L.R.). Note that in describing section 201(a) of the Criminal Code as a public welfare
offence, there is a difficulty. The section might not be seen as providing for public health
and safety, but only for that of a special group of the public, namely, servants and
apprentices.
Since this was written, the decision in R. v. Prue and Baril (1979), 8 C.R. (3d) 68
(S.C.C.) has been read. There the Chief Justice at 73 stated that unless there was a clear
indication against it, the inclusion of an offence in the Criminal Code made it a "true
criminal" offence without more. It leaves the question of what is a "clear indication against
it" open. In this regard note the holding of the dissentients, Ritchie and Pigeon JJ., that
the section in question, s. 238(3), was of the second type listed in Sault Ste. Marie.
124 [1976] A.C. 182, [1975] 2 All E.R. 347, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 913 (H.L.).
125 Lords Cross of Chelsea, Simon of Glaisdale and Edmund-Davies.
120 [1971] 2 W.W.R. 1, 2 C.C.C. (2d) 118 (B.C.C.A.), aff'd [1971] S.C.R. v, [1972]
1 W.W.R. 479, 4 C.C.C. (2d) 566.
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difficult for any master, in a situation in which a careful prosecutor is alleging
that unsafe conditions caused servants to become diseased, to successfully
argue that he did not suspect the existence of a material risk that such a
disease might be inflicted. We appreciate that, if section 201 (a) has to be
restricted to this kind of situation, it does not provide a markedly different
charge from prosecution in criminal negligence, at least as we analysed the
essence of that crime. Nonetheless, because the stigma and the penalty are
smaller, there may be more success in encouraging officers of the Crown to
prosecute under section 201 than under the criminal negligence provision.
The final obstacle which has to be overcome before section 201 (a) can
be successfully used is the fact that it must be shown by the prosecution that
the bodily harm done endangers life or that health is or is likely to be per-
manently impaired. This presents a problem only because some of the old
decisions were concerned with this and held that a mere traumatic injury
which caused permanent disablement would not be treated as a permanent
impairment to health. Thus in R. v. Coventry,127 it was held that the loss of
toes by a servant, due to the negligence of the master in omitting to carry out
his legal duties of providing for the necessaries of his servant or apprentice,
was a permanent bodily injury, but was not necessarily a "permanent injury
to health as I understand the expression.' '1 28 [Emphasis added.] In the con-
text of this paper, however, this difficulty does not seem to be a very signifi-
cant one. After all, prosecutions will be brought where the workers have suf-
fered a disease as a result of their occupation and permanent impairment to
health should not be difficult to prove. No prosecution should be launched
unless there has been some kind of serious disability of a permanent nature,
such as, silicosis, cancer, and partial or total deafness.
C. Assault; unlawfully causing bodily harm: Section 245(2)
Section 244 of the Criminal Code defines assault. An assault is commit-
ted when a person either applies force intentionally to another person or, by
an act or a gesture, causes another person to have reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that there will be an interference with his or her physical integrity. Sec-
tion 245 then sets out the penalties for assault. Sub-section 1 of section 245
states that anyone who commits a common assault is punishable on summary
conviction. Then follows sub-section 2:
Every one who unlawfully causes bodily harm to any person or commits an assault
that causes bodily harm to any person
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
It is clear that, in part at least, sub-section 2 must be speaking of ag-
gravated assault since it differs from sub-section 1 which speaks of common
assault. This is also indicated by the fact that the offence under sub-section 2
is punishable as an indictable offence and leads to imprisonment for 5 years.
The question which arises from the language of section 245(2) is whether
127 (1898), 3 Terr. L.R. 95, 3 C.C.C. 541 (C.A. N.W.T.).
1281d. at 101 (Terr. L.R.), 549 (C.C.C.) per Wetmore J. Note that it was held
sufficient for conviction that the master was negligent in the omission of carrying out his
duty under the equivalent of what is now s. 201 (b) of the Criminal Code.
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there is also created an offence other than assault. It has been judicially held
that there is. In R. v. Prpich29 it was held that it is perfectly proper for a
prosecution to be launched under section 245(2) in respect of the commis-
sion of an assault causing bodily harm without stating that such bodily harm
was unlawfully caused. The court held that "to unlawfully cause bodily
harm" was a separate offence to that of "committing an assault which causes
bodily harm." The court relied on R. v. Kerim'30 which also held that section
245(2) created two offences. It will readily be seen that the separate offence
of "unlawfully causing bodily harm" could be of great assistance to us in our
search for criminal offences with which to charge employers who do not take
adequate precautions in respect of the safety and health of their employees.
As is true for section 201(a), it is necessary that there be 'unlawful'
conduct by the accused. It has been held that there must be more than con-
duct which is "immoral and mischievous to the public" to satisfy this require-
ment. In R. v. Clarence, Stephen J., writing for the majority, said that for
the purposes of this kind of statute, conduct will be "unlawful" only if it is
forbidden by some definite law.'13 But, inasmuch as in the Clarence case itself
the conduct was deemed "unlawful" because it might amount to cruelty in
respect of a marital relationship and that it therefore infringed marriage law,
it ought not to be too hard to spell out a breach of a definite law for the
purposes of section 245(2) whenever a complaint is made in respect of a
disease suffered by a worker as a result of conditions which prevailed at work.
It should be easy to establish a breach of a statutory requirement, or of a
prescription in a collective agreement, or even of the common law duty of
care owed by a master to a servant. It might be argued that to be "unlawful,"
the conduct has to be a breach of the law and that, by referring to the defini-
tion of the word "Loi" in the French version of the Criminal Code, there
must be a breach of a statute. This argument was addressed in respect of
crininal negligence and discounted. The same reasoning applies here.
Another difficulty which might have to be overcome in order to success-
fully use section 245(2) in respect of the causing of occupational disease
arises because a court may refuse to accept the notion that to have, say, too
many contaminants in the air, or to fail to provide adequate respirators, or
to fail to ensure that there will be less noise, are really the kind of things
which inflict bodily harm by "unlawful" conduct of the kind envisaged under
a section mainly concerned with assault. The argument would be that assaults
require an application of force or a threat thereof to the person and that the
causing of disease is not such a threat or application of force. The argument
is bolstered by the case of Clarence already cited. There it was held that the
infliction of venereal disease upon the accused's wife (by engaging in sexual
intercourse) was not an assault-type offence. But it must be noted that in
that case a great reliance was placed for this view on the use of the word
"inflict" in the definition of the offence with which the court was dealing. In
section 245 (2) there is no such phraseology. Instead, there is the language of
129 (1971), 4 C.C.C. (2d) 325 (Sask. C.A.).
130 [1966] 2 O.R. 199, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 271 (Ont. C.A.).
1
3 1 R. v. Clarence (1889), 22 Q.B.D. 23 at 41, 16 Cox C.C. 511 at 525, [1886-90]
All E.R. Rep. 133 at 143.
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"causing" bodily harm which suggests that harm can be caused without such
directness as the harm which results from a hit or a stroke. Against this rea-
soning, however, is the fact that the offence of unlawfully causing bodily
harm finds itself in an assault context, a context which does seem to suggest
that a measure of direct impact with a person's body is required. 32 Yet, to
the contrary again, it must be remembered that the courts have specifically
held that "unlawfully causing bodily harm" is an offence separate from that
of "committing assault which causes bodily harm." Therefore, it is perfectly
reasonable to argue that the attendant criteria for assault are not to dominate
the separate offence of "unlawfully causing bodily harm."
The phraseology of "causing bodily harm," however, raises another ob-
stacle. It suggests that the harm must have been intentionally caused. The
nature of the mens rea required is not indicated in any way in this section.
Whereas section 244 speaks about intentionally applying force, its logic, as
already emphasised, does not necessarily apply to the separate offence of
"unlawfully causing bodily harm." It may be plausible, therefore, to raise
again the argument that the nature of the mens rea required is the same as
that required in respect of section 201 (a). The case for a more diluted form
of intent may not be as good here as it is when made in respect of section
201 (a) because it is hard to argue that section 245(2) might be classified as
a public welfare offence. Thus, although the argument is not to be abandoned
without a fight, it may well be that a person accused under section 245(2) is
able to escape conviction if the prosecution cannot prove that the accused did
not actually believe that his or her conduct would lead to bodily harm.
The last point to be made in respect of section 245(2) is that the nature
of "bodily harm" does not seem to require evidence of very serious disability.
Thus in R. v. Donovan, the English Court of Appeal, in holding that it is a
crime to hit anyone with an intention to inflict bodily harm, said:
For this purpose we think that "bodily harm" has its ordinary meaning and includes
any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the prose-
cutor. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent but must, no doubt, be more than
merely transient and trifling.1 3
D. Criminal Breach of Contract: Section 380
Section 380 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:
380.(1) Every one who wilfully breaks a contract, knowing or having reasonable
cause to believe that the probable consequences of doing so, whether alone or in
combination with others, will be
(a) to endanger human life,
(b) to cause serious bodily injury,
is guilty of
(f) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years, or
(g) an offence punishable on summary conviction.
1S2 Inasmuch as section 244(a) speaks about the application of force indirectly, it
must be taken to mean: not directly aimed at the particular person hurt, as in the case
where A aims a blow at B and hits C.
133 [1934] 2 K.B. 498 at 509, [1934] All E.R. 207 at 212, 25 Cr. App. R. I at 13.
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This is our modem enactment of the English Conspiracy and Protection of
Property Act, 1875 .14 Note that this statute, in turn, was a response to the
reaction of the common law courts to the liberalising legislation of 1871-76,
the Trade Union Act, 1871135 and the Trade Union Amendment Act, 1876136
which had provided that it would no longer be a criminal conspiracy for
workers to combine to form trade unions merely because such combinations
were in restraint of trade. The courts had held that, despite such saving provi-
sions, trade unions would still be held responsible in criminal conspiracy if
the combination had it as a purpose to coerce and molest employers in the
conduct of their business. The 1875 statute was passed to protect trade unions
from this judicial reading whenever they combined in specific ways. The ef-
fect was to legalize strikes and similar actions by not making them into crim-
inal conspiracies when they took place in the context of trade disputes (as
defined) and without overtones of intimidation. But such liberalization was
limited also by the need, as the legislature saw it, to protect the public from
the more serious effects of withdrawal of labour by workers. Accordingly,
there was special concern with the interruption of gas, water and (later),
electricity supplies which might be cut off as a result of the now permitted
concerted workers' conduct. Hence it was provided that, inasmuch as breach-
es of contract-which is what strikes and like actions were understood to
import-had these adverse effects, they would not be permitted. In our mod-
em legislation this has been expanded so that no breach of contract which
leads to the endangering of life or property, or the cutting-off of supplies of
essential services, will be permitted by this provision which otherwise permits
people-as far as the criminal law goes-to band together for collective bar-
gaining purposes. Understandably, this section has never been used-to our
knowledge-in the way that we now propose that it may be employed, name-
ly as a tool with which to regulate employer conduct. But, as criminal law is
always drafted as being applicable universally because the conduct it stigma-
tizes is seen as being anti-social and unacceptable, no matter who engages in
it, there can be no theoretical bar put up by those who advance this claim
of neutrality of the law to its use in the manner advocated, provided that no
serious violence is done to the language of the legislation.
Resistance to it being so used in our context would only serve to under-
score the nature of the inarticulate premise which, we argued in an earlier
section, makes it so difficult to be tougher with employers than we are-that
is, the premise that behaviour becomes less heinous when it is part of conduct
engaged in with a so-called enterprise motive.
It should not be hard to find situations in which a breach of contract in
the employer/employee situation leads to an endangering of life or the likeli-
hood of serious bodily injury. We point again to the fact that there is an es-
tablished duty owed by an employer to his employees to provide safe working
conditions and that this duty is satisfied by requiring the employer to behave
in a reasonable fashion. Failure to abide by regulatory requirements, inspec-
134 38 & 39 Vict. c. 86.
235 34 & 35 Vict. c. 31.
136 39 & 40 Vict. c. 22.
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torates' orders, joint committee recommendations, or even simply failing to
take a precaution which a reasonable employer in industry normally takes,
would be a sound basis for an argument that there has been a breach of this
employer/employee duty. There are, however, two apparent barriers to be
overcome before the provision can be successfully used as a means of prose-
cuting employers who create unsafe working conditions.
The first of these is the potential argument that the duty owed by an em-
ployer to his employees to provide safe working conditions is not a contrac-
tual one. This argument is suggested by some statements in cases to the ef-
fect that t.ie duty arises out of the relationship which is imposed by law, that
is, it is only a tortious duty, not a contractual one.8 7 But, in Matthews v.
Kuwait Bechtel Corporation,8 8 the English Court of Appeal having to face
the question squarely for the first time, held that an employee could sue in
either contract or tort in respect of. unsafe working conditions. Both these
limbs of substantive law gave rise to the duty. There might be differences in
the remedies available under each, but it could not be said that the employer's
duty to provide safe working conditions for an employee did not arise by
implication from the contract of employment. For the purposes of section 380
there should be no difficulty in showing the requisite breach of contract where
an employer does not behave as a reasonable employer would be expected to
do in the circumstances.
The second requirement which has to be satisfied for the provision to be
used successfully is that the conduct must have been wilful. This clearly sug-
gests that it must have been intentional. Once again we have to face the ques-
tion as to what is the nature of the intent required. It is worth noting that,
in the English predecessor of section 380, the words used to describe the in-
tent required were "wilfully" and "maliciously." Malice is often presumed to
exist from knowledge. The condition of the accused's mind was further pro-
vided for in the English section by a phrase to the effect that the breach of
contract must have been committed knowingly or with reasonable cause to
believe that certain consequences would follow. This qualification came to be
seen as describing the quality of the malice required under the section and,
therefore, the word "maliciously" was eventually taken out of the provision.
But the word "wilful" remained and it is clear that negligent conduct will not
satisfy the requirement of the section. A deliberate act which leads to the
breach of a contract must be proved. This, however, does not mean that the
prosecution must show a willingness to breach a contractual term in order to
do harm. What has to be shown is a willingness to do the act which amounts
to a breach of "contract. That being shown, the mens rea required by the
section will be satisfied if the employer knew or had reasonable cause to
believe that the consequences listed in section 380(1) would result from his
conduct. Hickling, in his careful analysis of the history of the predecessor of
section 380, summed this up as follows:
"3 7 See the argument in Riley v. Baxendale (1861), 6 H. & N. 445, 158 E.R. 183;
some of the statements in-Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. v. English, supra note 96; and the
statement of Lord Reid in Davie v. New Merton Board Mills Ltd., [1956] 1 All E.R. 379,
[1956] 1 W.L.R. 233.
138 [1959] 2 Q.B. 57, [1959] 2 W.L.R. 702, [1959] 2 All E.R. 345 (C.A.).
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Provided the conduct constituting the breach was itself intended, it is sufficient to
show that such consequences were probable and that, at the time of the breach, the
accused knew or had reasonable cause to believe that they would result from his
conduct. The onus of proof on the prosecution will be discharged by showing that
circumstances of which the accused knew, or must have known,-were such as would
have led any reasonable man to believe that such consequences would probably
ensue.
139
The mental element, therefore, seems fairly easy to satisfy for the pur-
poses of section 380: a deliberate refusal to comply with a statutory require-
ment, an inspector's order, or a refusal to abide by a joint committee's rec-
ommendation will satisfy the criteria.
Note further that it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that
actual harm flowed from the wilful breach of contract. This enables a prose-
cution to be launched without having to face the always difficult causation
problems which arise when conduct has to be linked to resulting conse-
quences. 40
E. Traps likely to cause bodily harm: Section 231
(1) Every one who, with intent to cause death or bodily harm to persons, whether
ascertained or not, sets or places or causes to be set or placed a trap, device
or other thing whatsoever that is likely to cause death or bodily harm to persons
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years.
(2) A person who, being in occupation or possession of a place where anything
mentioned in subsection (1) has been set or placed, knowingly and wilfully
permits it to remain there, shall be deemed, for the purposes of that subsection,
to have set or placed it with the intent mentioned therein.
The history of this section clearly indicates that it was meant to put a
restriction on the rights of property owners to do anything they liked on their
land. In particular, it was an inhibition sought to be put on the creation of
traps and the setting of devices which were used to keep people off the land
and which might cause intruders serious harm. Spring-guns, dog-spears, and
booby traps of various kinds were the nature of the devices envisaged by the
provision. That the curtailment of the property owner's conduct was not
meant to be too stringent can be seen from the requirement that, to be held
criminally responsible under section 231 and its predecessors, the accused
must have intended to cause death or bodily harm. Given this background it
is perhaps a little tendentious to offer this provision as a useful one in the
context of this paper, but the argument that it could be so employed is worth
making.
While it is most unlikely that there will be many situations in which an
employer sets or places a trap or device with the intent of hurting an em-
ployee, there might very well be cases where such a trap or device has been
set or placed and the employer, innocent as to the original setting or placing,
knowingly leaves it in place. In such a case the employer will be deemed to
139 Hickling, Citrine's Trade Union Law (3d ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1967)
at 526.
140 It may well be that if there are no actual consequences proved by the prosecution,
a summary conviction may result rather than the punishment of imprisonment for up to
five years which would ensue if the offence were treated as an indictable one.
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
have had the necessary intent for conviction under section 231 by dint of
subsection 2 thereof. Indeed, the deeming phraseology of 231(2) would not
seem to permit an argument by an accused that he or she did not intend to
cause death or bodily harm by knowingly and wilfully leaving the trap or
device in place. This was so decided in R. v. Besse,141 where the court point-
ed out that, if an intent which a section permits to be deemed is meant to be
rebuttable by evidence showing an actual lack of intent in the accused, the
draftsmen of the Code usually specifically provide for such a possibility.142
When would a situation raising the potential for the use of section 231(2)
be likely to arise in an employer/employee setting? Typically, it might crop
up where a piece of equipment which was sound when it was initially in-
stalled as long as it had, say, a protective guard, or appropriate resistors, or
had attached to it a warning system, comes to be without such protective
devices and the employer knowingly permits it to remain in use in such a
defective manner. The only argument that suggests itself as capable of reject-
ing the application of section 231(2) in this kind of situation is that the
piece of equipment ought to have been capable of description as a trap or
device when it was first put in place. There is nothing in the section that in-
dicates that such a reading is required. 143 But, even if this argument is not an
insuperable problem, it is unquestionably true that it may be seen as stretching
the section as far at it can legitimately go and, perhaps even further, to reason
that a piece of productive equipment should be labelled a trap or a device
when, for the purposes of section 231, those words have been used to de-
scribe such things as spring-guns, alarm-guns and dog-spears. But the section
does say "trap, device, or other thing whatsoever likely to cause death or
bodily harm." It would not be an unusual technique to interpret this phrase
as not requiring an ejusden generis reading, that is, that "other thing what-
soever" does not only mean things like a trap or a device but, quite literally,
means any other thing. We readily concede, however, that, given the history
of the provision, this would be a strained, albeit not a startling, reading of
the section.
A second point which arises is that, if it may be employed in our context
at all, the section is much more likely to be useful where traumatic injury is
probable rather than disease. Again, the history of the section indicates that
it was concerned with guns being fired, trip-wires being activitated, explosives
being set off, and the like. That is, there was some notion of direct assault
upon the body of a person. Accordingly, escape of contaminating fibres as a
result of an employer, say, wilfully and knowingly not replacing an exhaust
pipe, may not be seen as conduct intended to be included in the coverage of
141 (1976), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 140 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
142 Dohm Prov. Ct. J., supported this argument by contrasting sections 231 and
386(1) with sections 237(1), 306(2), and 320(4). Note further that the language of
section 231(2) is not crystal clear. It is plausible to argue from it that, for the section
to become operative, the trap, device, etc., must have been set or placed with the intent
to cause death or bodily harm. But if this reading were given to 231(2) then that subsection
would have no operation independent of 231(1).
143 The argument, however, can be supported by reasoning that the section requires
a malicious act by the accused and that the deemed intent provision of subsection (2)
should not be allowed to water down this section to a criminal negligence-type provision.
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this section because the infliction of likely harm is simply too indirect. Yet,
all that can be said with certainty is that the section is silent on the matter.
It may well be that, if the trap used by an owner of land to keep stray dogs
off his land was poisoned meat (instead of dog-spears), and a child ate such
meat by accident, a prosecution under the section could be launched success-
fully. If this is so, it may not be too much of an extension to apply the sec-
tion to a case where lead emissions impaired the health of a worker and the
employer had wilfully and knowingly failed to replace a failing ventilation
system.144
In sum, we concede that to use this section in order to prosecute em-
ployers who provide unsafe working conditions may well be straining the his-
toric intent behind the section to its very limit. But we have explored the pos-
sibility because, although in the situations posited as potentially lending them-
selves to the application of section 231 the effect will be to use the section
very much as if it were the basis for a prosecution in criminal negligence, a
section 231 prosecution has the advantage of being usable before harm has
actually been done. Like section 201, therefore, it presents the possibility of
focusing on the necessity for serious action in respect of safety and health
without having to wait for harm.
F. Causing mischief: Section 387
Section 387 of the Crininal Code reads as follows:
(I) Every one commits mischief who wilfully
(a) destroys or damages property,
(b) renders property dangerous, useless, inoperative or ineffective,
(c) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with the lawful use, enjoyment or opera-
tion of property, or
(d) obstructs, interrupts or interferes with any person in the lawful use, enjoy-
ment or operation of property.
(2) Every one who commits mischief that causes actual danger to life is guilty of
an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.
(5) Every one who wilfully does an act or wilfully omits to do an act that it is his
duty to do is, if that act or omission is likely to constitute mischief causing actual
danger to life, or to constitute mischief in relation to public property or private
property, guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for five years.
There are difficulties to be overcome in order to be able to use this section in
the context of our paper.
First, the title of Part IX is "Wilful and Forbidden Acts in Respect of
Certain Property." This indicates that the primary aim of section 387 is to
prevent abuse of property with the additional goal that, if physical danger is
created by the abuse of property, an aggravated offence will be said to have
been committed. Thus, we may be stretching the intent of the legislature in
144 The section speaks of "bodily harm." Quaere: Does this include disease? We
saw in relation to section 201 that physical injury was not necessarily seen as an impair-
ment of health. This does not mean that an impairment of health should not be seen as
bodily harm.
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seeking to apply a provision of this kind 45 to employers who delinquently
keep unsafe premises. But, again, we merely point to the fact that a criminal
law provision couched in universal terms, as this provision is, sets out to
characterize certain behaviour as socially unacceptable. To those who argue
that we live in a pluralistic rather than a class-divided society, it is not sup-
posed to matter by whom or for what purpose particular behaviour is engaged
in, unless a specific motive underlying the behaviour is explicitly made a
defence to the created offence. It is also pertinent to note that section 387 (6)
provides for just such a defence when workers, involved in a legitimate dis-
pute with an employer, cause a mischief as defined by sections 386 and 387.
That is, the draftsmen of the provision foresaw the potential use of section
387 in relation to the workplace and decriminalized particular behaviour by
employees which might otherwise be described as a mischief. No such protec-
tion was provided for employers. This may be because it simply was not
deemed necessary as, in another provision-section 386-it is provided that
no conviction under section 387146 is possible if the owner (who for our pur-
poses can be equated with the employer) has a total interest in the property
which is wilfully destroyed or damaged, unless such a person also had an
intention to defraud. That is, the draftsmen may very well have thought that
there was adequate protection for an owner who was also an employer in
cases analogous to those in which employees are given protection-cases in
which a trade dispute leads to the destruction of property. In such cases, the
owner/employer will be protected in the absence of fraud.
In the context in which we would like to see the section used it is un-
likely that destruction by the employer of property in which he has a total
interest and which will also lead to physical danger for workers will be the
result of fraud.147 Nevertheless section 387 may be available for use in our
context, despite the requirement of an intention to defraud in people with a
total interest in the property destroyed or damaged.
First, it is to be noted that section 386(2) requires the mischief to be
committed with fraud where the offence is one "to destroy or to damage"
property. Not all of the means of committing offences in Part IX involve
destroying or damaging property. It is arguable, therefore, that the require-
ment to defraud by a total owner does not apply to all of the offences created
under this part of the Criminal Code.148 Note now that section 387(1) (a)
speaks directly of destruction or damage of property, whereas paragraphs
(b), (c) and (d) of that section do not. It may very well be that the need
145 One would argue that a refusal to take precautions, knowing of the risk, in breach
of a duty to take care, satisfies the literal reading of the section.
146 And also under sections in Part IX.
147 It might occur in the typical situation which the requirement of fraud obviously
envisages, that is, where a person with total interest in a property destroys it to collect on,
say, an insurance policy. There would be foreseeable danger to the people in the plant
at the time such destruction took place. In those cases the likely harm to workers will
always be protected by the criminal law because of our strong desire to curb such fraudu-
lent activity. No special arguments need to be made about the use of the criminal law
against employers who, in their chase for profit, neglect the well-being of their employees
where such neglect is the result of such fraudulent activity.
148 In particular, see ss. 393, 394, 395 and 396.
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to find an intention to defraud in a person with total interest in a piece of prop-
erty affected by the wilful conduct of such a person and which also creates a
physical danger, does not apply to these latter paragraphs because the prop-
erty is not "destroyed or damaged."'1 49
Even if the courts are reluctant to give sections 387(1) (b), (c), and
(d) the reading contended for above, another argument may be mounted
to support the use of section 387. As the intention to defraud must only be
found in a person with a total interest in the property destroyed or damaged,
there seems to be no such barrier if the person prosecuted has no interest in
the property at all. Such a person might be, say, a foreman, a supervising
engineer, or a safety manager.
To prosecute successfully under either sections 387(2) or 387(5), the
wilful mischief affecting property must be directly linked to danger to life.
Thus, in R. v. Nairn,15° it was held that it was not sufficient to show that the
accused shot aimlessly, while drunk, in the general area in which people were
grouped. The shooting resulted in a bottle being broken and the court went
on to say that if the bottle had actually been held in someone's hand at the
time and a splinter had entered the eye of the person so holding the bottle, a
prosecution might have succeeded. Let us now return to the definition of mis-
chief in section 387(1) and hypothesize about the kinds of situations in
which damage to property could create health hazards in the workplace. The
breakdown of guarding machinery, exhaust or ventilating systems or the like,
could clearly constitute such circumstances. Outright destruction of such
equipment would satisfy the requirements of this section where there was also
a finding of wilfulness (and, in the case of an owner with a total interest in
the property, an intent to defraud). 151 Note the wording of paragraph 387
(1)(b). This provision may be particularly useful because it would seem to be
sufficient to let safeguarding equipment deteriorate rather than to require a
positive and deliberate act of interference.
The mental element of the crime is wilfulness. "Wilful" is described in
section 386(1) as the doing of an act or the omitting of the doing of an act
which it is the accused's duty to do, and doing or omitting to do so while
knowing that it will cause an event (namely, property being damaged, de-
stroyed, rendered ineffective, etc.). This causes no serious problem for the
potential use of this section in our context. All that seems to be required is
to show that the accused's conduct was done with an understanding of its
consequences. No malice of any kind need be proved. It should be fairly easy
149 People with a partial interest in such property may be convicted without estab-
lishing such an intent to defraud and thus partners, etc., may be prosecuted under this
section without the prosecution having to meet the more onerous requirement.
150 (1955), 36 M.P.R. 151, 112 C.C.C. 272 (Nfld. C.A.).
151 A difficulty may be created by the fact that section 387(2) speaks of danger to
life, not just of impairment of health or of bodily harm. Arguably more than an impair-
ment of health or bodily harm is therefore required. But note that a splinter in the eye
from a shattered bottle was apparently seen as sufficient danger to life in Nairn. Note
further that it was also held in Nairn that the charge under section 387 must be specific
in identifying the persons whose lives are in danger. In our context this will never present
any real difficulty.
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to prove that a failure to maintain, or to respond to a request for repair, or
that a decision not to renew insulation, etc., was a wilful act in the sense
that it was a knowing one for the purposes of this section. Again, if the
conduct is classified as an omission, there will, in this context, be no difficulty
establishing an existing duty to act in respect of which the omission took
place.' 52
In conclusion, the section can, with a little imagination, be used success-
fully to launch prosecutions in the context of the creation of health hazards
in the work place. If the arguments necessary to support the use of this sec-
tion in this context are rejected by the prosecutorial forces or a court, this
may serve to focus attention on the issue as to why our society treats em-
ployers in the way it does. Awareness of the contradiction between the sup-
posed nature of our society and the alleged essence of the legal system on
the one hand and reality on the other hand may be heightened. To avoid this,
more effective regulation of health and safety by the state may ensue. Note
also that one of the advantages which section 387 has is that it permits prose-
cutions to be laid in anticipation of physical danger. There is no need to wait
for harm to employees to occur. Finally, if the section is usable in the way
that we have argued that it is, it will be even more useful in traumatic injury
cases where the harm likely to arise out of property damage or defect will
be more easily classified as likely to occur as a result of the particular con-
duct which it is sought to characterize as a mischief.
G. Common nuisance: Section 176
Section 176 of the Criminal Code provides:
176. (1) Every one who commits a common nuisance and thereby:
(a) endangers the lives, safety or health of the public, or
(b) causes physical injury to any person,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
(2) For the purposes of this section, everyone commits a common nuisance
who does an unlawful act or fails to discharge a legal duty and thereby:
(a) endangers the lives, safety, health, property or comfort of the public,
or
(b) obstructs the public in the exercise or enjoyment of any right that is
common to all the subjects of Her Majesty in Canada.
Unlike the reasoning adopted in respect of sections 245(2), 231, 380
and 387, the argument supporting the use of this provision to lay criminal
charges in respect of hazardous conditions in the workplace does not require
an imaginative extension of the apparent intention of the legislature.
It has long been recognized that common nuisance is an appropriate
remedy where the public is endangered by a particular activity. Thus, in R. v.
Toronto Railway Co. 153 McDougall J. said:
The Crown in proceeding by indictment for a nuisance are taking the only course
open to secure an abatement of the evil alleged to exist in this case, should it be
152 See our earlier argument on this point in the text at note 85.
153 (1900), 4 C.C.C. 4 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
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found upon the evidence adduced at the trial that a danger to the lives and safety
of the public was created .... 154
The charge was seen as one peculiarly fitted to avoid and prevent harm
to the public.
There seems to be only one major hurdle to overcome in order to be
able to apply the provision successfully in our context. This is the require-
ment that it is the life, safety, health, property or comfort of the public which
must be threatened or affected. In R. v. Schula 55 the court held that haras-
sing telephone calls to three individuals over a prolonged period did not con-
stitute a common nuisance because it did not affect the public as such. The
cases which had found that there was a common nuisance have mainly arisen
in situations where the public's access to roads was impeded or endangered.
Thus, in R. v. Chittenden'56 the use of a very wide and large traction engine
on a public highway was held to be a common nuisance because there was a
substantial interruption and inconvenience of the travelling public-a nui-
sance to all potential road users. In another R. v. Toronto Railway Co.15
case it was held to be a common nuisance to systematically and regularly
reverse electrical trams on a public thoroughfare without equipping the trams
with warning lights or sounding gongs, for such failures created unexpected
hazards for road users. This is to be compared with yet another Toronto Rail-
way Co.15 8 case where the alleged nuisance was a breach of a contractual
agreement not to overload streetcars. It was held that a breach of this con-
tractual duty, not being one owed to the public in general, did not amount
to a nuisance.
On the face of it, it does not seem as if section 176 will be all that use-
ful in respect of prosecutions for the endangering of workers' lives because
endangered workers may not be regarded as the "public". But there are
some potentially helpful arguments. One arises from the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Union Colliery Co. v. The Queen.159 In that case it was
held that, having accepted a public charter to operate a railway company, the
accused corporation was, as a public carrier, bound to carry its passengers
and loads safely. The court went on to hold that:
[elven as carriers not of passengers, but of freight, carrying on their business by
means of trains and locomotive engines, they were, in my view, equally bound to
see to the safety and protection of their employees. Whether the persons alleged
in the indictment to have been killed were employees or passengers does not appear,
but whether passengers or employees, the company defendants were under an equal
obligation to both, and the offence committed was an offence not so much against
154Id. at 10. The authority relied upon was R. v. Stephens (1866), L.R. 1 Q.B. 702,
14 W.R. 859.
155(1956), 18 W.W.R. 453, 115 C.C.C. 382, 23 C.R. 403 (Alta. C.A.).
156 (1885), 49 J.P. 503, 15 Cox. C.C. 725 (Q.B.D.).
157 (1905), 10 O.L.R. 26, 10 C.C.C. 106 (C.A.).
158 R. v. Toronto Ry., [1917] A.C. -630, 38 D.L.R. 537, 29 C.C.C. 29, 23 C.R.C. 183
(P.C.).
159 (1900), 31 S.C.R. 81, 4 C.C.C. 400.
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individual right or against people in their private capacities, but against the public
at large, and therefore, in the public interest, indictable.' 60
Arguably, then, employees can complain that a common nuisance had been
committed when their lives are endangered because it is the same as "the
public" having been endangered. But note that in the Union Colliery case
the accused corporation had taken on a public duty and, in addition, there
was at that time in the Criminal Code a provision which imposed on those
who had under their charge or control any animate or inanimate object or
thing a duty to provide safeguards where failure to do so would endanger lives.
Thus, the situation in a typical privately run plant might be viewed differently
than in the Union Colliery case in that in such a plant there is no public
duty explicitly accepted by the employer, nor is there a direct equivalent of
the old section 213 in the Criminal Code.1 1 But, despite these apparent diffi-
culties, it is worth noting that the offence does not require that all of the
public must be endangered. In Schula it was held that calls to three indivi-
duals did not constitute a common nuisance because these persons were not
the public. But in so holding the court spoke as follows:
The present conviction must therefore be quashed on the grounds that the acts
complained of were directed to three individuals and not to the public generally or to
any section of the public, and was therefore not a common nuisance.10 2 [Emphasis
added.]
Conceivably, then, a large group of workers might thus be held to be an iden-
tifiable section of the public in respect of which a common nuisance may be
committed.
Whatever doubts there may be about the strength of the foregoing argu-
ment, there can be little doubt that if the danger to workmen is also a danger
to people outside the plant a common nuisance charge will be well-founded.
Thus if, say, sulphur fumes inside the plant also endanger people living or
passing near the plant, or if effluent pipes disgorge noxious and toxic sub-
stances into the environment which are also released inside the plant, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the public is affected by the enterprise of the
employer. To take a more grisly example (and thereby to underscore the
utility of the provision in question), take the scientific findings that merely to
live near an asbestos factory or to come into contact with asbestos workers'
clothing may lead to mesothelioma.'83 If these findings can be substantiated
to a court, an effective prosecution for common nuisance might very well be
undertaken against an asbestos producer.
160 Id. at 86 (S.C.R.), 404-05 (C.C.C.) per Sedgewick J. The particular failure in
the case had been a neglect to maintain a bridge so that it became unsafe and collapsed
when a train crossed it.
101 Note, however, that in s. 199 of the present Criminal Code there is a duty imposed
on anyone who undertakes to do an act, a section which is not too dissimilar to the old
s.213.
16 2 Supra note 155 at 457 (W.W.R.), 387 (C.C.C.), 407 (C.R.).
16 3 See the work of Dr. Newhouse of the London School of Hygiene cited by Dr.
Selikoff in his speech, supra note 7.
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All of these arguments are premised on the notion that the conduct that
endangers life, health, and property, is in no way justifiable. In civil cases, the
question of whether conduct is a nuisance is determined by an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the conduct in its own right. The Supreme Court of
Canada in the Union Colliery case held that the same test should be applied
in criminal cases.' 64 In the context of this paper, if the reasonableness of the
employer's conduct is crucial to determining whether a common nuisance is
committed when the lives of employees are endangered, prosecutors would
have to overcome the extreme reluctance of courts to make a finding of un-
reasonableness when it involves criminalizing people who are behaving in a pro-
ductive and profit-making way. But the very wording of section 176 may pre-
clude this proverbial escape hatch. It includes in the definition of common
nuisance those situations where life or property is endangered as a result of
an unlawful act. This requirement will be satisfied by a breach of a statute in
respect of health or safety or, more usefully to us, a legislative enactment in
respect of, say, environmental protection.That is, a nuisance will exist because
of the endangerment. Note further that section 176 also provides that there
will be a common nuisance where life and property are endangered as a re-
sult of a failure to discharge a legal duty. It would be unnecessary repetition
to indicate once again that, in the employer/employee context, the estab-
lishment of a duty which will have been breached by acts or failures leading
to poor safety conditions does not provide a serious difficulty.165
One of the real advantages obtainable by using section 176 is that it can
be utilized before lives, safety and property are in fact impaired. Indeed, the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Toronto Railway Co.166 held that the fact
that a life had been lost as a result of the railway company's conduct was
merely illustrative of the fact that the public was endangered by the behaviour
of the accused. Proof of actual damage done to individuals is not essential to
conviction under this provision.
H. Conspiracy: Section 243
The discussion of the potential of this offence for use against employers
who permit unsafe working conditions is included with a good deal of hesi-
tancy. The main rationale for the retention of this criminal offence is that it
provides the state with an appropriate tool with which to combat complex
criminal organizations. But the very reasons which make it so useful in that
context are the same ones which make it an offence capable of being abused
to the serious detriment of important civil liberties and rights. It is a crime
whose actus reus is the mental act of agreement by two or more persons. The
crime is really the agreement to carry out a common design. Thus, it becomes
feasible to prosecute people for thinking rather than doing, and even for as-
164 Supra note 159. It has already been noted that the existence of a duty under the
Criminal Code substantiated the finding of a common nuisance in that case.
105 See text at note 102.
166 Supra note 157.
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sociating with certain people.' 67 This frightening possibility is made into a
probability because the law of conspiracy has developed procedural and sub-
stantive rules which facilitate prosecutions. This is seen as a good thing be-
cause of the laudable objective of fighting organized crime. As a result, an
exception to the rule against hearsay has been fashioned which permits what-
ever one conspirator may have said-extra-judicially-in furtherance of the
conspiracy, to be used in evidence against other alleged conspirators. Pro-
cedures in respect of joint trials may also work against a particular individual
accused since that accused, being associated with a large number of others,
may be prejudiced by evidence adduced against such other people, even when
a jury is advised that technically such evidence cannot be used in that way.
We are, therefore, far from eager to advocate the utilization of an offence-
even though it suits our purposes-when we believe that that offence ought
to be diminished in scope, if not abolished altogether. We will, therefore,
merely set out the bare bones of the offence for the sake of completeness.
It is a criminal offence to conspire to commit murder or an indictable
offence. 16 In as much as a conspiracy to commit an indictable offence of the
kind discussed in this paper can be established, the section could be of use
in the occupational health context. More useful to us than these sections,
however, are sections 423(2) (a) and (b). They provide as follows:
423. (2) Every one who conspires with any one
(a) to effect an unlawful purpose, or
(b) to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means, is guilty of an indictable
offence and is liable to imprisonment for two years.
This provision is an enactment of the common law offence. Section 8 of the
Criminal Code has abrogated all common law offences but, as the Supreme
Court of Canada noted in Wright, McDermott and Feeley v. The Queen,16
criminal conspiracy was one of the few common law offences which Parlia-
ment had thought it advisable to perpetuate by codification. As a result the
conspiracy provisions have been interpreted in line with the case law devel-
oped in respect of the common law offence.
In Wright, McDermott and Feeley it had been argued that the require-
ment of unlawfulness of purpose was met by proving a purpose which was
criminal only under the Criminal Code. The Supreme Court of Canada, how-
ever, held that it would be sufficient if there was a breach of a provincial
statute.170 In a subsequent case, R. v. Thodas,'71 it was argued that a breach
167 The crime has its origin in a statute which was directed at abuses of criminal
procedure-Ordinance of Conspirators, 1305, 33 Edw. 1. It was soon widened to counter
general social unrest which existed in society; see Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy
(1947), 35 Geo. L.J. 328. And the use made of criminal conspiracy as a tool of oppression
of labour organizations is well-documented.
168 See sections 423(1) (a) to (d) of the Criminal Code.
160 [1964] S.C.R. 192, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 201.
170 See also R. v. Chapman and Grange (1972), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 84, 20 C.R.N.S. 141
(Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Jean Talon Fashion Centre Inc. (1975), 56 D.L.R. (3d) 296, 22
C.C.C. (2d) 223 (Qu6. Q.B.).
171 (1970), 73 W.W.R. 710; [1970] 5 C.C.C. 260, sub nom. R. v. Layton, Ex parte
Thodas (B.C.C.A.).
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of any statute would not necessarily amount to unlawfulness for the purposes
of the Criminal Code offence of criminal conspiracy. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal held that, at the very least, the breach of the statute before
them did satisfy the requirement. There was a suggestion in the majority hold-
ing that the particular statute breached, dealing with securities, was of great
social significance and that such breaches could not be ignored. From this an
inference could be drawn that not every breach of any statute would suffice.
Indeed, the dissentient in Thodas, Nemetz J.A., argued that only breaches
of statutes which are of great importance to the safety of the public ought to
be considered the kind of unlawfulness which satisfy the requirements of the
offence of conspiracy. 172 In our context, we would always be concerned with
statutes of importance to the safety of the public and, therefore, even if the
Nemetz J.A. principle were applied, it would not limit the scope of the crime
of conspiracy in relation to occupational health problems.
Because in conspiracy it is not necessary to prove that particular acts
were engaged in, it is not necessary to prove that a particular accused agreed
to do particular acts with other members of the alleged conspiracy. 7 3 What
must be shown, however, is not only that there was an intention to enter into
a particular agreement, but also that there was an intent that the common
design would be carried out. Thus in R. v. O'Brien Taschereau J. held as
follows:
I think there has been some confusion as to the element of intention which is
necessary to constitute the offence. It is, of course, essential that the conspirators
have the intention to agree, and this agreement must be complete. There must also
be a common design to do something unlawful, or something lawful by illegal means.
Although it is not necessary that there should be an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy, to complete the crime, I have no doubt that there must exist an intention
to put the common design into effect. A common design nccessarily involves an
intention. Both are synonymous. The intention cannot be anything else but the will
to obtain the object of the agreement. I cannot imagine several conspirators agreeing
to defraud, to restrain trade, or to commit any indictable offence, without having
the intention to reach the common goal. 1 74
12 Id. at 751-52 (W.W.R.), 297 (C.C.C.). See also Kamara v. DPP, [1974] A.C. 104,
[1973] 2 All E.R. 1242, 57 Cr. App. R. 880 (H.L.) in which it was held that not every
breach of the law would amount to an unlawful purpose for the offence of criminal
conspiracy and that, therefore, not every tortious act would so qualify. Note that in that
case, however, a trespass was held to be an unlawful purpose because it involved an inva-
sion of the public domain to an extent which inflicted more than nominal damages. It was
also held that a real harm to the public as opposed to a few particular individuals had
occurred because people in the building which had been invaded had truly felt threatened.
17 3 R. v. Sokoloski (1977), 13 N.R. 191 (S.C.C.). Note that the difficulty arose in
that case because an agreement to sell and buy was characterized as part of a series of
joint acts which, when so viewed, allowed a finding of conspiracy. The question of whether
an exchange of different but corresponding set of promises amounts to a conspiracy has
also created difficulties in American jurisprudence. See, for instance, Note, The Conspiracy
Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants (1948-49),
62 Harv. L. Rev. 276 and the discussion at 279-80 in particular.
'74 [1954] S.C.R. 666 at 668, [1955] 2 D.L.R. 311 at 313, 110 C.C.C. 1 at 2-3. See
also R. v. MacDonald (1963), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 488 (B.C.C.A.), Mulcahy v. The Queen
(1868), L.R. 3 H.L. 306.
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
To prove the intention to enter into an agreement to carry out a common de-
sign resort will frequently be had to the actual conduct of the various accused
persons. 75 Indeed, the agreement may be inferred from a series of incidents
which in themselves are quite unimportant and insignificant. 170
The mens rea to be proved is that of entering into an agreement with the
appropriate intention. It does not necessarily require intention to commit an
unlawful act, but rather an intention to agree that a common design shall be
carried out which is in fact unlawful, even though there may be no under-
standing in all of the alleged conspirators that it is in fact unlawful. The al-
leged conspirators must have known that certain acts will be committed or
must have had an awareness of what acts would be committed or conse-
quences would follow when seeking to attain the common design which they
had agreed to achieve. They must also have known enough about the acts or
consequences to make them criminally responsible for them if they had been
charged with the offence of committing such acts or causing such conse-
quences. That is, the co-conspirators must have had the intent which would
have amounted to the mens rea requisite for conviction had they been charged
with the substantive offence of doing such acts or causing such conse-
quences.' 77
In our context, this could mean that a common design which involved
the breaching of statutory safety standards as an integral part of the achieving
of the purpose of the agreement would be a conspiracy. It would not matter
that the conspirators did not know that a breach of a statute or other unlaw-
ful act had been committed in seeking to achieve the common design, pro-
.vided that they knew that acts which were to be committed had certain attri-
butes which would make them responsible in law for such acts.
It may be that in some circumstances a higher mens rea requirement
than merely having the intention necessary to be convicted of a substantive
offence must be present in founding a conspiracy charge. This possible gloss
arises out of the decision in Churchill v. Walton.178 In that case co-conspira-
tors had been charged with having entered into an agreement to achieve a
common design: a breach of a statute. The acts committed in furtherance of
the alleged conspiracy had, for the purpose of that statute, strict liability at-
tached to them. Therefore, strict liability would have made it very easy to
establish the intention in the conspiracy charge if the test set out above had
been applied. The House of Lords, however, held that it would be necessary
to show that the alleged conspirators not only knew that the acts were being
committed (which is all that was necessary for the strict liability offence),
but also that they knew that they were unlawful when so committed. This
makes some sense because, for the purpose of statutory regulation, it may
175 This explains why it is easy for one accused to be prejudiced at the trial as a
result of the proving of wrongful acts by other co-accused persons.
17 6 See Paradis v. The King, [1934] S.C.R. 165 at 168.
177 See generally Goode, Criminal Conspiracy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1975)
at 18-40; in particular, at 35.
178 [1967] 2 A.C. 224, [1967] 1 All E.R. 497, 51 Cr. App. R. 212 (H.L.).
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well be worthwhile to hold people strictly liable but, where people are being
charged with a Criminal Code offence for the same breach of statutory regu-
lation, it does not seem out of line, especially as the prosecution's burden of
proof problems are reduced in conspiracy cases, to require a higher degree
of intention to convict a person for that offence. 179
In sum, it will be relatively easy to establish that the offence of con-
spiracy has been committed where there has been an agreement to commit
one of the indictable offences identified in this paper as apposite in certain
industrial circumstances. It will be readily available where there is a common
design to lower the standard of the duty of care owed to workers where this
is evidenced by conduct suggesting that this is the aim of a number of people
controlling safety standards in an enterprise. It will be readily available where
an agreement, evidenced by conduct, can be deduced to defeat the aims of a
statutory safety-health scheme. It will be readily available where a company
enters into any agreement of the kind listed above with some of its employees
who make decisions on its behalf.180 Our preference is that in each of the
cases where conspiracy would be an available charge, no prosecution ought
to be launched where agreements culminate in actual substantive offences.
Where such offences are actually committed there should be no reason to use
the tool of conspiracy at all: the perpetrator should be charged rather than
people who may have agreed to commit the crime.' 8 '
I. Murder: Section 212(c)
As a practical matter, the only provision which could be used to convict
employers of murder because of death arising out of unsafe conditions in
their plant is section 212(c).182 Let us state at the outset that we do not
advocate such use of section 212(c) because it requires a reading of the
179 It is not certain that the same reading would be given to the mens rea requirement
in conspiracy by a Canadian court as was done in Walton, supra note 17. In other areas
of inchoate crimes, the Canadian courts seem to have been satisfied with a finding that
the mens rea required is the same as that applicable when a person is charged with the
associated substantive offence. See Lajoie v. The Queen (1973), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 618, 10
C.C.C. (2d) 313, R. v. Trinneer (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 568, 72 W.W.R. 677, [1970]
3 C.C.C. 289.
18 0 See discussion of the criminal responsibility of corporations in the text accompany-
ing note 222, infra.
181 Note s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code which attributes the requisite intention, when
the actual offence has been committed, to any of the conspirators so that such a conspirator
no longer is merely a conspirator but also becomes a person who is guilty of the
substantive offence.
182 It is not likely that an employer who keeps unsafe premises would do so because
he means to kill one of his employees or means to inflict bodily harm on one of them
which he knows is likely to cause her/his death, reckless of whether or not this will cause
death. Therefore ss. 212(a) (i) and (ii) are of no practical importance in the context of
this paper. Nor is s. 213, which deals with the causing of bodily harm which results in
death when committing a number of listed offences such as treason, robbery, arson and
rape, of any practical interest to us.
Section 212 states:
Culpable homicide is murder
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section which would make murder convictions more readily available in all
sorts of circumstances which we believe ought not to give rise to murder
charges at all. This section of the paper, therefore, is merely included to give
a full picture of the potential of criminal law as a health and safety regulator.
Section 212(c) states that culpable homicide is murder:
where a person, for an unlawful object does anything that he knows or ought to
know is likely to cause death, and thereby causes death to a human being, notwith-
standing that he desires to effect his object without causing death or bodily harm
to any human being.
On its face this provision is much less stringent in its requirements than the
other ones defining murder; indeed, it seems completely out of character with
the main ones, sections 212(a) (i) and (ii). Those sections require a finding
that the accused positively meant to kill or cause bodily harm. By contrast,
section 212(c) has no such subjective element in it. The accused merely
should, as a reasonable person in the circumstances, have known that his
or her act was likely to cause death. It is surprising that in a Criminal Code
in which the requirement of subjective intent is to be implied unless there is
a provision to the contrary,8 a section relating to the most serious of all
offences does not clearly insist on subjective intent.
Unsurprisingly, the commentators have classified section 212(c) as an
anomaly, to be given as narrow scope as possible. In particular, Hooper 8 4
and Parker'8 5 have pointed out that the section is based on the English Draft
Code of 1879 and that, at that time, the provision would have had a differ-
ent import than it may now have. In particular, they note that Stephen,
whose Digest of the Criminal Law of 1877 formed the basis for the English
Draft Code,8 6 was a strenuous opponent of the felony-murder rule and that
it can hardly be supposed that he would have favoured a provision which, in
effect, widens the scope of that objectionable rule. Hooper therefore looks
for a different explanation for the inclusion of what is now section 212(c)
in the Draft Code. He points out that in the 1870's notions about mens rea
were not as refined as they are today and it was believed that an accused's
intent could be gleaned only by determining the foresight of a reasonable
person in the circumstances of the accused. At that point of legal develop-
(a) where the person who causes the death of a human being
(i) means to cause his death, or
(ii) means to cause him bodily harm that he knows is likely to cause his death, and
is reckless whether death ensues or not.
Nor will s. 212(b) be of practical use in the context of this paper as it also deals with
an intention to cause death or bodily harm, in this case resulting in death of a person
other than the one who was meant to be hurt.
183 See discussion in the criminal negligence section of the paper, text accompanying
note 35, supra.
184Some Anomalies and Developments in the Law of Homicide (1967-68), 3
U.B.C.L. Rev. 55.
185 Criminal Law-Homicide-Constructive Murder-Canadian Criminal Code-
Section 212(c)--Historical Origins of "Unlawful Object" (1979), 57 Can. B. Rev. 122.
18 6 He was also one of the Commissioners who drafted the Code.
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ment it was assumed that a person must be taken to have intended the natural
and probable consequences of his or her acts. Today there is no such as-
sumption. Instead, the trier of fact may infer that an actor intended to attain
the natural and probable consequences of his or her act, but need not do
so.187 Hooper further points out that the presumption of intent made sense
when the English Draft Code was being formulated because the accused could
not be a witness at that time and there seemed to be no other sensible way
of getting at the accused's intent than by using an objective test such as that
an actor must be taken to have intended the natural and probable consequen-
ces of his or her act.
Taking all this together, the commentators surmise that the precursor of
section 212(c) was not meant to be anything more than a provision which
purported to make it murder when an accused intended death or grievous
bodily harm to ensue and, in the later case, was reckless as to whether or not
death would follow. In effect, it would be a stylistically different way of stat-
ing what is now section 212(a) (i) and (ii), since the objective test was
really a way of formulating the subjective one in vogue at the time of the
English Draft Code. 88 Both Hooper and Parker noted that section 212(c)
has seldom been used and that in most situations in which it has been relied
on to found murder charges, section 212(a) (i) or (ii), or section 213 would
have yielded the same result. They argue that section 212(c) should be read
as anomalous and not be used as its phraseology suggests, namely, to permit
attaching criminal responsibility for murder on an objective basis.'8 9
In recent years, however, some courts, notably in Ontario, have shown
a willingness to give greater scope to section 212(c). Whereas the act which
leads to death need not have been so intended, the section requires that the
act must have been done to attain an unlawful object other than the cause
of death. As long as this was read as requiring to show that the act done
would have been seen by a reasonable person in the accused's circumstances
as likely to cause death, and that the act done was separate from the unlaw-
ful object sought to be attained, violent acts directed at a victim could not
lead to a conviction for murder unless the accused had deliberately intended
to cause death or bodily harm regardless of whether death ensued. This was
so because such violent acts would also be the unlawful object, for example,
l87 Hosegood v. Hosegood (1950), 66 T.L.R. 735 (C.A.); R. v. Giannotti (1956),
115 C.C.C. 203, [1956] O.R. 349, 23 C.R. 259 (C.A.); R. v. Hilson (1958), 121 C.C.C.
139, 28 C.R. 262 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Mulligan (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 270, 26 C.R.N.S.
179 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Brent, [1972] 4 W.W.R. 766, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 232 (B.C.C.A.).
188 Hooper records that Stephen, in Volume III of his History of the Criminal Law,
set out the provisions of the English Draft Code and the equivalent ones from his Digest
of the Criminal Law. Stephen, in his Digest, had defined murder as intending death or
grievous bodily harm, reckless of its consequences. Stephen then stated that this definition
and s. 174 of the Draft Code (now s. 212(c)) "exactly corresponds" and that the differ-
ences were "a mere matter of style." Hooper, supra note 184 at 62.
189 Note that when the House of Lords applied an objective test in DPP v. Smith,
[1961] A.C. 290, it was overturned by Parliament in the Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80,
s. 8 (U.K.), and expressly disapproved of by the High Court of Australia in Parker v.
The Queen (1963), 111 C.L.R. 610, 37 A.L.J.R. 3.
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assault, which needed to be proved to make section 212(c) applicable. Thus,
in R. v. Desmoulin,190 the theory of the prosecution was that the accused had
beaten a child, causing injuries which resulted in its death. The Ontario Court
of Appeal held that the assault on the child could not constitute the separate
unlawful object which had to be proved to make section 212(c) applicable.
Thus, even if the historical background is not accepted as sufficient ground
to limit the scope of section 212 (c), a severe limitation on its availability would
exist if the Desmoulin reasoning were universally applied. But, in R. v. Ten-
nant and Naccarato,191 the act of leaving the scene of a confrontation, re-
turning with a revolver and pointing it at the victim, was held to be separate
from the unlawful object of assaulting the victim (who died from his injuries).
This separation of the act from the assault was artificial. The Ontario
Court of Appeal found support for its reasoning in the rather enigmatic deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of Canada in Graves v. The Queen.192 In a subse-
quent case, the same argumentation was relied upon to convict a person of
murder who had conspired to commit arson causing an explosion which killed
a person. The act of setting fire was seen as separate from the unlawful object
of the conspiracy.193 In R. v. DeWolfe,194 an attempt was made to halt the
trend. It was there held that the pointing and using of firearms could not be
both the acts done and the unlawful object required by section 212(c). It
had been argued that these acts were also the unlawful object because they
contravened the Criminal Code's provisions in respect of the proper use of
firearms. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that section 212(c) should not
190 (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 517 (Ont. C.A.). For a similar decision see Hughes v.
The King (1951), 84 C.L.R. 170 (H.C. Aust.). Note that the English Draft Code, which
contained s. 212(c)'s predecessor, was also the basis for the criminal codes of New
Zealand, Western Australia, Tasmania, and Queensland. Hughes arose out of a crime
committed in Queensland.
191 (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 687, 23 C.C.C. (2d) 80 (C.A.).
192 (1913), 47 S.C.R. 568, 9 D.L.R. 589, 21 C.C.C. 44. There the three accused had
trespassed on the victim's property. The victim, holding a loaded gun, asked them to leave.
The accused rushed at him and the victim used his gun as a club. It went off and he died.
The accused were held guilty of murder. In Tennant and Naccarato the Ontario Court
of Appeal said:
It is implicit in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada that the unlawful
object relied upon to bring the accused within s. 259(d) of the Code (the predecessor
of s. 212(c)) was an attack or assault upon the deceased and that the act done to
achieve that unlawful object was the conduct of the accused in rushing at the
deceased in the circumstances. In our view, the facts of that case can only be
brought within the subsection if the conduct of the accused in rushing at the deceased
is regarded as a separate act done to achieve an unlawful object, namely, to attack
or assault the deceased.
At 702 (O.R.), 94-95 (C.C.C.).
193 R. v. Quaranta (1975), 24 C.C.C. (2d) 109 (Ont. C.A.). Note that in this case
the act done was easier to separate from the unlawful object. In Tennant and Naccarato
it is difficult to perceive how an assault which requires a threat of an act or an act is
distinct from the completion of the threatening act. In Quaranta it would have been
equally difficult to distinguish between the act of setting fire and the unlawful object of
arson. The finding that there was a conspiracy, however, makes the distinguishing process
more persuasive.
194 (1976), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 23 (Ont. C.A.).
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be left with the jury unless there was plain evidence of an unlawful object
separate from the acts. Indeed, the Court said that:
the facts [of a particular case] should not be subjected to a metaphysical examina-
tion to uncover further unlawful objects; a common sense view of the evidence
should be taken. Cases such as Tennant and Naccarato and Graves can well be
regarded as high-water marks of the construction and application of this subsection
and should not be construed as points of departure.' 95
There is thus a discernible development in the direction of greater scope
for section 212(c). The apparent retreat in DeWolfe may arrest this trend,
but in our context this is not so important because, in the occupational health
area, the unlawful object will be easily separable from the acts which cause
death. Take for example a case in which the employer's process leads to too
many contaminating fibres being released into the plant's atmosphere. This
act, even if it is not intended to cause death or bodily harm, may very well
be of the kind that a reasonable employer in those circumstances would
know to be likely to cause death.' 96 The unlawful object could be a breach of
statute, a failure to comply with an inspector's order, or a breach of con-
tract.1 7 The crime would then be complete. At this juncture, note that there
is nothing to indicate what kind of an unlawful object is necessary to satisfy
section 212(c). Parker, alarmed by the development in Tennant and Nacca-
rato, argues that a reading of section 212(c) in its proper historical setting
would require that "unlawful object" be read as "inherently violent."'198 This
would bring the section into operation in circumstances where an approxima-
tion of subjective intent might be found. There seem to be no compelling
data supporting this reasoning, but it does underscore an anxiety about sec-
tion 212(c) which we share. Returning to our occupational health example,
it is clear that a murder conviction of an employer in such circumstances
would amount to a conviction as a result of a "misdemeanour-murder" rule.
This was precisely what the High Court of Australia warned against in
Hughes v. The King.199 In that case, this unacceptable development was seen
as an outgrowth of failing to separate the act from the unlawful object. In
our context, this result could obtain even if Tennant and Naccarato reasoning
is rejected.
The objection to the Tennant and Naccarato development is that it may
herald a greater willingness to exploit section 212(c). We oppose this, even
though it could be of dramatic use in the occupational health area, because, if
195 Id. at 29. As remarked in note 193, supra, the finding of conspiracy in Quaranta
left the holding in that case more in line with a narrow reading of s. 212(c). In DeWolfe,
the Court of Appeal, which was obviously not in a position to say that Tennani and
Naccarato was wrong, sought to narrow its possible effect by noting at 28 that "in both
Graves and Tennant and Naccarato the accused persons were parties to a conspiracy or
something very close to it."
d 196 As usual, it might be argued that the contamination of the atmosphere is due to
an omission (e.g., failure to ventilate) rather than to an act. We refer to our argument
on this point in the section on criminal negligence, text accompanying note 85, supra.
197 Add to this the possibility of conspiracy; see the discussion in section H of this
part, text accompanying note 167, supra, et seq.
198 Supra note 185, at 134.
199 Supra note 190.
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it is applied, it could work to characterize as murder acts and conduct which
we clearly would not want to treat as seriously. Since this article is concerned
with demonstrating that entrepreneurs should be treated no more favourably
than other persons by the criminal law, it would not behove us to make an
argument that they should be treated as criminals when no one else would be
so characterized for analogous behaviour. If it be argued that all people, in-
cluding entrepreneurs, should be charged under section 212(c), we return to
our argument that the section is anomalous in that it is out of step with the
other homicide provisions of our Criminal Code and, as Hooper and Parker
have shown, ought not, as a matter of its history, to be used as a literal read-
ing of its phraseology suggests it could be.
We take heart from the fact that, at least in the context of occupational
health causing death, the section may be very difficult to use because of the
requirement that the death of the victim must occur within a year-and-a-day
of the accused's act. We will return to this point.200
VI PRACTICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS INHIBITING THE
USE OF CRIMINAL LAW
A. The initiating of prosecution
One of the difficulties with using criminal law in the way that has been
suggested in this article is the built-in reluctance to stigmatize as criminal an
activity that is regarded as being productive. Therefore, even if the arguments
made herein do persuade people of both the capacity and utility of the crimi-
nal law in the employer-employee context, the launching of prosecutions may
well be hindered by the refusal of prosecutorial officers to initiate proceedings.
The nature of criminal offences is that they are offences against the state
and that therefore the state is the appropriate prosecutor.201 In the normal
course of events, the Attorney-General or his agents will keep control over
criminal proceedings. An information may be laid by any private citizen, but
this is usually done by a policeman. Where the information is one in respect
of an offence of a summary nature, a trial will follow the laying of the in-
formation unless the Attorney-General exercises his right to stay the proceed-
ings.20 2 Where the offence is an indictable one, a preliminary inquiry will
follow the information. If the court, as a result of this inquiry, decides to
commit the accused for trial, the prosecutor may prefer an indictment. The
prosecutor may be the private citizen who brought the information in those
jurisdictions where grand juries are still employed, as well as the Attorney-
General or his officers. 2 The only other persons who may prefer an indict-
200 See the section on causation, text accompanying note 224, infra, et seq.
201 Woo Tuck v. Scallen (1929), 46 Qu6. K.B. 437, 51 CC.C. 365.
202 Section 723(1) of the Criminal Code. As to the laying of information and the
ensuing proceedings in summary offences, see Part XXIV of the Code.
203 Prosecutor is so defined in s. 2. Section 504 refers to a "prosecutor." Where grand
juries are not employed the word "prosecutor" is not used in the pertinent provisions, but
rather the Attorney-General, his agents, or persons to whom the Attorney-General or the
court has given permission to prefer an indictment; see s. 507.
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ment are the Attorney-General or his officers, or persons who are given per-
mission to do so by the Attorney-General or the court.20 4 But, regardless of
who is entitled to prefer an indictment, the Attorney-General can always
direct a stay of proceedings, even where he has preferred the indictment.20 5
The exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion to direct a stay of proceed-
ings or not to prefer an indictment is not reviewable by a court. 0 6 He does
not have to give reasons to support the way in which the discretion was
exercised. It is his duty to assess the public's interest in having a prosecution
go forward or not. This residual right to control creates serious political
difficulties which will have to be overcome to enable prosecutions to be
launched even where the charges brought look as if they should result in con-
viction of the accused.
There is an argument that if a private citizen, as a result of a breach of
criminal law, apprehends injury to a right or interest he or she possesses
which is different to the right all citizens have in other people complying
with law, such a citizen may obtain an injunction to prevent criminal con-
duct. As this remedy would be one offered to a citizen to protect a civil right
or interest, only incidentally raising an issue of public interest, it will be avail-
able without requiring permission to apply for it from the Attorney-General
or from any other such public official. 0 7 There are some questions as to
whether or not this makes the remedy potentially available to a worker who
fears injury because of an existing or anticipated breach of the Criminal
Code. These include the issue as to whether the worker has the kind of right
or interest in his or her physical well-being which is to be protected by the
remedy and whether a breach of a universally applicable section. of the Crimi-
nal Code, as opposed to health or welfare legislation aimed at a particular
204 Sections 505 and 507.
205 Section 508.
2 06R. v. Osborne (1975), 11 N.B.R. (2d) 48, 25 C.C.C. (2d) 405, 33 C.R.N.S. 211
(N.B.C.A.). This is not to say that where a court believes there has been an abuse of
process by the forces of prosecution it does not have the power to stay proceedings:
Rourke v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1021, 76 D.L.R. (3d) 193, (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d)
129; but the majority thought that the power should be exercised only in the most excep-
tional circumstances; compare R. v. Catagas, [1977] 3 W.W.R. 706, 38 C.C.C. (2d) 296
(Man. C.A.), where it is suggested that the decision to stay proceedings is essentially a
matter of the politics of the administration of justice and should, therefore, not be
complicated by the judiciary.
207 The availability of the remedy was identified by the House of Lords in Gouriet v.
Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] A.C. 435, [1977] 3 All E.R. 70, where the applicant
had sought a restraining order to prevent a trade union from carrying out its threat to put
an embargo on mail between the U.K. and South Africa. The Attorney-General had
refused to grant his consent to act as a plaintiff in a relator action. The House of Lords
held that this was not a reviewable decision, but went on to say that, but for legislation
granting trade unions immunity in torts actions, the applicant might have had an interest
worthy of protection by way of an injunction. See the judgments of Lord Wilberforce at
474-75 (A.C.), 78 (All E.R.), Viscount Dilhorne at 491-92 (A.C.), 92 (All E.R.), Lord
Diplock at 496-98 (A.C.), 96-97 (All E.R.), Lord Edmund-Davies at 506-07 (A.C.), 104
(All E.R.), Lord Fraser at 522-24 (A.C.), 118-119 (All E.R.). Shortly afterwards the
English Court of Appeal held (2 to 1) that performers and recording companies were
entitled to an order enjoining bootleggers; see Ex Parte Island Records Ltd., [1978] 1 Ch.
122, [1978] 3 All E.R. 824.
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section of the community, is the kind of provision which may be enforced by
a civil remedy. But, even if these hurdles can be cleared, two immense prac-
tical problems remain.208 The first is that an interlocutory injunction would
be the most useful remedy for an endangered worker but, as a matter of
practice, if not of law, to obtain this the applicant has to give an under-
taking that he or she will make good the losses incurred by an enjoined de-
fendant should it be decided, at the eventual trial, that the injunction ought
not to be granted. In our context this might present an insurmountable barrier
to a worker. It is possible that a court would listen sympathetically to an
argument that the requirement of an undertaking in respect of costs is not
mandatory and, therefore, that a worker who believed there was a genuine
jeopardy to his or her health should not effectively be deprived of this legal
remedy because of his or her relative impecuniosity. 09 Further, it may be
that to issue a writ seeking a permanent injunction is worthwhile. Although
208 In Ex Parte Island Records Ltd., supra note 207, at 137 (Ch.), 831 (All E.R.)
Lord Denning M.R., after analysing a whole series of cases where injunctive relief was
given, opined that the applicant did not have to establish "rights of property, strictly so
called," but that all that was required was to demonstrate that there had been an unlawful
interference with the plaintiff's trade or calling. It should not be too hard to show that
where a criminal offence is being committed, danger to a worker's physical well-being
represents an unlawful interference with her/his trade or calling, particularly as in
Springhead Spinning Co. v. Riley (1868), L.R. 6 Eq. 551, a case cited with approval by
both the House of Lords in Gouriet and by the majority in Ex Parte Island Records, an
employer was permitted to argue that loss of profits and goodwill as a result of a strike
and boycott entitled it to an injunction because it was the same as causing that loss by
making the plant uninhabitable by inundating it with noxious fumes. It does not seem
to stretch things too far to argue that, where the harm feared is physical danger to the
person complaining rather than harm to the employer whose protectible loss is due to those
persons being endangered, an injunction ought to be granted. If it be argued that the
employer stands to lose profits and goodwill whereas the workers will suffer mere physical
harm, note that the workers also stand to lose earnings and earning capacity. Inasmuch
as the Criminal Code provisions are sought to be differentiated from such statutes as health
and welfare enactments which set out to protect particular sections of the community
(and Lord Diplock in Gouriet at 498-501 (A.C.), 98-99 (All E.R.) suggested that he saw
the potential injunctive relief in that context), note that in Gouriet the statute breached
was one affecting the general public, as it was in the Springhead Spinning case and that,
even though in Ex Parte Island Records the statute protected only performers, Lord
Denning's analysis did not hinge on that feature. Indeed, Lord Denning provided an
answer to another perceived difficulty, namely that to give an injunction in respect of a
breach of the criminal law could lead to double jeopardy; see Island Records at 135
(Ch.), 829 (All E.R.).
209 The applicant also has to show that (i) the harm likely to be inflicted is irreparable,
(ii) the balance of convenience between the plaintiff and the defendant warrants the making
of an interlocutory order, and (iii) a prima facie case exists that an unlawful interference
with a right has occurred or will occur. The first two requirements may not be so difficult
to satisfy in our context. As to the third, it could be a sticking point because of the rather
uncertain state of the law discussed above. It is possible that the need to demonstrate a
prima facie case has been removed since the decision in American Cyanamid Co. v.
Ethicon, [1975] A.C. 396, 1 All E.R. 504 (H.L.), and Canadian decisions apparently
adopting it: Bank of Montreal v. Calbax Properties Ltd. (1977), 4 A.R. 483 (S.C.), Labelle
v. Ottawa Real Estate Board (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 502 (H.C.). To the contrary, however,
seems to be Toronto Marlboro Major Junior "A" Hockey Club v. Tonelli (1975), 11 O.R.
(2d) 664, 67 D.L.R. (3d) 214, 25 C.P.R. (2d) 175 (H.C.), and some doubt is thrown on
the matter by Abouna v. Foothills Prov. Gen. Hospital Bd. (1975), 65 D.L.R. (3d) 337
(Alta. S.C.).
[VOL. 17, No. 3
Occupational Hazards
there would be an undesirable lag of time between the issuance of a writ and
the trial, this route could provide workers with a bargaining tool and, if the
issue were to go to trial, it would focus attention on the fact that workers need
to resort to extraordinary remedies to protect their very special interest in
working conditions.
But this brings us to the second problem. As the granting of an injunc-
tion is a civil remedy to protect rights against breaches of the criminal law,
it is an extraordinary remedy and one which is not likely to be granted where
courts are not satisfied that no other means of relief are readily available. It
will be hard for workers to satisfy courts of this because the various safety
and health statutes provide for inspectors, joint committees and agencies
which can provide help in a crisis. Inasmuch as the argument in this article is
that these schemes will, in general, fail to provide adequate protection, in any
one case it is hard to overcome the argument that they provide a means of
redress.2 0
In sum, it may not be easy to launch prosecutions of the kind this article
advocates but, since the difficulties arise from the political reluctance of the
state to prosecute employers for behaviour which it would otherwise charac-
terize as anti-social, ammunition will be provided for those lobbyists who
demand greater direct regulation of entrepreneurial activities. The state, con-
fronted with the contradiction that it does not wish to label producers crimi-
nals while, at the same time, expressing a desire for a safe work environment,
would find it increasingly difficult to resist demands for planning and licensing
systems, even if this meant reduced profitability for enterprise.
B. Criminal responsibilty of corporations
In many of the cases in which criminal responsibility is sought to be
imposed on employers, the employer will be a corporation. If a criminal
charge can be successfully brought against employees, (for example, super-
visors who are responsible for safety and health in a plant, managers or di-
rectors who decide on particular materials or processes, foremen, etc.), can
the corporations who employ them also be made criminally responsible?
The Criminal Code clearly envisages that there will be situations in
which a corporation can be held criminally responsible. Section 647 provides
that a corporation which is convicted of an offence is liable, in lieu of any
imprisonment which is prescribed for that offence, to be fined in an amount
within the discretion of the court if the offence is an indictable offence or in
an amount not exceeding $1,000 if the offence is summary. It does not fol-
low that a corporation will be responsible for every act of its employees.
Mens rea must be established and there is an obvious question as to whether
or not the intent of an employee can be attributed to that of the employing
corporation.
210 It is true that in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Grabarchuk (1975), 11 Q.R.
(2d) 607, 67 D.L.R. (3d) 31 (Div. Ct.) it was held that an injunction could be granted
where other remedies for a breach of statute were available, but in that case it was the
Attorney-General seeking the injunction and he was able to show that the public as a
whole would be adversely affected if the normal remedies had to be relied on by it.
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As early as 1900 the Supreme Court of Canada held in Union Colliery
Co. v. The Queen2 1' that a corporation could be held criminally responsible
for omitting, without lawful excuse, to perform a specifically created duty to
avoid danger to human life in respect of something under its charge or con-
trol.2 1 2 In the Union Colliery case it had been argued that manslaughter could
have been charged on the facts which were actually presented to the court
and that a corporation could never be held responsible for a crime such as
manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Canada had said that, as it did not have
to address itself to that problem, it would leave the question open. In R. v.
Canadian Liquid Air Ltd.2 13 the question did confront the court directly. It
was held that a corporation could be found criminally negligent if the pro-
cesses it employed would establish that it had a wanton or reckless disregard
for life. The context in which this principle was enunciated is noteworthy.
The accused company had undertaken to make an area of its plant gas-free
and had set up what appeared to be an appropriate process to achieve this
end. It failed because an employee did not follow the set-out procedures
properly. The company was held not to be criminally negligent because the
employee's failure did not establish the wantonness or recklessness required
to prove criminal negligence in the corporation. On the contrary, its conduct
had been impeccable even though the performance of its employee had not
been. The company would have been held responsible if, having undertaken
to keep the plant gas free, it had not devised an appropriate means of attain-
ing this objective.21 4 For our purposes, it is of interest that the breach of a
duty which it is necessary to prove when prosecuting in criminal negligence
would have been found to be present in the Canadian Liquid Air case be-
cause there had been a breach of section 199 of the Criminal Code. It recites:
Every one who undertakes to do an act is under a legal duty to do it if an omission
to do the act is or may be dangerous to life.
This approach could be very useful in relation to criminal negligence prose-
cutions in our context. Where an omission amounting to a breach of a legal
duty needs to be established, it could be argued that, as every master under-
takes to do an act, namely to keep premises safe because of the master's un-
abrogated common law duty to take care, the failure to set up appropriate
safeguards could be a breach of duty because it was a failure to do an act
carefully which the master had undertaken to do.
Returning to our immediate problem, it is clear then that the corporation
can be held criminally responsible in its own right.21 5 The question that re-
2 11 Supra note 159.
2 12 In coming to this view reliance was placed on R. v. The Great North of England
Ry Co. (1846), 2 Cox C.C. 70, 115 E.R. 1294 (Q.B.); Whitfield v. South Eastern Ry
(1858), El. BI. & El. 115, 120 E.R. 451; and Pharmaceutical Society v. London and
Provincial Supply Association (1880), 4 Q.B.D. 313, 5 App. Cas. 857.
213 (1972), 20 C.R.N.S. 208 (B.C.S.C.).
214 See also R. v. Michigan Central Ry Co. (1907), 10 O.W.R. 660, 17 C.C.C. 483
(H.C.); R. v. East Crest Oil Co., [1944] 3 D.L.R. 535, [1949] 2 W.W.R. 503, 82 C.C.C.
77, reversed on another point, [1945] S.C.R. 191, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 353, 83 C.C.C. 211.
215 For a good description see Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporation in
English Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969) at 1-28.
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mains is: Can it be criminally liable for the acts of its employees? The diffi-
culty is the attribution of the employee's intent to that of the corporation. In
the past this question caused considerable difficulty. But, since the decision
in R. v. Fane Robinson Ltd.,2 16 it has become accepted that corporations
can have the necessary mens rea to commit crimes if the acts were committed
by individual employees with the requisite intent.2 17 To make a finding that
the corporation was criminally responsible in Fane Robinson it had to be held
that, although a corporation acts through people, if the actor was a directing
mind of the corporation and had the necessary intent, the corporation would
be deemed to have that intent.218 In R. v. St. Lawrence Corp. it was held that:
While in cases other than criminal libel, criminal contempt of Court, public nuisance
and statutory offences of strict liability criminal liability is not attached to a corpora-
tion for the criminal acts of its servants or agents upon the doctrine of respondeat
superior, nevertheless, if the agent falls within a category which entitles the Court
to hold that he is a vital organ of the body corporate and virtually its directing
mind and will in the sphere of duty and responsibility assigned to him so that his
action and intent are the very action and intent of a company itself, then his conduct
is sufficient to render the company indictable by reason thereof. It should be added
that both on principle and authority this proposition is subject to the proviso that
in performing the acts in question the agent was acting 'within the scope of his
authority either express or implied. 219
The question that now remains is, who or what constitutes a directing mind
of a corporation for these purposes? When the test was first propounded in
Lennard's case it was done in the context of the act of a managing director of
a limited company. In Fane Robinson the situation was of a similar kind.
Gradually the courts have come to recognize that, in line with the activ-
ities of complicated corporate structures, the doctrine ought to be stretched
to cover the acts of corporate officers who could generally be described as
210 [194113 D.L.R. 409, [1941] 2 W.W.R. 235, 76 C.C.C. 106 (Alta. C.A.).
217 Compare this to those situations where the alleged crime is committed as the result
of the corporation's failure to set up appropriate processes.
218 Reliance was placed on the much-cited passage from Viscount Haldane L.C. in
Lennard's Carrying Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. [1915] A.C. 705 at 713, [1914-15] All
E.R. Rep. 280 at 283:
A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a
body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the
person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is
really the directing mind and will of the corporation .... his action must, unless a
corporation is not to be liable at all, have been an action which was the action of
the company....
This was cited at 410 (D.L.R.), 236 (W.W.R.), 197 (C.C.C.), of the report of the decision
in Fane Robinson, supra note 216.
219 [1969] 2 O.R. 305 at 320, 5 D.L.R. (3d) 263 at 278, [1969] 3 C.C.C. 263 at 281
(C.A.). Reliance was placed on R. v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry Co. (1842), 3 Q.B.
223, 114 E.R. 492, R. v. Great North of England Ry Co., supra note 212, Chuter v. Freeth
& Pocock Ltd., [1911] 2 K.B. 832, [1911-13] All E.R. Rep. 138 (C.A.), Mousell Bros
Ltd. v. London and North-Western Ry Co., [1917] 2 K.B. 836, [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. 1101
(C.A.), Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 395,
[1939] 2 All E.R. 613 (C.A.), DPP v. Kent & Sussex Contractors Ltd., [1944] K.B. 146,
[1944] 1 All E.R. (D.C.), R. v. I.C.R. Haulage Ltd., [1944] K.B. 551, [1944] 1 All E.R.
691 (C.C.A.), Moore v. I. Bresler Ltd., [1944] 2 All E.R. 515 (D.C.).
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"responsible officers. '' 2  Thus, in R. v. Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd.221 a
used car sales manager who worked for the accused corporation had fraudu-
lently caused odometers on cars to be turned back. The corporation had not
indicated that it wished this to be done. The sales manager was not an officer
or director of the company but he did operate two used car lots for it and
was responsible for keeping stocks replenished and for keeping the cars in
working order at all times. He had twelve people assisting him in these tasks
and approved all sales made from the car lots. He was responsible to a gen-
eral sales manager who was in turn responsible to the president of the accused
corporation or to the treasurer-secretary of that corporation. The sales man-
ager was not a signing officer of the corporation nor was he authorized to
sign cheques. He was responsible for all invoices issued in respect of used
car sales and was able to create debts which were honoured by the company
after a rubber-stamping procedure by the comptroller-treasurer. The court
held that the used car sales manager had an intention to defraud which could
be attributed to the accused corporation. Thus it is clear that corporations
can be held criminally responsible in two guises: for failure to make and
create appropriate conditions after they had undertaken to do so and for the
wrongful acts of responsible officers, a term which has a widening although
not very precise meaning.
Note that, as a consequence of these developments in the law, corpora-
tions can be held criminally responsible when charged with conspiracy where
the alleged conspiracy may result out of an agreement between the corpora-
tion and its responsible officers. This notion creates conceptual difficulties
because the only intent that the corporation can have in the first place is that
of the officers with whom it has allegedly entered into the wrongful agreement.
To enable courts to come to this view they have to hold that the individual
officers are acting in a dual capacity. 2
Although it is clear that it is possible to prosecute corporations for crimi-
nal offences, a difficult question remains. When, as a matter of social policy,
ought a corporation to be made criminally responsible? It is one thing to say
that the juristic personality of a corporation is equivalent to that which is
attributed to a human being. It is another to say that the nature and the pur-
pose of these juristic entities are the same. Thus, inasmuch as the aims sought
to be achieved by the criminal law have been formulated in the context of
what effect enforcement of the criminal law will have on human beings, they
may be unattainable if the same criminal law provisions are enforced against
corporations. That is, the aims of deterrence, prevention, retribution and
rehabilitation may not be attainable by making a criminal corporation respon-
sible in the same way as a human being would be in respect of particular
behaviour. And, even if these aims are attainable by enforcing the criminal
220 See R. v. Canadian Allis-Chalmers Ltd. (1923), 54 O.L.R. 38 at 46, 48 C.C.C.
63 at 74 (C.A.) and Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153 at 171, (1971]
2 All E.R. 127 at 132 (H.L.).
221 [1974] 4 W.W.R. 516, 18 C.C.C. (2d) 248 (Alta. D.C.).
222 See R. v. Electrical Contractors Association, [1961] O.R. 265, 27 D.L.R. (2d)
193, 131 C.C.C. 145 (C.A.).
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law against a corporation, there still may be good political reasons why one
would not wish to make a corporation criminally responsible. For instance, it
may be obfuscating to make a corporation responsible rather than individual
actors who benefit directly from the criminal behaviour; if one takes the
juristic personality argument too seriously it might serve to hide the fact that
the people who are really behaving anti-socially are not doing so because of
their felt need to please an entity known as a corporation but rather to feather
their own nests while hiding behind a corporate veil. Or, if one believes that
some worthwhile objectives can be attained by imposing criminal responsibil-
ity on corporations, for example specific deterrence or creating a greater em-
phasis on internal discipline in corporations, one would still have to look at
the way a particular corporation is organized to determine whether or not
such desiderata can, in fact, be achieved. Thus, different approaches might be
warranted depending on whether the corporation is seen as (i) a single unit
in which all decisions are made as part of a unitary, rational decision-making
process, (ii) a group of loosely allied decision-making units who discretely
govern a narrow range of topics in which such decisions have to be made
according to prescribed organizational rules, or (iii) a collective in which bar-
gaining takes place between a hierarchy of players, as a result of which deci-
sions emerge on behalf of the total organization. Thus, in the first kind of
organization it might be appropriate to visit criminal responsibility on the
corporation in the same manner as one would impose it on an individual, in-
asmuch as all decisions are made for the juristic person's benefit. In the sec-
ond model postulated this would not be so clear, although a similar argu-
ment might be mounted. In the third category the better argument would
seem to suggest that the individual actors who bargain with each other ought
to be made personally responsible. The picture will be more complicated if,
as is very likely to be true in many cases, the corporation is seen as being
constituted by a combination of these structural models.2-
To state these difficulties is not to resolve them. They are merely raised
in this context because we are making an argument that, in principle, em-
ployers should be criminally prosecuted for their failure to provide adequate
working conditions. It would be wrongful not to recognize that, even if crimi-
nal prosecutions are an appropriate sanction where employers have behaved
in a particular anti-social manner, some employers might on principle not be
appropriate targets for such sanctions.
C. The requirement of a causal connection
This aspect of the criminal law trial presents no greater difficulty in the
occupational health area than it does in any other kind of criminal law case.
Sometimes the relationship between the harm alleged by the victim and the
poor working conditions under which he or she laboured will be easy to
223The notion of these models of organization and what the different structures
might mean from the point of view of the attachment of criminal responsibility has been
taken from a very useful note by Kriesberg, Decision Making Models and the Control of
Corporate Crime (1976), 85 Yale L.J. 1091. We were also greatly aided by an unpub-
lished paper by W. B. Fisse of the Faculty of Law, Adelaide University, The Social Policy
of Corporate Criminal Responsibility.
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establish because the harm will be associated with particular processes or
materials used at the work place. Thus, in Central Asbestos Co. v. Dodd, 24
workers had been diagnosed as having asbestosis, a disease known to be
directly related to the inhalation of asbestos fibres. It was not doubted by the
courts considering this and associated cases that the necessary causal connec-
tion between exposure to asbestos and disease to permit a finding of liability
in tort had been established. The same form of reasoning would apply in a
criminal trial, although the burden of proof would there be different. This lat-
ter aspect might make the task difficult at times for the prosecution as a
matter of fact, but it presents no inherent legal problem. The burden of proof
will usually be discharged by the use of expert scientific opinion. Such opinion
will have to prove the length of time and amount of exposure which is nec-
essary to cause the particular harm done when certain materials or processes
are used in an enterprise. Proof will also have to be given that there was in
fact exposure to the materials or processes beyond the accepted limits. Diffi-
cult though it may be to marshall sufficient proof to discharge the burden im-
posed on the prosecution in certain cases, it will also be noted that such a
debate in open court might be beneficial in its own right, given some of the
objectives set out in this paper.
It is to be noted that the prosecution does not have to prove that a par-
ticular process or material was the only cause of the harm suffered by workers
when a criminal charge is brought in respect of the wrongful use of such pro-
cess or material. If the accused's conduct is a substantial cause of harm this
will establish the necessary nexus to found criminal responsibility. It is the
function of the judge to determine whether the evidence is reasonably capable
of permitting a finding that the accused's conduct was a substantial contribut-
ing factor to the harm. If he or she believes it is, the jury is left to answer
the question of whether or not it was in fact such a contributing factor. 2
The principle that the accused's conduct must not necessarily be the only
cause which inflicted the harm on the victim is very important to us in the
context of this article, because it has as a corollary the rule that the victim's
conduct will not necessarily relieve the accused of criminal responsibility. Thus,
if an argument is made that the victim might have contracted the particular
disease whether or not he or she had worked at the plant in question, it will
not necessarily defeat the prosecution's case.
224 [1973] A.C. 518, [1972] 2 All E.R. 1135 (H.L.). See also Smith v. Central Asbestos
Co., [19721 1 Q.B. 244, [1971] 3 All E.R. 204 (C.A.), a case based on the same fact
situation concerning another plaintiff.
225 See Howard, Australian Criminal Law (2d ed. Melbourne: Law Book Co., 1970)
at 31. See also Morris & Howard, Studies in Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1964); Smithers v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 506, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 321, 34 C.C.C. (2d)
427; R. v. Jordan (1956), 40 Cr. App. R. 152 (C.A.); R. v. Smith, [1959] 2 Q.B. 35, [1959]
2 All E.R. 193, 43 Cr. App. R. 121 (C.-M.A.C.); R. v. Fletcher 1841, in 1 Russell on
Crime, ed. Turner (1 lth ed. London: Stevens & Sons, 1958) at 741. Note also that when
the victim actually dies of the harm allegedly inflicted by the accused, the principle that
cause means "substantial" cause and not "only" cause is made applicable directly by
section 209 of the Criminal Code. As a result of that provision, where the victim would
have died whether or not the accused's conduct had taken place, it will be sufficient for
the accused's conduct to have accelerated the death for it to be considered a cause of that
death.
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In R. v. Smithers the Supreme Court of Canada set out to explain causal
principles. Dickson J., who delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court,
cited a decision of his own:
in which the accused, one Alan Canada, following an argument, struck his brother
lightly on the head with a piece of firewood as a result of which the brother died
some time later without regaining consciousness. The medical evidence showed
that the bony structure of his skull was unusually thin and fragile. The accused on
the advice of counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter and I have never
considered that he was wrong in doing so.- 0
That is, the accused is to take the victim as he or she finds her or him.227
Even if the victim's susceptibility to harm is increased by the victim's
own conduct this will not necessarily relieve the accused of criminal responsi-
bility. Thus, in R. v. Blaue228 the accused had inflicted wounds which would
not have been fatal but for the victim's refusal to accept blood transfusions.
She had so refused because of her religious convictions. It was held that the
accused was guilty of manslaughter because the accused's conduct had sub-
stantially contributed to the victim's death. In this regard note again R. v.
Nicholson229 where, in addition to the accused's blows, the abnormally small
heart of the victim and his suffering of Bright's disease, over-indulgence in
alcohol had contributed to the victim's death. Nonetheless, the accused was
convicted. 23 0
In our context it follows from all this that the mere fact that the disease
is contributed to by the worker's physical make-up or habits, such as smoking
and drinking, would not necessarily defeat a criminal prosecution against an
employer, unless a finding is also made that the intervening cause (smoking
or drinking) made the conditions of employment insignificant as a cause.
Although conceptually the distinction between a substantial contributing cause
and a cause which has no legal significance is one which is difficult to main-
tain, it is the kind of exercise which has been performed in the criminal law
process (and for that matter in tort law) for a very long time. Such judgment-
making is, of course, never logically convincing. It suffices to note here that
the reasoning generally employed in no way makes the establishment of a
causal connection between, say, a particular contaminant on the one hand
and a particular disease on the other, a peculiarly difficult one which would
make the criminal process inapposite for criminal charges brought in respect
of causing the harm of occupational ill-health.m l
226 Smithers, supra note 225, at 331 (D.L.R.), 437-38 (C.C.C.).
227 See also R. v. Nicholson (1926), 47 C.C.C. 113, 59 N.S.R. 323 (N.S.C.A.), in
which the victim had an abnormally small heart and suffered from Bright's disease.
228 [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1411, [1975] 3 All E.R. 446 (C.A.).
229 Supra note 227.
230 See also R. v. Holland (1841), 2 M. & Rob. 351, 174 E.R. 313; Governor Wall's
Case (1802), 28 St. Tr. 51; R. v. Flynn (1867), 16 W.R. 319 (Ir.).
231 The judicial confidence that judges know how to discharge the obligation of dis-
tinguishing between significant legal causes and insignificant ones can be gleaned from
statements such as that offered by Lord Wright in The Oropesa, [1943] P. 32 at 39, 59
T.L.R. 103 at 104, [1943] 1 All E.R. 211 at 215 (C.A.):
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It is also worth noting that, as a consequence of the above principles re-
lating to causation, it follows that medical treatment administered to a victim
which in fact worsens a condition initially caused by the accused's conduct
will not automatically relieve the accused of criminal responsibility. Thus, in
R. v. Jordan232 the English Court of Appeal held that abnormal treatment in
the circumstances which prevailed had intervened between the accused's con-
duct and the death of the victim to such an extent that the accused should have
been acquitted of murder at his trial. But, in that case, the victim had almost
recovered from the accused's blows when the medical treatment which he
received led to a worsening of his condition. The Court of Appeal indicated
that, if the medical treatment had been more acceptable, it might have come
to a different conclusion:
We are disposed to accept it as the law that death resulting from any normal treat-
ment employed to deal with a felonious injury may be regarded as caused by the
felonious injury .... 233
A final point to be made in this section is that, where death ensues as
a result of the accused's conduct, the death must have occurred within a year-
and-a-day of the accused's act in order to permit a criminal prosecution to be
brought.234 This is an anomalous restriction. It has its origin in the compara-
tive state of frailty under which medical science laboured some time ago. It
must have been much more difficult in earlier times than it is now to connect
events with results which occurred at a much later point of time. Arbitrary
and obsolete as this now seems, the requirement has to be met when death is
an ingredient of a charge, as it always is in murder. It does, then, pose a ser-
ious difficulty in the context of this paper. Inasmuch as the infliction of
death results from a series of exposures, the last exposure which can be iden-
tified as accelerating the death of the victim will be the event from which
time can be made to run. This is the effect of section 209 of the Criminal
To break the chain of causation it might be shown that there is something which
I will call ultroneous, something unwarrantable, a new cause which disturbs the
sequence of events, something which can be described as either unreasonable or
extraneous or extrinsic.
It is to labour the obvious to stress that that which is ultroneous or unreasonable to one
judge may very well appear the opposite to another. Cf. the judgment of Haines J. in
Marshall v. Lionel Enterprises, [1972] 2 O.R. 177 at 183, 25 D.L.R. (3d) 141 at 147
(H.C.).
2 3 2 Supra note 225.
233 Id. at 157. See also R. v. Burgess and McKenzie, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 694, [1928] 1
W.W.R. 633, 49 C.C.C. 243 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. McIntyre (1847), 2 Cox C.C. 379; R. v.
Pym (1846), 1 Cox C.C. 339 (where necessary treatment given by competent surgeons
acting competently was held not to be a factor rendering the accused's act not a cause);
R. v. Forester (1886), 20 S.A.L.R. 78 (South Aust.) (where common knowledge and skill
and good faith used in treatment which had, as had the accused's act, significantly con-
tributed to the death, was held to be a non-intervening cause.) Note also that, inasmuch
as death is the subject matter of a criminal charge, s. 208 of the Criminal Code provides:
"Where a person causes to a human being a bodily injury that is of itself of a dangerous
nature and from which death results, he causes the death of that human being notwith-
standing that the immediate cause of death is proper or improper treatment that is applied
in good faith."
234 See s. 210 of the Criminal Code.
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Code which provides that, even though a particular cause merely accelerates
death, previous existing disease or disorder, such acceleration will be con-
sidered a legal cause of death for the purpose of the criminal charge.,2
Thus, in a situation where death arises from the infliction of traumatic injury,
the requirement may not present any insuperable problems. There will, how-
ever, be difficulties where death is due to an occupational disease with a long
incubation period. On occasions it will be possible to argue, even though the
original exposure some twenty years or so before death was a sufficient
cause,2 36 that if the worker continued to work right up until a period of time
less than a year-and-one day before her or his death, any extra exposure just
before retirement was a cause of death. Such an argument would be fraught
with difficulties of proof. And, clearly, the difficulties will become insurmount-
able where the last exposure to the substances or process was, say, some
twenty or thirty years before death. From this it becomes clear that murder,
even where it is otherwise theoretically available, will be a most impractical
charge in the context of occupational health prosecutions.237 The same, how-
ever, is not true in relation to criminal negligence charges because these can
be brought where the harm complained of is grievous bodily harm. Further,
even where the victim dies, death is not an essential ingredient of the crime.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The rather elaborate arguments presented in this article have not been
made either in a spirit of malevolence based on a hatred of all employers,
or to indulge ourselves in the sheer delight that academically-minded people
get from engaging in abstruse, interesting, theoretical exercises. We have,
rather, developed the arguments herein because of our belief that the regula-
tory mechanisms which our society employs at present will never yield any-
thing like the amelioration in health and safety conditions in the workplace
which we would like to see. In particular, the mechanism of the so-called dis-
cipline of the market will not bring us such results. For this conclusion the
proof is in a well-known pudding. Until fairly recently there had been little,
if any, state regulation of health and safety in the workplace. The toll on the
physical well-being of workers was terrible. The argument we probably have
to meet is that the cost in human life which was extracted was acceptable to
workers or at least acceptable in the sense that the market defines that term.
We reject that argument on two grounds. The first is that, as the market has
never operated as the theorists would want it to, it cannot be assumed, there-
fore, that the dreadful state of occupational health and safety which has
persisted was due to a free market operation and therefore represented an
optimal economic adjustment between workers and their employers who had
freely bargained. Second, even if the free market, in the theoretical sense of
235 See also R. v. Dyson, [1908] 2 K.B. 454, [1908-10] All E.R. Rep. 736, 21 Cox
C.C. 669 (C.A.).
2 36 An example of this might be asbestos cases where one short exposure is thought
to be sufficient to induce disease.
237 See text accompanying note 182 supra, where it is argued that s. 212(c) ought
not to be used in the occupational health area and that, thankfully, the year-and-a-day
rule may inhibit such use.
1979]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
that phrase, could actually ever be made to operate in our society, it might well
be that, at any one time, the market conditions would be such that the opti-
mal distribution of costs between employers and employees would require
an even greater disaster for the physical well-being of workers than that
which currently exists or which has previously existed. It is our assertion, ve-
hemently made, that any scheme which could leave thousands, perhaps mil-
lions, of people physically debilitated is not worthy of a civilized society's
support.
If the regulatory mechanism used is the market, as supplemented by state
regulatory schemes, which is what we presently use, let us note that this is
also likely to fail to provide the dramatic relief which we would wish to see.
This pessimistic view is based on the fact that these regulatory schemes have
assumptions built into them about the overriding value of market-oriented
precepts and are, sometimes explicitly and other times implicitly, premised on
the notion that there should be hesitancy and reluctance when interfering with
profit-making enterprises.
We have therefore embarked on this exercise to demonstrate two things:
1. Regulation cannot ever make the work environment as safe as it
should be. But better regulation will be a step forward. Such amelioration is
more likely to occur if regulators can be convinced that failure to upgrade
standards and enforcement will permit critics to claim that they are biased
against workers at the behest of employers. They may be so convinced if it is
shown that the practices of employers are, from the point of view of the law,
criminal in nature. Legislators and administrators are not in a position to
argue that the criminal law should reflect a bias favouring entrepreneurs and
that it should not treat anti-social behaviour, which in other contexts would
be characterized as criminal, as acceptable. In addition, the controversy sur-
rounding the applicability of criminal law to workplace practices will raise a
question as to whether the legal system is neutral in its concept and applica-
tion. The raising of this question will aid the workers' cause.
2. In addition to demonstrating that, as a matter of established law, em-
ployers' behaviour may be so anti-social as to be criminal in nature and
thereby helping, by the sheer force of this conceptual argumentation, to add
to the urgency to find means by which to improve employers' behaviour, we
have also sought to provide practical ways to focus the would-be regulators'
attention on the enormity of the problem. Indeed, it is our argument that
prosecutions ought to be launched in certain kinds of cases because they
would be both useful in a generalistic way and also in the particular cases.
While it is true that the more modern statutory regulatory schemes provide
for controls which could eliminate the more flagrant and repeated violations
of the existing standards, and as success in many of the discussed prosecu-
tions depends on proving violations of established standards over a protracted
period, it may be that few occasions will present themselves in which the crimi-
nal process can be employed. We hope this is true, but we are not sanguine.
First, it is almost inevitable that there will be egregious offenders, that
is, people who, despite knowledge of the standard required by regulation,
despite cautions which may be administered by appropriate inspectorates or
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committees, will continuously endanger their workers. To prosecute such
people will serve as both specific and general deterrence. It will also help to
make the enforcing agencies more aware of their duties.238
Second, as has already been pointed out in the earlier part of this paper,
enforcement mechanisms under the statutory schemes will vary a great deal
in intensity and scope. Inasmuch as they depend on workers' ability to de-
tect dangers and then to do something about their knowledge, the schemes are
far from foolproof. Inasmuch as they depend on the watchfulness of enforce-
ment agencies, they will vary with political will, competence and alertness.
The data available in respect of the success rate to date are not confidence-
inspiring.239 Note further that, whatever their mandate, the enforcement agen-
cies may believe that coaxing is better than enforcement by way of imposing
sanctions.240 A recent example of this is provided by the Canada Metal en-
vironmental case reported in The Globe and Mail.2 41 It was there recorded
that the environmental agency knew very well that there had been many vio-
lations of the standards set by it in respect of lead emission, but that at no
time had the pertinent inspectorate sought to use the full range of sanctions
available to it. It brought a very angry editorial from the newspaper. In our
context, it is a good illustration of the kind of situation which might arise and
in which criminal prosecutions might play a useful role.
Third, there will often be a long gap between the standard-setting in
respect of particular substances or processes and the investigation into the
dangers of the substances or processes.2 42 During that gap, conditions which
are acceptable on the basis of the existing regulatory standards may, in fact,
be seriously suspect because there is sufficient expert opinion available which
suggests that there is a rational basis for believing that such existing standards
do not adequately protect workers. Where there is such a belief it may well
be worthwhile to bring criminal prosecution. For example, if it is known that
the use of certain material or processes is in some degree dangerous and has
already been much more stringently controlled in other countries, might it not
serve a useful purpose to launch a criminal prosecution against an employer
238 A recent instance where an employer allegedly ignored safety regulations is pro-
vided by an item in the Washington Post of Friday, October 27, 1978. It is there reported
that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration imposed the heaviest fine in the
agency's history against N.L. Industries, the nation's largest lead producer. OSHA alleged
that, after it had moved to prescribe acceptable exposure levels of lead in the air following
a long debate with the industry, N.L. Industries had knowingly allowed workers to be
exposed to lead levels that exceeded permissible levels by more than 100 times, and that
on other occasions lead levels regularly exceeded the federal limit by 2-4 times. In this
case the agency itself sought to enforce its regulation. But it took a while for it to do so.
Criminal prosecution might well be warranted in such a case, especially if it can be brought
before serious harm is done to too many workers.
230 See text accompanying notes 21 to 28, supra.
240 See text accompanying notes 29 and 30, supra.
241 Globe and Mail, April 23, 1979.
242 Thus the most recent Ontario statute, The Occupational Health and Safety Act,
S.O. 1978, c. 83, was passed to set up an agency which was to set standards. To date no
standards have been set. Indeed the body to set standards has not yet been created. See
also the discussion of NIOSH and OSHA operations in the first section of the article.
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who continues to use such a material or process in the face of that know-
ledge? If it be argued that it will be difficult to prove criminality in view of
the fact that the same stringent standards have not been set in our society by
our regulatory schemes, it is to be remembered that, for many of the criminal
offences described in this paper, knowledge of danger coupled with an under-
standing of the duty to provide safe working conditions may be sufficient to
attract criminal responsibility. Just as a breach of statute does not necessarily
indicate a breach of the criminal law, compliance with a safety statute does
not necessarily indicate compliance with the criminal law. To wait for the
outcome of long deliberations by an agency which is being bombarded by
lobbyists with very diverse interests may be counterproductive. Consider here
the asbestos situation. The question of the appropriate level of exposure to
asbestos is still being debated vigorously. A scientific controversy still rages
as to whether asbestos causes diseases when it is present in amount x as op-
posed to y. By 1918, the insurance industry in America and Canada, how-
ever, had already decided that the risk of exposure to asbestos was so great
that it could not ignore it for its own profit-making purposes.: Thus, in 1918
American and Canadian life insurance companies refused to insure asbestos
workers.243 Or, consider the incident which occurred at a B.F. Goodrich
Company plant in 1974 in respect of the liver cancer known as angiosarcoma
which results from exposure to vinyl chloride in the plastics industry. In the
outcry which followed the discovery that the prevalence of this disease in
this plant using vinyl chloride vastly exceeded its incidence in the general
population, it was noted that the employers had been aware of a report from
Germany that a very high danger of liver cancer as a result of exposure to
vinyl chloride existed and that this warning was ignored.244 Assuredly, an
argument can be made that, where operations with certain materials and pro-
cesses continue in the face of risks known to be high and severe, it might be
worthwhile launching a criminal prosecution even though an existing standard
is not breached or a standard has not yet been set.
Fourth, the statutory schemes which regulate standards will often be
limited in scope and not cover a great number of people.245 Even where the
statutory schemes purport to cover certain enterprises, the protection will
depend in part for their controlling and monitoring of conditions on the
workers' initiative. This tool will prove to be at its most inefficient in the
243 Hoffman, Mortality from Respiratory Diseases Industry Trades, U.S. Department
of Labour, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 231 (1918) at 178.
244 As reported by Brody, "Vinyl and Chloride Parley Told of Dangers to Workers,"
New York Times, May 11, 1974 at 17, col. 2. Note that one of the governing agencies,
the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health might also have had access to
such a report prior to the investigation which resulted out of the Goodrich incident, but
that OSHA did nothing until that incident hit the headlines.
245 E.g. The Occupational Health and Safety Act, supra note 242, in which people
working on farms, teachers, university faculty, teaching assistants, people working inside
correctional institutions, and patients participating in work programmes in psychiatric,
retardation or rehabilitation facilities are excluded. Much more importantly, the joint
committee programme, which is one of the real means of protecting workers under the
scheme of the Act, does not apply to work places which have less than twenty employees
on a regular basis.
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poorly organized or totally unorganized sectors of the work force, the very
sectors in which the most blatant violations of acceptable standards are likely
to occur.
One strategic difficulty in urging the use of the criminal law in respect
of occupational health problems is that such usage may influence standard-
setters in respect of the kind of minima they will prescribe. That is, they may
be influenced to set standards which can .be met relatively easily by employers,
while leaving serious health and safety problems extant. This might occur
because' of the anxiety such standard-setters will feel about employers being
considered to be akin to common criminals merely because they are in breach
of one of their regulations. But we do not take this pessimistic view. We do
not believe that standard-setters are venal or callous. They truly want the best
possible health and safety conditions for workers within their jurisdiction.
But the term "best possible" indicates that it is not an absolute standard
which they are seeking to set. What they are always looking for is a standard
which keeps the risk of harm down to an "acceptable" level. At present, what
it "acceptable" is very strongly influenced by market conditions. The pre-
vailing understanding of market conditions is frequently based on instinct and
guesses fed by strenuous lobbying from entrepreneurs who, understandably,
resist all changes which might increase their costs. Standard-setters who do
want to have as good a set of health and safety conditions as they can pos-
sibly achieve will be more resistant to these influences and blandishments if
they can be persuaded that the harm inflicted by productive enterprises is, in
its nature, capable of being characterized as harm caused by criminal beha-
viour. Indeed, this is also true of scientists who purport to be neutral when
they are asked to set the level of optimum exposure to various materials and
processes. If they start off with the premise that profit-maximization is of
utmost importance their research will be quite different from what they would
do if they began on a "workers' safety first, profit last," basis. We cannot
elaborate here on the effect that beginning premises (usually inarticulate)
have on scientific research, but merely note that there has been much writing
of a critical and valuable nature in the area.2 46 We believe that to perceive
health and safety at work from the workers' perspective, a belief which may
gain adherents by the use of the criminal process, could lead to better en-
246 There have been those who show how scientific institutions and individuals are
organized in such a way that particular kinds of research only are undertaken. See Ben-
David, The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.:
Prentice-Hall, 1971); de Solla Price, Little Science-Big Science (New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1965); Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971); Ziman, Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Di-
mensions of Science (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968). There have also been those
who have attempted to show the corruption of such scientific research; see Laudan,
Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1977). Then there have been those who have critically argued that science
may be part of ideology and therefore a tool of the dominant class by which to categorize
and use knowledge to its advantage. For instance, see Dickson, Alternative Technology
and the Politics of Technical Change (London: Fontana, 1972); Gorz, ed., The Division
of Labour: The Labour-Process and Class Struggle in Modern Capitalism (Hassocks,
Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976); Young, Science Is Social Relations (1977), 5 Radical Sci.
J. 65.
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forcement of existing conditions and to the promulgation of more exacting
ones. Given the continuation of our present economic system for the fore-
seeable future, our aim is to draw attention to the urgent need for a new
frame of reference when looking after workers' health and safety. Nothing is
more important, and thus the most drastic of measures are completely war-
ranted.
